



Center for Conflict Studies and Cultural Diversity (CSCD)
Prince of Songkla University, Pattani Campus



MEN AND YOUTH IN THAILAND'S CONFLICT - AFFECTED DEEP SOUTH



Center for Conflict Studies and Cultural Diversity [CSCD]

Men and Youth in Thailand's Conflict-Affected Deep South

Men and Youth in Thailand's Conflict-Affected Deep South

Prince of Songkla University, Pattani Campus.

Men and Youth in Thailand's Conflict-Affected Deep South .-- Pattani : University, 2015.

122 page.

1. Thai--Politics and Government. I. title.

320.9593

ISBN 978-616-271-259-3

Men and Youth in Thailand's Conflict-Affected Deep South

Acknowledgments.....	i
Foreword.....	ii
Abbreviations, Glossary and Notes.....	iv
Executive Summary.....	v
Chapter 1: Introduction.....	1
Chapter 2: Study Methodology.....	3
Chapter 3: Background: Conflict and Violence in the Deep South.....	9
Chapter 4: Review of Literature: Men and Youth in Subnational Conflicts.....	15
Chapter 5: Programs of Government Service Providers.....	32
Chapter 6: Qualitative Research Findings.....	34
6.1 Detainees and Former Detainees.....	35
6.2 Men on the State's Watch Lists.....	49
6.3 Young Men Who Have Lost Family Members to the Unrest.....	60
6.4 Youth Indirectly Impacted by the Conflict.....	79
Chapter 7: Conclusion and Policy Recommendations.....	94
References.....	104

Figures

Figure 2-1. Provinces of Patani, Yala, Narathiwat, and Songkhla.....	4
Figure 2-2. Conceptual Framework.....	5
Figure 3-1. Fatalities and Injuries, 2004–14.....	9
Figure 3-2. Monthly Incidents of Violence, 2004–14.....	10
Figure 3-3. Incidents of Violence, 2004–14.....	11
Figure 3-4. Incidents of Violence from 2004 to 2014.....	12
Figure 3-5. Support for Different Models of Government in the South, 2013.....	13
Figure 3-6. National Budget for the Deep South, 2004–14.....	13
Figure 3-7. Serious Problems in the Communities, 2013.....	14
Figure 6-1. Men Charged with Security Offenses.....	36
Figure 6-2. Men on Watch Lists.....	50
Figure 6-3. Men Losing Family Members.....	62
Figure 6-4. Unemployed Youth.....	80

Tables

Table 2-1. Respondents for Data Collection.....	6
Table 6-1. Summary of Help and Support from Service Providers for Detainees and Former Detainees.....	43
Table 6-2. Summary of Help Provided by Service Providers to Men on the Government Watch List.....	57
Table 6-3. Summary of Help and Support from Service Providers for People Who Have Lost Family Members to the Unrest.....	70
Table 6-4. Government's Financial Assistance for Families That Have Lost Members.....	71
Table 6-5. Summary of Help and Support from Service Providers for Youth.....	88

Acknowledgments

This study was supported by the World Bank Umbrella Facilities for Gender Equality (UFGE) and the Korean Trust Fund (KTF), with the aim to close knowledge gaps on the impact of conflict on men and youth, as well as to improve understanding of the socio-economic profile, needs and aspirations of men and youth in conflict zones in southern Thailand. The Center for Conflict Studies and Cultural Diversity (CSCD), Prince of Songkla University, would like to thank the World Bank and in particular the two funds for the opportunity to conduct this study. The study was led by Dr. Srisompob Jitpiromsri and his team comprising Phaison Da-oh, Surawut Chomaitong, Fasol Hayi-awang, Numan Hayimasae, Metta Kuning, Nuchanad Juntavises, Somkiat Pitakkamonporn, and Don Pathan. The research team is grateful for helpful guidance and comments from the Advisory Committee from the Southern Border Province Administrative Centre, the Ministry of Social Development and Human Security, the Mental Health Center Region 12, the Asia Foundation, and the World Bank.

This report is rich in valuable information, especially the qualitative field study section. Additionally, figures 6.1–6.4 provide a summary of the findings as diagrams.

Some of the translations of quotes, especially in the field study section, may appear awkward. This is because the report team wanted to present the respondents' comments as accurately as possible.

Young Men in the South Thailand Insurgency Crisis

What era are we in today?

Some senior Thai citizens identify themselves as “14 October generation” because they were young adults at the time of the 14 October Student uprising in 1973.

Others, who are younger, refer to themselves as observers of the 2004 tsunami in Southern Thailand.

Both the 14 October Uprising and the 2004 Tsunami are considered significant incidents which had an enormous impact, both directly and indirectly, on the feelings and thinking of almost every Thai. These major incidents have had a major influence on the lives, hearts and even identities of the Thai people, even though they were not ongoing for months or years.

Yet when it comes to the insurgency in Thailand’s southernmost provinces, an intractable conflict that has lasted decades, much longer than the two aforementioned incidents, not many Thai people are informed about the rancor, hopelessness and gloomy futures that many young men who live there face. This is even truer for those who live far away in other parts of the country.

Although Thailand has become an information-based society, Thai people do not have the complete story when it comes to the crisis in the southern provinces. The research findings that follow break down perception barriers and focuses on a different side of the story. Countless new items about the daily violence in the southern provinces are reported through various channels including newspapers, TV, and research, so much so that people in general feel overloaded. Although many people are well-informed, there is a lack of fraternity and acknowledgement of the turmoil of incidents occurring in the faraway places.

This research paper takes a refreshing new angle on the crisis. It sets out to identify the perception gaps, or the blind spots in Thai people’s perception, which are an undeniable fact.

The “Men and Youth in Thailand’s Conflict-Affected Deep South” research sheds light on many crucial issues, and I personally have learned the following lessons:

1. The insurgency in the southern border provinces has had an impact on people of all ages and genders. Importantly, the violence has tremendously and unavoidably affected the lives of men, young men, and children, both directly and indirectly.
2. Among the crucial issues is this ironic fact: while it is widely perceived by government officers and the public that young men in the southern border provinces are one of the “risk groups”, Thai society as a whole knows very little about the viewpoints of these young men. Yet, government officers have systematically and seriously kept and continue to keep a watchful eye on them.
3. It is a sad and unpalatable fact that men and young men in the southern border provinces, who want nothing more than to live normal lives just as others in society do, have been monitored and negatively stereotyped by government officers in this climate of constant violence. It is noteworthy that the insecurities felt by these young men are among the unintended consequences of state policies. This research is one step toward better understanding, but it certainly should not be the last. Policy makers have to adjust their paradigm and put more focus on creating mutual understanding, as well as conducting further in-depth research on the issues that have been overlooked.

4. Many people in other parts of Thailand acknowledge the dangers of the southern Thailand insurgency and therefore feel insecure in the face of the violence. The response is to create a surveillance society with CCTVs at every possible corner. Of course, this is one method to try to manage the current insecurity, but the reality is that this method has a highly negative impact on those surveilled and without offering sustainable, long-lasting peace for the country as a whole. Indeed, this response has become an obstacle to reaching reconciliation, which is impossible unless we really care about the problems of others.
5. How can the southern part and Thailand as a whole become peaceful when the real problem threatening human security has not been faced adequately? How can suffering be lessened and hope be imbued in Thai society when we remain complacent to the fact that our current human security situation is exclusive rather than inclusive? We cannot overlook the anger and hopelessness caused by power structures that have been blind to the needs of those excluded from human security, such as the young men from the southern provinces. This “invisible” and unacknowledged structural violence must be seriously considered and is the key to strategic problem solving. Undoubtedly, those in power will need to recognize that lasting peace also means common human security.
6. It is a challenge for Thai society to go beyond the “visible” political conflict in Bangkok and big cities and to focus on changing the power structures that would enable checks and balances of power. The policy in this era of reform, therefore, needs to place more emphasis on a comprehensive and viable peace strategy for the entire country, as well as on building mutual trust between government officers and local people, especially youth in the Southern border provinces. This is because these youth have faced long-standing conflicts, which have huge impacts on their hearts, cultures and security in life.

This significant research study is the first to take overlooked and marginalized young men from southern Thailand into serious consideration. I truly appreciate this work because it puts a focus on the views and experiences of those who have been monitored, giving them a voice that was previously unheard in the public sphere. The research employs various social science methodologies that help readers to better understand the hearts and minds of the overlooked and the suffering. Moreover, the determination to do this work amidst a crisis makes this study and analysis a highly valued exercise.

I sincerely hope that this research will catch the interest of university students and the public, in particular national security policy makers. I also hope that it will help push for serious reviews and improvement of national security policies in the southern border provinces at various levels and in particular the sensitive issues concerning different ethnic groups and political viewpoints.

Professor Surichai Wun' Gaeo
Director, Center for Peace and Conflict Studies
Chulalongkorn University

Abbreviations, Glossary and Notes

Abbreviations

ARMM	Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
CSO	Civil Society Organization
ISOC	Internal Security Operations Command
NGO	Nongovernmental organization
SBPAC	Southern Border Province Administrative Centre

Glossary

Barangay	village
Bilal	person who calls people to Friday prayer at a mosque
Dawah	Islamic practice
Khutbah	sermon based on the Koran
Kitab	Islamic religious book
Mathayom	secondary school
Ponoh/pondok	private religious boarding school
tadika	religious school
ustaz	religious teacher

Notes

Definition of Respondent Groups Interviewed during Field Study

Men directly impacted by the conflict

- Detainees/former detainees refers to men charged with criminal offenses, including those imprisoned during their trials, those out on bail during their trials, and those who are acquitted of wrongdoing.
- Men on the state watch list refers to men of any age monitored by security officers, including those under investigation and those charged with offenses under the Emergency Decree.
- Young men who have lost family members to the unrest refers to young men aged 15–25 years, Buddhist or Muslim, with a family member who died due to a violent action taken by any party involved in the conflict.

Men indirectly impacted by the conflict

Men who have not lost anything as a direct result of the insurgency, but whose way of life have been affected economically and socially.

Unemployed young men/youth

Men aged 15–25 years under the following conditions:

- Unemployed young men who do nothing at all. Most are aged 15–18 years and have not attended school for the past 1–3 years.
- Young men who have dropped out of school and do not have jobs but help with their families' businesses. They can lessen their families' burdens but have no regular income and cannot support themselves.
- Young men who work temporary jobs but have no regular income. They may be employed for a stretch of time and then at other times, might have no work at all for many consecutive months.

Service providers refers to state organizations, nongovernmental development organizations, and civil society organizations that support and assist those who have had both direct and indirect impacts from the unrest in the Deep South.

Executive Summary

The unrest in Thailand's southern border provinces—the Deep South—has dragged on for 10 years. Since 2004, several violent incidents have erupted for a number of reasons, including conflicts over demands to maintain ethnic, religious, and language (dialect) identities. Violent acts have been committed by both antigovernment groups and the Thai military. Disputes over government benefits provided in the region and local politics are complicating factors.

The unrest has taken a toll in human lives—almost 6,000 people have died and 11,000 have been injured. The government has tried to calm the unrest by focusing on security operations, economic development, and quality-of-life improvements for people in the southern border provinces. It has already spent 206,094.400 million Baht trying to reign in the unrest. In 2013, peace talks were initiated with representatives from the insurgent Muslim groups. The first official round of talks took place on February 28, 2013, offering Deep South residents high hopes, but the negotiations have been disrupted by Thailand's internal political problems.

Men, women, and children are affected by the conflict, regardless of their religious faith. Studies on conflict-affected areas and violence-plagued zones, including Thailand's Deep South, have found that men are often the targets of violence because they are viewed as parties to the conflict who are prepared to use violence against the state. Also, for many, it is more acceptable for men than women to be the victims of violence.

According to the qualitative study findings, the close watch that the Thai government keeps on men causes them stress and has fostered mistrust, a sense of injustice, and even feelings of hatred. Young men with no educational or social opportunities and who lack adequate life skills are particularly prone to take up arms against the government. Because these men, mostly youth, belong to a high-risk group, they will be an essential element in resolving the crisis, but they have yet to receive sufficient attention or assistance and the public is not well informed about their situation.

Qualitative Field Study

The qualitative field study focuses on men affected by the unrest in Thailand's three southernmost provinces and assesses the impact of the unrest on individuals, families, and communities in physical, psychological, economic, and social terms. It examines the needs and coping strategies of conflict-affected men and the assistance delivered by organizations and service providers. The findings of the study have led to several recommendations for appropriate approaches to providing assistance and care for the men.

Respondents for the study include men affected by the unrest in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat provinces, divided into two groups:

(1) *Men directly affected by the conflict*, including detainees and former detainees involved in security cases, men on the government watch list, and men who lost family members due to the unrest.

(2) *Men indirectly affected by the conflict*—socially or economically—including the unemployed. This group was further divided based on religion (Buddhist or Muslim), location of home (rural and upland, coastal rubber plantation, or urban zone), and educational background.

Primary data collection comprised 24 focus group discussions with 118 conflict-affected men, individual interviews with 17 conflict-affected men and, representatives of 21 service providers from government, nongovernment, and civic sectors.

Findings

Men Detained in Security Cases

Some men are detained in security cases based on evidence found at crime scenes; others are implicated without any clear evidence. Sixty-one percent of detainees are released on bail; the rest are detained throughout the legal process. Most detainees face charges in several cases, and each case must be fought on its own. It usually takes about one or two years for the court to review a single case so one can spend a long time fighting court battles.

Men detained on security charges face consequences at the individual, family, and community levels. At the individual level, they feel their lives are in danger, especially after charges against them are dropped. Men report problems with freedom, dignity, and the ability to live normal lives after being cleared of charges, and they complain of a loss of their social status and roles. Former detainees are indeed often viewed with suspicion by the community even after charges are dismissed. Detainees and former detainees therefore feel that they are unfairly treated, and they lack confidence in the judicial system.

Families face negative economic impacts while their breadwinners are detained. And as the family income shrinks, legal expenses, including bail, must be met. Family members of detainees and former detainees also experience stress on their relationships with their communities and within their families. Psychological effects are felt in the form of fear, depression, frustration, and hatred toward state government officials, as examples. Addressing these impacts is a critical component to helping conflict-affected men and their families resume normal lives as quickly as possible.

The role of communities and society in delivering care to men involved in security cases is not clearly defined. Many choose to play it safe and only give limited help. Detainees/former detainees and their families struggle to handle the impacts on their own using three approaches: (1) adjusting travel behavior and activities of daily life; (2) finding safe temporary or permanent places to stay; and (3) turning to reliable organizations for help and counseling. Detainees and former detainees usually turn to nongovernmental and civic organizations because they do not trust the government. During the past three years, some conflict-affected men have formed groups and organizations that allow men facing security charges to help one another. With regard to the psychological impacts, conflict-affected people often turn to religion and family for support.

Assistance from organizations provided to men facing security charges comes in two phases. The first phase occurs while the man is involved in legal proceedings; the second begins after he is cleared of charges. During the first phase, there are two types of assistance, each with strengths and weaknesses. The first provides assistance to detainees for legal proceedings under normal procedures; the second involves negotiating. If a detainee opts for the normal procedure, the court might acquit him, but the process is often lengthy, and while underway, the accused is unable to return to a normal life and he incurs major legal expenses. If a detainee opts to negotiate, he is able to return to a normal life more quickly, but he will probably have to admit some guilt. Men who choose to negotiate are often thought to be pro-government.

The second phase involves financial compensation. In response to the government's Southern Border Provincial Administration Centre (SBPAC) special policy, compensation is awarded to former detainees for time spent in detention despite having not committed a crime. But if SBPAC executives decide to change the policy, the payments could discontinue. And government and service providers in other sectors are not yet able to provide assistance to men facing security charges that would hasten their return to normal lives.

Men and Youth on Watch Lists

Most men on the government watch list are religious leaders, teachers and young men from religious schools, and men who have completed their education abroad in Muslim countries. During the first three to four years of the unrest, many people were put on the government watch list. The list was so extensive that it was seen as a blanket measure affecting many people. However, the situation did improve somewhat when, backed by clear information, official operations became more focused and accurate.

At the individual level, the main impacts on the men on the watch list are the *lack of freedom to live a normal life; living in fear; and the fact that, in practice, even if their names have supposedly been removed from the government watch list, they are still being monitored*. The men complain of a loss of social status—especially community and religious leaders. Men also face major economic and social problems when they are first embroiled in security cases; these impacts gradually decrease if they are not prosecuted. The consequences for men facing prosecution are more severe; they find it challenging to participate in public activities while they are under the constant close watch of government officials.

Getting their name removed from the government watch list is a priority for most men. To protect their own safety, the men try to reduce government suspicion by living as openly as possible. If they feel threatened, they remove themselves from the situation or seek protection. For support in dealing with psychological effects, they often turn to religion and to their families.

Civic organizations are key players in delivering assistance to men on the government watch list when issues such as rights violations or the use of violent measures by government officials are involved. In particular, the Muslim Attorney Center has won the trust of men on the government watch list and their families. Other service providers include SBPAC and the Alternative Volunteer Lawyers Network—both have tried to coordinate with relevant agencies to request that the conflict-affected men's names be removed from the government watch list. With regard to remedial actions, service providers have mainly provided compensation to the detained men under SBPAC's special policy. There are no other clear forms of remedial action to curb the feelings among conflict-affected men that they are victims of government abuse.

Young Men Losing Family Members to the Unrest

Many young men (aged 15–25 years) have lost family members—usually their fathers—to the unrest, often as a result of extrajudicial killings by government officials, the Krue Se and Tak Bai incidents, or other incidents related to the insurgency. The young men are Buddhist and Muslim alike. Their families can be divided into two groups: (1) those who receive remedial actions from the government after their losses by extrajudicial killings by government officials are confirmed by three agencies; and (2) those not receiving any remedial action because the family members are suspected of being insurgents.

The most significant consequences to young men who lose family members are psychological, educational, and economic. The experience of a loss of this magnitude at a young age causes profound psychological effects. It is difficult for young survivors to cope with what has happened. Boys need male role models, and when their role models are lost, the impact is enduring. The loss of the family breadwinner creates major economic issues that can spawn other problems. Family members may be forced to live apart from one another and educational opportunities might be lost, which negatively impacts future prospects.

Young men who have lost family members to extrajudicial killings experience the most severe impacts because they do not receive much-needed assistance. Further, the men believe they are treated unfairly, fostering feelings of hatred toward the government. In the face of such contempt, the government finds it difficult to reach out to these young men, and this only feeds their sense of being unfairly treated.

Most of the young men who have lost their fathers, rely mainly on their mothers and other close family members for help. Coping abilities depend on age. A very young person may not understand the extent of their loss, and should be monitored. Young men aged 15 years or older may be better equipped to cope with their situation and might even be able to help other family members.

Help from government agencies has been welcome, but it has been plagued by delays in acquiring the necessary certifications from three government agencies and by the lack of an integrated and updated central database. In addition, the government's follow-up support has been inconsistent due to the limited number of officials available and because some families and communities distrust the government. A number of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have reached out to conflict-affected families, particularly those not receiving government assistance, but their resources are limited. And NGOs cannot reduce the level of dissatisfaction and anti-government sentiment among the conflict-affected families.

Unemployed Young Men

Unemployment among young men in the three southernmost provinces is a major problem. Compared to other parts of Thailand, unemployment rates are quite high. Most unemployed young Muslim men completed primary education at local public schools and attended private religious schools in their communities for their secondary education. Some dropped out of school. Most unemployed young Buddhist men continue their education through the secondary or vocational level.

The main factors that explain the high unemployment rates are: (1) *educational levels are rather low, limiting job opportunities*; and (2) *there is a lack of local jobs* because of the stagnant economy caused by the unrest. Education levels among Muslim young men are somewhat low, partly due to the language barrier—they lack fluency in the Thai language. In addition, educational services in the Deep South—especially at privately-run religious schools—have quality control issues. Most Muslim youth are from poor families with many children, and the religious views of their families limit their opportunities to pursue their studies in a field of their interest. This leads many to lack the motivation to apply themselves to their education. Young Buddhist men tend to remain in the educational system for a longer period of time than do their Muslim peers.

To a lesser degree, the unemployment problem is caused by a shortage of workers with

specialized skills, a lack of confidence in local youth labor by entrepreneurs, limited access to information about empowerment programs and job opportunities, the failure of empowerment programs to equip young men with practical occupational skills, among other factors. Further, many Muslim families have not yet embraced the importance of an education. Further, the ongoing unrest makes the lives of young Muslim men more difficult because they are under surveillance by the security agency.

The employment status of youth is affected by where they live. Young men from poor coastal zones have, on average, much more severe economic problems than youth living elsewhere. There are limited resources to build livelihoods along the coast and scant economic opportunities, quite unlike the farming and urban zones.

To date, government agencies have not identified young men as a main target group for continued support. The government has no clear strategy for the development of young men. Therefore, the men will not receive adequate educational opportunities or acquire needed life skills. Nongovernmental and civic organizations have the potential to empower young people, but their efforts lack a clear development direction because their limited resources will not allow them to sustain their work over the long term. Many organizations have provided livelihood support, but these efforts have been somewhat unsuccessful because they have not been comprehensive. They did not increase knowledge and skills, provide start-up capital, offer marketing assistance, or develop monitoring and evaluation systems.

Impacts Related to Gender

The unrest has affected both men and women, but the public usually sees men as being parties to the conflict. Therefore, when a man is a victim of violence due to arrest, detention, or extrajudicial killing, there is a certain level of public acceptance of it. At the family and community levels, men often experience reduced roles as breadwinners, public participants, and community actors as they try to avoid the intense attention of the authorities. This is particularly true for men being prosecuted in security cases or who are on the government watch list. As a result, they feel they have lost their social status as leaders—something quite important for men in Muslim societies.

As men have kept low profiles, women have had to take on more public roles. They shoulder additional burdens in terms of supporting their families, joining community activities, and engaging in social activities in lieu of male family members. They face pressure within their Muslim communities where the idea of women taking on leading roles is not accepted. Further, it is impossible for women to fully embrace the roles of men. They cannot, for example, serve as male role models to their sons. The adjustments women have made in the unrest-plagued southern border provinces have widespread social implications—many women from conflict-affected families are now engaged in the rehabilitation of other victims and are participating in campaigns to increase public awareness about human rights.

Conclusion

The study presents the types and degree of impacts that men—especially youth—experience as a result of the conflict and violence in Thailand's Deep South. All conflict-affected groups experience grave economic and social consequences, but detainees and former detainees are the most psychologically impacted by their experiences. Men on the government watch list suffer many

of the same psychological problems, but on a lesser scale than detainees and former detainees. Family members of the victims of the conflict also suffer with grief.

The government has poured substantial financial resources into the southern provinces for security, development, and compensation. Government assistance to the affected men and their families is necessary but insufficient for helping to ease the unrest for the following reasons:

- The judicial system in the southern border provinces has failed to win the confidence of the local people and has not set a clear goal of pursuing justice for reconciliation.
- Remedial help has failed to effectively rehabilitate victims or to generate their trust in government.
- Services by various government organizations in the three southernmost provinces are too focused on security matters.
- Distrust is growing between Muslims and Buddhists in the southern border provinces.
- Efforts to improve the quality of life among men, including youth, in these provinces has not been given the priority status it deserves since the role the men play is critical to the unrest.
- Communications regarding the unrest and conflict have failed to adequately spread knowledge and understanding of the situation necessary for real peace-building.

Policy Recommendations

The following recommendations, based on the findings of a qualitative field study, relate to men and youth (men aged 15–25 years) in Thailand's conflict-affected Deep South. Women and girls are also affected by the conflict, however, and while they receive more attention and assistance than their male counterparts, programs targeted at them should continue to be implemented and improved.

1. Strengthen the judicial and legal system with the aim of reconciliation. There should be clear guidelines for the searching, arresting, and questioning of suspects. Improvements should be made to shorten the process in order to reduce the impact on men involved in security cases and their families. Laws should be fairly and equally enforced so local residents can gain confidence in the justice system. Reconciliatory and/or alternative judicial processes should be employed in accordance with existing laws and institutions, particularly the Internal Security Act (Article 21) and the Public Prosecutors Organization Act (Article 21). In addition, there should be mechanisms for providing humanitarian assistance to conflict-affected people carried out by the civil sector or by academic institutions with the participation of representatives from widely accepted local and international human rights organizations known for their neutrality.
2. Improve attitudes of officers. A positive attitude among officials toward local residents should be fostered. The peace process should be viewed favorably by officers and society. Moreover, lessons should be learned together with the conflict-affected people from past efforts—regardless of their level of success—so that improvements can be made and the repeating of mistakes can be avoided.
3. The efficiency of remedial work should be improved. A participatory method should be encouraged and emphasis placed on the emotional rehabilitation and the restoration of

dignity among conflict-affected people. Positive relationships with local residents should be nurtured. Psychosocial programs should be developed and provided to men directly impacted by the conflict, including youth. Existing local social mechanisms should be fostered to play major roles in helping conflict-affected people, including community, religious, and civil society organizations. Affected men and their families should be fully informed of the regulations regarding remedial measures. The public should also be given clear messages. A central database on remedial work that would give involved parties access to information to help target groups in a timely manner should be developed, and there should be effective follow-up efforts. It is important for authorities to provide a remedy to all target groups of conflict-affected people, including families of men lost to the extrajudicial killings, with the aim of reducing dissatisfaction and opposition against authorities, which had the potential of growing into violent resistance.

4. Men, including youth (15–25), should be designated an important target group for support with the aim of improving their quality of life—economically, socially, and educationally.

Economic and social concerns. Integrated vocational training focused on occupations compatible with the men's lifestyles should be provided. Men should be encouraged to become operators of small- or medium-sized enterprises in their communities. Their vocational and entrepreneurial skills should be honed, and they should be given access to capital. Jobs should be created by promoting investments in large businesses that complement local products. Work environments should be proper and in line with local customs. There should be activities for men and youth to improve their self-esteem and connect with others in the community.

Education. Young men should be given opportunities to study in the formal educational system—standard or vocational—for as long as possible. Muslim young men should be encouraged to improve their Thai language skills so that they can read, write, and speak Thai more fluently. This will improve their communication skills, increase their confidence, and help them study more effectively. Young men who are unable to participate in the standard education system should be encouraged to take part in short-term vocational courses more suitable to their needs and circumstances.

5. Affected men and youth should be encouraged to form networks. They could include people from one particular group or from different groups. The networks could provide forums for men to exchange experiences, thoughts, and feelings as they learn to adapt to new circumstances. It could serve as a space for like-minded people to help each other create opportunities for self-development and ultimately for serving others in society.
6. Young men should be encouraged to improve their learning and life skills. Men who increase their learning skills can expand their horizons, feel inspired, and become more motivated. Leadership skills should be promoted through trainings and with creative social and cultural activities. Professional consultants should be available to help the young men cope and adapt to a changing multicultural society.
7. There should be an atmosphere of mutual respect in a multicultural society. Shared learning and understanding should be encouraged between people from different cultures. For example, young people from different groups (e.g., Buddhist and Muslim) should be encouraged to study and take part in activities together, starting in childhood.

There should be areas set aside in neighborhoods for joint activities so that people from different communities can share knowledge about religion and culture. The aim is to allow people with differing views to be part of the same community.

Assistance in Thailand's Deep South should be delivered in a way that seeks to avoid causing a further rift between Buddhists and Muslims. The situation is fragile and sensitive. Buddhist youth feel that government agencies and other organizations have unfairly focused on Muslim youth, leaving them with fewer opportunities.

8. Communities should be improved and strengthened so that they become areas of trust and care for conflict-affected people. In every community, there should be an area for learning and a channel for communicating. Training sessions about the law, legal processes, and human rights should be provided. Also, the state and community should develop joint strategies regarding the comprehensive care of orphans.
9. Communications should be aimed at increasing knowledge and understanding with the ultimate goal of bringing about peace; they should not seek to create division or to be negative. They should be carefully drafted and fact-checked, especially if they contain sensitive material. There should be a balance of positive news as well, including for example, stories about local culture and identity and messages of social and cultural diversity. Accurate information about the procedures of the judiciary should be distributed. News coverage should include the progress of the civil society movement, which could encourage an atmosphere of peace-building and nonviolent problem-solving. Efforts should be aimed at creating an environment that is conducive to peace.

This report seeks to narrow the knowledge gap about how armed conflict impacts men in southern Thailand. Literature on conflict-affected men in other countries is reviewed; the consequences for men are examined; and coping strategies, mechanisms, and solutions are suggested.

The violence in southern Thailand is described by local researchers as “volatile, confusing, and complex.” The conflict is an ethnic separatist insurgency, operating primarily out of the Malay Pattani region, which comprises the four southernmost provinces of Thailand. The former Sultanate of Patani was conquered by the Thais in 1785 and has been governed by them ever since. Although low-level separatist violence had occurred in the region for decades, the campaign escalated in 2004, even spilling over into other provinces. After a decade of violence, the end of the conflict is still nowhere in sight. The political nature of the conflict was acknowledged for the first time in 2012, and a new security policy included the following language:

“identified decentralization and dialogue with militants as components of a resolution. But fulfilling this policy demands that Thai leaders depoliticize the South issue, engage with civil society, build a consensus on devolving political power and accelerate efforts toward dialogue.” (Crisis Group Asia 2012)

In 2007–09, in response to a request from the Royal Thai government, the World Bank provided support for a conflict study and a gender needs assessment. Findings from these studies were used to design the Pilot Community Approaches in Conflict Affected Areas in the Three Southernmost Provinces project, which was implemented by the World Bank and Local Development Institute in 2009–13. One of the activities, a participatory project, provided technical and financial assistance to community groups through two windows: community-driven development and small grants for civil society organizations. The assistance benefited numerous women’s groups.

During the implementation of the project, it became apparent that it would be more difficult to reach men than women. It is a struggle for men—especially youth—to participate and benefit from development assistance in these communities. Unlike the women, men under investigation or involved in security cases are usually under close watch by the security agency and cannot form groups to get access to economic opportunities or to voice their opinions on issues at community meetings.

More men than women have become fatal victims of the armed conflict in southern Thailand. In 2014, Deep South Watch reported that fatalities from January 2004 to April 2014 comprised 459 females and 5,212 males—91.9 percent of the people killed were men (Deep South Watch 2014).

Men in the south are unable to play active roles in public life or in social and economic activities. Many are afraid to leave their homes or villages, resulting in a significant reduction of income for their families. Large numbers of young men have migrated from the southern provinces to work in Malaysia, in part because of the restrictions, but also because their incomplete education from Thai state schools has kept them from obtaining a Thai education certificate, required for entering into the labor market in Thailand.

The focus on women in gender studies has begun to increase awareness and improve programs for women in varying circumstances, including armed conflict situations. The impact of armed conflict on men is not as well understood. International organizations are starting to focus on civilian men—including youth—in conflict-affected areas. They want a better understanding of how these vulnerable groups are being impacted

by armed conflict; their needs; the challenges they face; and the most appropriate ways to engage them in rebuilding their lives, families, and communities. Thai government agencies, including the military and national security agency, have provided assistance to these groups through skills training and income-generating activities, as examples. Thus far, the government's policy and development programs have been driven mostly by security interests and without sufficient attention being given to the profiles, aspirations, fears, and needs of the men.

To conduct this study, the World Bank has partnered with key government agencies, including the Southern Border Province Administrative Centre (SBPAC), the Ministry of Labor, and the National Economic and Social Development Board, as well as academic institutions, including the Prince of Songkhla University. It seeks to narrow the knowledge gap about how armed conflict impacts men in southern Thailand and how to best reach them. The findings and recommendations are provided to facilitate a policy dialogue among the relevant line ministries at SBPAC.

The report is divided into the following sections:

Chapter 2 presents the study's methodology and describes the detailed review of nationally and internationally published literature and the qualitative fieldwork undertaken in southern Thailand. The fieldwork provides information about the study areas, the various research groups involved, the people interviewed (names of respondents are withheld), and research tools.

Chapter 3 provides a background on the conflict and violence in southern Thailand and explores the human cost of the insurgency.

Chapter 4 is a review of available international literature on the impact of armed conflict on men, including youth, at the subnational level.

Chapter 5 presents information about government agencies and the services they provide for conflict-affected people—especially young men—in southern Thailand.

Chapter 6 describes the findings of the qualitative fieldwork in southern Thailand. An analysis is provided of the results of the focus group discussions with men, including youth, and in-depth interviews with young men who directly suffered as a result of the conflict, men who were indirectly impacted by the conflict, and service providers.

Chapter 7 offers recommendations applicable to the situation in southern Thailand, including approaches used by national and international groups to minimize armed conflict and reach out to men as well as to government agencies and local law enforcement officers. Key relevant recommendations from the study findings are provided to help the government more constructively engage and support this high-risk group and build consensus for a way forward.

The report has three main sections: (1) background on the conflict in Thailand's southern border provinces (Deep South), (2) a review of the literature on men and youth in subnational conflict situations, and (3) a qualitative field study. Several groups of consultants produced the different sections of the report; they are identified at the beginning of each chapter.

Conflict in Southern Thailand

An overview of the conflict in the Deep South provides a backdrop for this report. The phases of conflict, incidences of violence, and statistical analyses of the conflict's impact on people and the region are examined. This study seeks to unravel the "volatile, confusing, and complex" nature of what is happening in southern Thailand. The field study complements the national review by focusing on the impacts on people directly or indirectly affected by the armed conflict.

Literature Review

The literature review examines nationally or internationally published studies that address the issue of men and youth in subnational conflicts. Twenty-three documents were reviewed—the work of international organizations and academics exploring gender issues in conflict-affected areas. This review considers four interrelated issues: (1) causes of the conflict, (2) how violence impacts men and youth in conflict-affected areas, (3) coping strategies and mechanisms, and (4) recommendations based on cases from other areas. Researchers are growing increasingly aware of the need to include a focus on the role of men in peace and conflict studies.

Qualitative Field Study

The study used qualitative research from first-hand data collected through in-depth interviews with focus groups and individuals. Interviews were semi-structured and used open-ended questions.

The rest of this chapter describes the research methodology and tools, field data collection techniques, and data analysis.

Area of Study

This study covered the area of four southern border provinces—Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and Songkhla—located in the districts of Chana, Thepha, Na Thawi, and Saba Yoi (Figure 2-1)


Methodology

Respondents were divided into three groups: (1) adult men and young men aged 15–25 years (youth) directly affected by the conflict, (2) adult men and youth indirectly affected by the conflict, and (3) service providers.

Men and youth *directly* affected by the conflict include detainees and former detainees, men on the government watch list, and young men (aged 15–25 years) who have lost family members to the conflict.

Men and youth *indirectly* affected by the conflict include unemployed men, classified according to their religion (Buddhism or Muslim), settlement (rural mountain or lowland, coastal area, and urban community), and education level (private religious school/pondok, education abroad in Muslim countries, and university education).

Figure 2-1. Provinces of Patani, Yala, Narathiwat, and Songkhla



Source: Google Maps

The causes of the conflict and its impact on individuals, families, and communities are examined, including physical and mental health, livelihoods, local economies, and social relationships. The coping strategies of men, their families, and their communities are explored and their needs are identified.


It is vital that the support provided by agencies and organizations to conflict-affected people reflect their needs. An analysis of support given by service providers should be undertaken to assess its adequacy and relevance to its target groups. This analysis could help identify gaps in services to men, including youth, stimulating short, medium, and long-term policy recommendations for all relevant agencies and stakeholders. See Figure 2-2 for a visual representation of the study's potential framework.

Population and Sample Group

The population and sample groups for this study were men in Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and Songkhla, including youth, whose lives have been impacted by the legal system and who have received assistance from service providers. A more detailed description follows:

1. *Men directly impacted by the conflict:*
 - a. Detainees/former detainees charged under the criminal code, including men imprisoned during trial, out on bail, or acquitted.
 - b. Men on the government security agency watch list, including those who have been interrogated or held under the Emergency Decree.
 - c. Young men aged 15–25 years, Buddhist and Muslim, who lost a family member to the conflict.

Figure 2-2. Conceptual Framework



2. *Men indirectly impacted by the conflict* have not suffered the loss of or injury to a family member, they have not lost property, and they have not been directly involved in security cases, but they have still experienced economic and social impacts.

Unemployed young men (aged 15–25 years) include:

- Totally unemployed youth who are idle; usually aged 15–18 years and out of school for 1–3 years.
- Young men who have left school but cannot find work other than with their family's business; this relieves family burdens, but youth do not receive adequate or steady incomes.
- Young men with part-time work, without steady incomes and with occasional periods of unemployment lasting months with no incomes whatsoever.

3. Service providers are workers from government agencies, private development organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) who provide direct and indirect support and assistance to conflict-affected people in Thailand's southern provinces.

Data Collection Target Groups

The number of respondents for data collection is shown in Table 2-1. Information was collected in focus group discussions and in-depth interviews. There were 24 focus group discussions with a total of 118 participants. Individual in-depth interviews were held with 17 participants. For the service providers, 20 agencies/organizations participated in in-depth interviews, including 31 participants from government agencies, private development organizations, and the private sector. Focus group discussions were conducted for the four subgroups of conflict-affected individuals, five or six participants per group. Supplemental in-depth interviews were held with groups of two or three participants. In-depth interviews were conducted with service providers. See Table 2-1 for more detailed information about the respondents, including where they live.

Table 2-1. Respondents for Data Collection

AREA TARGET GROUP	Pattani		Yala		Narathiwat		Total	
	Focus group discussion	In-depth interview (person)	Focus group discussion	In-depth interview (person)	Focus group discussion	In-depth interview (person)	Focus group discussion	In-depth interview (person)
Directly affected men								
Former detainee	2	1	1	1	2	3	5	5
Watch list	2	1				4	2	5
Young men who lost family members	2 (1*+1)		2		1		5	
Mothers of young men who lost family members				4 (1*+3)				4
Indirectly affected young men								
Unemployed young men	4		2 (1*+1)	1	3 (1*+2)		9	1
Young men educated abroad in Muslim countries	1	1				1	1	2
University students	1		1				2	
Total							24	17

*indicates Buddhist target groups.

Research Tools

Semi-structured interviews are a set of broadly prepared questions for focus group discussions and in-depth interviews that allow for expanded discussions, making data more complete. The interview questions covered the parameters and objectives of this study, were open-ended, and were reviewed for validity of content and clarity of language. Questions were divided into four sets:

Set 1—Questions for a detainee/former detainee or young man who lost a family member to the conflict:

1. What are the impacts from being arrested/tried? How do the conflict-affected men manage and cope with the impacts?
 - How do the events affect your body and mind?
 - Can you continue to work as normal? Are things different than before? How? Why? How does it affect you? Is there a change in your income or debt? How?
 - What impacts have been felt on your way of life after the incident, your religious activities, your role in the community/district, your participation in social activities in your community, your relationship with neighbors and people in the community, and your acceptance from the people in the community. (For youth in school, questions concerning impacts in school are pursued. For

unemployed youth, questions are asked about the impact on unemployment.)

- How do you feel after having gone through the incident? What is your state of mind? Why?
 - How do you cope/deal with the impacts mentioned above?
2. What is the impact on your family? How do you deal with the impact?
 3. Who do you trust or go to for advice or assistance?
 4. Has the help that you received after your trial been adequate and relevant to the needs of the conflict-affected? How so?
 5. What assistance/support do the conflict-affected need?
 6. Do you want to share any other opinions or suggestions?

Set 2—Questions for an unemployed male youth:

1. What are the lives and education like among unemployed male youth? (For participants educated in countries the Office of the Civil Service Commission (OCSC) does not recognize, there are questions about further education) Do you know beforehand whether the courses or schools are recognized by the OCSC? If so, why do you choose to go there? Does working in an occupation unrelated to your education impact you? How?
2. Does the conflict in the three southern border provinces affect unemployment?
3. To what extent do unemployed youth have access to learning to assist gaining employment?
4. How are unemployed youth helped?
5. What kind of help or support do unemployed youth need?

Set 3—Questions for a service provider:

1. How does your agency or organization help or support the men and youth affected by the conflict?
2. What are your agency's means and methods for providing support (short-term or long term project, ongoing or occasional activities, as examples)? What is the annual budget for the support/project?
3. What is your agency or organization's target group for receiving support? What issues do each target group have and what do they need? How does your agency provide support and assistance?
4. Do you think the support and assistance your agency or organization provides is relevant and suitable to the target group's needs? How? Why? Is it adequate? How? Why?
5. What difficulties or challenges does your agency or organization face in helping the target group/s? How could your work be improved?

Set 4—Questions for a community, local, or religious leader:

1. How do local people feel about detainees and former detainees, men questioned under the Emergency Decree, and young men (aged 15–25 years) who have lost family members to the conflict?
2. Do the roles and participation levels of the detainees and former detainees, men questioned under the Emergency Decree, and young men who have lost family members to the conflict changed? How? Why?
3. Does the community take any part in caring for the detainees and former detainees, men questioned under the Emergency Decree, and young men who have lost family members to the conflict? How?
4. Is there an agency or organization that provides assistance to detainees and former detainees, men questioned under the Emergency Decree, and young men who have lost family members to the conflict? Does it improve the life of detainees and former detainees, men questioned under the Emergency Decree, and young men who have lost family members to the conflict? How?
5. Does having detainees and former detainees, men questioned under the Emergency Decree, and young men who have lost family members to the conflict in the neighborhood affect the community overall? How? How does the community cope with any impacts?

Data Collection Procedures

The interviews were conducted under ethical research standards, using notebooks, small recording devices, and cameras to record the interviews. Before questioning began, the researcher informed the participants of the study's objectives and asked for permission to record the interview. The subjects could freely share their opinions and engage in verbal exchanges with the researcher. Interviews were usually 1.5–2.5 hours. An interview was over when there were no new issues or information to discuss or when the subject appeared tired. The interviews were transcribed word-for-word and verified for completeness. Missing information was collected at subsequent interviews.

Researchers fostered relationships of trust with the participants by introducing themselves and outlining the objectives of the interview. This allowed participants to give informed consent after understanding the study's benefits as well as its confidential nature.

Participants were made to feel comfortable during the interviews so that they did not feel under pressure and were able to share valid information. A trusted third person was invited into the conversation, making subjects more inclined to share information because they felt more confident about speaking. Interviews required leading questions at first. Sometimes, a subject had to be interviewed a number of times before trust was established.


After the interviews, the collected data was given back to the subject for verification. This was a safeguard against bias or misperceptions of the research, and ensured the completeness of data.

Background: Conflict and Violence in the Deep South¹

The Insurgency

The violence and conflict in Thailand's southern border provinces (Deep South) is an ethnic separatist insurgency rooted predominantly in the Malay Pattani region, which comprises the four southernmost provinces of Thailand—Pattani, Narathiwat, and Yala—and four districts in southeastern Songkhla province: Chana, Na Thawi, Saba Yoi, and Thepa, where most of the population is Muslim. The former Sultanate of Patani was conquered by the Thais in 1785, and it has been governed by them ever since. Low-level separatist violence has occurred in the region for decades, but the campaign escalated in 2004, occasionally spilling over into other provinces.

Figure 3-1. Fatalities and Injuries, 2004–14



Central to the conflict is identity politics, which is the claim to power by a particular identity—national, clan, religious, or linguistic. For years, the Thai state had drastically rearranged and transformed Pattani's elite and political structures, particularly the governance, Islamic education and legal systems, to be more secular and Thai-oriented. The escalation of violence in the Deep South is similar to conflicts in other countries between a centralized state and a resistance movement that represents the interests and grievances of an ethnic minority—the multifaceted state-minority conflict. The Deep South conflict also shares major characteristics with subnational conflicts—armed conflicts for control of subnational territories. In this type of violent conflict, one or more armed resistant movements use violence to try to oust the contesting political authority and replace the lack of state legitimacy with self-rule governance (Burke, Tweedie, and Poocharoen 2013, 3).

Successive governments, beginning with that of Thaksin Shinawatra (2001–06), have been unable to control the insurgency in the Deep South. Abhisit Vejjajiva, Democrat Party leader, came to office in December 2008, pledging to make a resolution to the conflict a priority, but he was unable to keep the violence in check. In July 2011, the Thaksin-aligned Pheu Thai party (PTP)-led government came to office, with Mr. Thaksin's sister, Yingluck Shinawatra, serving as prime minister. She had not been vocal about the southern provinces early in her administration, but in February 2013, she made a surprise announcement of the beginning of a peace dialogue with key political representatives from the Deep South. Since August 2014, after ousting Ms. Yingluck's government, the former army Chief Prayuth Chan-ocha has been serving as prime minister. It is not yet known how this will affect the Deep South.

The following sections examine the impacts of the fatalities and injuries stemming from the conflict, followed by analyses of the different phases of the conflict that demonstrate an action-reaction sequence and that appear to have a relationship to the policies of the various administrations.

¹ This section borrows language and figures from the report, "An Inconvenient Truth about Deep South Violent Conflict: A Decade of Chaotic, Constrained Realities and Uncertain Resolution" (Jitpiromsri, 2014).

The Insurgency's Human Cost

The most recent statistics regarding the unrest in Thailand's Deep South for January 2004 – April 2014 show that there were a total of 14,128 violent incidents and 17,005 deaths and injuries (see Figure 3-1). Most of the 6,097 people who died were Muslim—3,583 people (58.55 percent); 2,359 of the people who died were Buddhist (38.69 percent). Among the 10,908 people injured, most were Buddhist—6,462 individuals or 59.24 percent; 3,475 people or 31.86 percent were Muslim. Fatality and injuries were higher in July 2007, resulting from the large-scale military crackdown on the unrest after the military coup of September 2006.

The period after the coup led to the severe surround-and-search operations enforced under the provisions of martial law and the Emergency Decree initiated in 2005. In addition, more than 4,000 people were detained, most of whom were then released soon after. Consequently the insurgents altered their operational tactics toward a focus on specific targets—civilian and military. This gave rise to a higher casualty rate but fewer incidents of violence—sometimes referred to as “qualitative violence” (Jitpiromsri 2010).

After 2007, the number of violent attacks decreased, but there were more deaths and injuries per incident (see Figure 3-2). Patterns of violence clearly show that while the rate of violent incidents varies significantly from month to month, the death and injury rate has been growing since late 2007 (Jitpiromsri and McCargo 2010). This implies that the broad use of a security-military approach to solve this complex political conflict may be creating both positive and negative effects. And the adverse effects of the military-oriented approach in the Deep South are massive when the number of family members who have been affected is considered: 30,435 family members of the deceased and 54,540 family members of the injured for a total of 85,025 impacted individuals.


Phases of Conflict

There have been three phases to the Deep South conflict situation since 2004: Phase 1, 2004–07; Phase 2, 2008–11, and Phase 3, 2012 to present.

The early years of escalated violence (phase 1) were marked with suppression, resistance, and the vigorous enforcement of state order. These efforts were unsuccessful and resulted in dramatically high levels of violence. Phase 2 interventions, including a stronger mobilization policy with 60,000 forces pouring into the region; de-escalatory measures such as the “politics lead military” approach; and special economic development programs,

led to a significant decrease in the number of violent incidents. However, this phase also saw the introduction of “qualitative violence”—incidents of violence at a relatively lower level but that result in a constant fatality and injury rate. The conflict in the phase 3 years of 2012–14 became increasingly dynamic, with numerous conspicuous violent incidents as well as apparent signs for a peaceful solution. See Figure 3-3 for incidences of violence from 2004–14.

Figure 3-2. Monthly Incidents of Violence, 2004–14



Phase 1: 2004–07

During the four years from January 2004 to December 2007, the unrest increased dramatically. Two incidents sparked the escalation. The first was in April 2004 when Muslim militants attacked police outposts, resulting in the assault and killing of 32 Muslim gunmen at Krue Se Mosque by the Thai military. The second was the Tak Bai incident in October 2004 when 78 Muslim men died of suffocation in the back of military trucks.

Patterns of violent incidents were characterized by multiple and coordinated attacks. For example, in June 2006, there were simultaneous attacks by militants in 54 locations in all four provinces of the

Deep South, most of which involved improvised explosive devices aimed at creating disturbances in numerous target areas. In August 2006, disturbances occurred in more than 122 locations in the four Deep South provinces at approximately the same time, including bombings, arson, puncture nail scatterings, and tire-burnings. In September 2006, there were bombings of residential and tourist areas at seven spots in the center of Songkhla province's Hat Yai City, resulting in five deaths and more than 60 injuries. The average number of incidents of violence per month was 160.47.

Phase 2: 2008–11


There were signs that the conflict was de-escalating after the Thai government modified its policies toward the Deep South in the second half of 2007. Incidents of violence decreased significantly. However, while de-escalatory measures that involved the use of military force impacted the frequency and number of incidents of unrest, they had no significant effect on monthly death toll and injury rates (Jitpiromsri 2011).² From January 2008 to April 2014, the average number of violent incidents per month was about 84.53 compared with 160.47 during the first phase. This suggests that the “politics leads military” (*kanmuang nam kantahan*) policy of making structural political changes and reforms to solve problems over the long run has had at least some positive effects.

The government, particularly the military, achieved some tactical success suppressing the insurgency and maintaining peace. The number of incidents of unrest declined after late 2007. However, the economic development policy and civil affairs activities, major components of the structural policy adjustments to enhance military operations, failed to achieve their intended goals, particularly in regard to socioeconomic development (Jitpiromsri and McCargo 2010). Many of the chronic structural problems endure.

Phase 3: 2012–Present

After 2011, there were signs of policy changes. Initially, the Yingluck government had not been vocal about the Deep South. But in February 2013, the government made the surprising announcement that it was beginning a peace dialogue with key political representatives from the southern provinces. It approved


Figure 3-3. Incidents of Violence from 2004 to 2014



² For a more thorough review of the patterns of violence, see the ICG report, “Thailand: The Evolving Conflict in the South” (ICG 2012).

a new policy, the Administration and Development of the Southern Border Provinces, 2012–14—drafted and settled by the National Security Council during the Prachathipat-led government (Jitpiomsri 2013). Among the nine objectives articulated in the new policy, it clearly states that the government will attempt to create appropriate circumstances conducive to dialogue in order to end the conflict and ensure the participation of all concerned parties in the peace-building process. The peace dialogue has been spurred on by the Kuala Lumpur's Peace Initiatives that began on February 28, 2013.

Figure 3-4. Incidents of Violence from 2004 to 2014



Many high-profile violent operations took place in 2012, which may have prompted the government to launch the peace process in 2013. The violent incidents included the following: in March, insurgents staged the most deadly coordinated attacks in years, killing 14 people and injuring more than 100 using car bombs to target shoppers in Yala province and a high-rise hotel frequented by foreign tourists in Songkhla province; in July, there was an attack on the Ban Ba Ngo School in Mayo district; in November, there was the murder of Imam Abdullateh Todir and a subsequent spike in violence; and in February 2013, there was a bombing at the entrance of the Batu Mitrapap 66 School in Bacho district (Pathan 2014b).

The Thai National Security Council and the Barisan Revolusi Nasional, one of the main separatist movement groups, agreed to a 40-day ceasefire during Ramadan in 2014. This resulted in fewer insurgency-related deaths since the outbreak of violence in 2004, particularly in July 2013. However, the peace broke down when both parties apparently withdraw from the agreement, and this led to an escalation of violence in August (Jitpiomsri and Engvall 2013). The violent patterns of 2013 that took place while the conflicting sides were engaged in a peace dialogue changed to a focus on hard targets, the military, the police, and the paramilitary. During the peace talks, the Thai authorities had asked Barisan Revolusi Nasional to refrain from attacking civilians and economic interests in towns (Jitpiomsri and Panjor 2013). But in early 2014, after the peace talks had stalled, the attack trends shifted back to soft targets, civilians, and ordinary people (see Figure 3-4).

Political versus Military Approach

The higher overall human casualty rate during 2004–07 demonstrates that the outright use of a security-military approach to solve the complex political conflict in the Deep South is clearly not the answer. In recent years, counter-balancing forces have been developing, encompassing the “politics-led military” approach of government agencies, human rights movement, growth and strengthening capacity of civil society organizations (CSOs), and peace process initiatives.³ For security officials on the ground, their 10+ years of experience makes it clear—security reforms and a political approach should form the central strategy for the Deep South. Political solutions coupled with security reforms are the keys to gradually improving the volatile situation. Political dialogue and decentralization are critical to a political approach, enhancing its legitimacy. A crucial component of security reform is effective coordination between civilian and military agencies within the security administration. Another workable approach is a managed process for moving toward more professional and accountable security arrangements (Jitpiomsri 2013).

³ For details on the security and political measures developed by the different governments, see “Thailand: The Evolving Conflict in the South,” (ICG 2012).

The most critical factor for improving the stability of the situation and de-escalating the level of violence since 2011 was the peace dialogue initiated in 2013. The dynamic of these talks—organized by government agencies and civil society groups from within and outside the Deep South—widened the space to discuss contested political issues related to the region (IPP 2014). The process also produced a constructive atmosphere for peaceful conflict resolution (IPP 2014). In the end, given the number of lives that have been lost to this terrible insurgency, it is fair to say that any peace process is better than no peace process (McCargo 2014). Nevertheless, the Thai government and the Barisan Revolusi Nasional failed to maintain the ceasefire for the agreed-to initial 40-day period (Jitpiomsri and Engvall 2013).

The widening space for public deliberation has also led to the formation and expansion of civil society network organizations in the Deep South, which started emerging in 2010. CSOs have engaged in dialogues and consultations with local people. They understand well the appropriate models of governance based on local demands and the public

deliberations that took place during the campaign of approximately 200 local community forums in 2012–13. The public discussions revealed that local people have a strong orientation toward the self-governance model of administration to help support conflict resolution—51.8 percent of respondents preferred an elected governor to the current appointment system (Panjor 2013).⁴ The data is corroborated by the attitude survey conducted in 2013 by Prince of Songkhla University at Pattani (see Figure 3-5), which found that 55 percent of the 1,870 respondents were in favor of a special form of decentralization in the Patani region, and only 14 percent were opposed to it (Jitpiomsri et al. 2013).

Despite the challenges and internal difficulties, the Malaysian initiative made considerable progress compared to the previous closed-door talks (McCargo 2014). Moreover, the open-space policy is paralleled with a growing movement among local civil society voicing their support for the three rounds of peace talks in Malaysia (Ropers 2013a; 2013b). Compared to a March 2013 survey by Prince of Songkhla University, the June 2013 survey demonstrated an increasing number of local people—from 67 to 77 percent—were in favor of and had confidence in the peace process (CSCD 2013a).

Figure 3-5. Support for Different Models of Government in the South, 2013





Figure 3-6. National Budget for the Deep South, 2004–14



⁴ The variations of proposed models for autonomy of the Deep South provinces can be seen in "Autonomy for Southern Thailand: Thanking the Unthinkable?" (McCargo 2010).

Government Expenditures in the Deep South


Under the "politics lead military" approach in the Deep South, the government's emphasis has been on economic development and special development plans for the southern provinces, including substantial expenditures on numerous projects aimed at raising income levels and standards of living, fostering an economic revival, encouraging investment, and connecting the economy to neighboring countries. The Southern Border Province Administrative Centre (SBPAC) is the main source for mobilization and coordination. For over 10 years, much of the government budget spent in the Deep South region was for coping with the immediate and ongoing emergencies (see Figure 3-6). The national budget for "problem solution and development of the southernmost provinces" for 2004–14 reached 206,094.440 million Baht, a considerable sum.⁵ The peak year for budget mobilization was 2009—27,144.91 million Baht—two years after the large-scale crackdown on the Deep South insurgency and the subsequent decreased level of violence. Counter-insurgency wars are costly.

The second largest amount budgeted was for 2014 spending—24,152.39 million Baht, which followed the lengthy peace and dialogue policy process led by SBPAC.

However, economic development policies, civil affairs activities, and enhanced military operations are insufficient to cope with the adverse effects of insurgencies. Studies in 2010 show there was a great need for state assistance, and short-term efforts such as the 4,500 Baht employment project and the Graduate Volunteer program as well as development of infrastructure and transportation were positively received. But these efforts had little impact in terms of income distribution or poverty reduction. State projects still lack capacity building and the area's economic development potential remains unrealized.

One serious indicator of social problems is illicit drug use. Abuse of illicit drugs has been widespread in the region for years, reflecting failures in socioeconomic development, such as youth unemployment (Jitpiromsri and McCargo 2010). Despite the increase in economic development programs since 2004, economic inequalities still pose a serious problem. This is borne out by the most recent opinion survey of local people by Prince of Songkhla University, which indicates that the most serious problems facing the communities are the difficulties surrounding illicit drug and substance use, unemployment, the insurgency, and poverty (see Figure 3-7) (CSCD 2013b).

Figure 3 7. Serious Problems in the Communities, 2013



⁵ The budget expenditure statistics do not include the salaries of public employees. Data was provided by the Bureau of the Budget, 2014.

Review of Literature: Men and Youth in Subnational Conflicts⁶

This literature review examines the existing literature that addresses the issue of adult men and young men—aged 15–25 years (men and youth) in subnational conflicts. Twenty-three documents were reviewed—the work of international organizations and academics exploring gender issues in conflict-affected areas. This review considers four interrelated issues: (1) causes of the conflict, (2) how violence impacts men and youth in conflict-affected areas, (3) coping strategies and mechanisms, and (4) recommendations based on cases from other areas.

There is only a limited amount of literature available about how conflicts and insurgencies affect men and youth. Further, there is a tendency to draw simplistic connections between problems, such as unemployment and violence, while largely overlooking gender issues. In the past, society portrayed women as inherently peaceful and men as aggressive warriors. But there is now a growing understanding among researchers that there is a need to move away from “masculinist underpinnings” in peace and conflict studies in order to reveal and understand the gender of violence. But the move toward a more gender-sensitive approach is still a work in progress.

The current insurgent wave in Thailand’s Deep South that reemerged in January 2004 after a decade of relative quiet has already claimed almost 6,000 lives, with no end to the violence in sight. More than 80 percent of the residents in this region are Muslims who embrace a Malay identity. The conflict is essentially rooted in an ethno-nationalist sentiment among Patani’s Malay that challenges Thailand’s nation-state construct and national narratives, which are thought by Malays in the southernmost provinces to be at the expense of their own ethno-religious identity.

Framing the Issue

In 2011, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) published a report, “Gender, Conflict, and Peacebuilding.” The Praxis Institute for Social Justice was commissioned to reflect on the developments, contributions, and prospects in the area of gender, conflict, and peacebuilding. The task involved reviewing more than 100 projects with gender dimensions. The report pointed out that gaps existed between understanding and awareness of the gender dimensions of conflict and its legacies, and added that the field must overcome its tendency to reduce gender sensitivity to a focus on women.

“Gender identities and norms—as well as the systems, institutions, traditions of practice, and patterns of attitudes that support them—are crucial to conflict dynamics and responses. Both men and women are involved in inflicting violence and are its victims, defying a simplistic classification of roles,” the report said (Theidon, Phenicie, and Murray 2011).

Moreover, according to the report, sexual violence is widespread—though not universal—and the practice is employed selectively for strategic reasons, targeting both men and women. Most legal processes during periods of transitions out of conflict, have failed to provide safe space for victims to redress the harms they have suffered. The report called on the field to embrace a broader concept of gender and to conduct an in-depth examination of the gender aspects of security and peacebuilding.

⁶ This chapter was written by World Bank consultant Don Pathan.

In terms of masculinity and gender-based violence in conflict settings, the case of the war in Kosovo is relevant. Men risk being evicted from their communities and families if they do not conform to the expectations associated with their role as the defenders of their honor, homeland, and women. This results from dominant western stereotypical expectations of a “strong man,” “the breadwinner,” and “the defender of his homeland.” Because of such expectations, there is always the tendency to view a male victim of gender-based violence as a loser rather than as a victim. Moreover, because national military strength is highly associated with masculinity and sexual virility during war, homosexuality was perceived as a “sexual practice that endangers[s] national military strength” (Piccard 2011).

“The tendency among us is to use gender and women interchangeably,” said Kathleen Kuehnast, director of United States Institute of Peace’s Center for Gender and Peacebuilding. “However, this leaves us with half a solution to many of the problems that plague women and girls in conflict and fragile settings” (Gienger 2013).

Kuehnast made that statement in October 2013 in Washington, DC, at an event that brought together three-dozen keynote speakers and panelists for a two-day symposium on the paradox of hyper-masculinity, the threat of “failed adulthood,” and the lure of power through violence. The third day involved training for practitioners, during which they explored how male identity and societal norms contribute to violent conflict and, conversely, how they might be altered to support peace. A special report by USIP published in December 2013 argues, “Long term peace and stability can only be achieved by understanding how militarized male identities are constructed and how they can be deconstructed.” It points to programs that engage men in sustainable peace efforts and takes a male perspective in post-conflict peace-building work. In addition to a focus

“Understanding men’s lived experiences in conflict and seeing men as gendered beings whose lives are shaped by social norms, as women’s are, in no way takes away from the women, peace, and security agenda; it enhances that agenda by engaging men as allies in achieving equality and empowerment for women, while at the same time addressing the gendered realities, traumas, and stresses that men and boys face in conflict.”

on unlearning violence of all kinds, these programs encourage men to support economic empowerment initiatives for women in post-conflict settings. The report argued that, “Understanding men’s lived experiences in conflict and seeing men as gendered beings whose lives are shaped by social norms, as women’s are, in no way takes away from the women, peace, and security agenda; it enhances that agenda by engaging men as allies in achieving equality and empowerment for women, while at the same time addressing the gendered realities, traumas, and stresses that men

and boys face in conflict.” In other words, understanding how militarized male identities are constructed and how they can be deconstructed can lead to sustainable peace (Vess et al. 2013).

Contextualizing Youth, Masculinity, Violence, and Gangs

A toolkit produced by the United States Aid for International Development (USAID)—“Youth and Intervention”—does not indicate a specific age group, placing the range somewhere between 15–24 years old. For the purpose of the study, “youth” are defined as “having reached the stage in life where they are physically capable of assuming adult roles (i.e., have passed puberty) but would generally not be expected to make decisions or provide support for others.” That is, they have left behind childhood but have not yet assumed the responsibilities of adulthood (USAID 2005).

Ruth Streicher described a number of issues to contextualize her analytical framework for her study in East Timor in the aftermath of independence from Indonesia, including the Indonesian occupation and a relevant historical background of violence in Timorese society. The omnipresence of violence against women and children was raised to show that violent practices are not confined to gangs in East Timor. Although the

involvement of young people in violent activities was quite visible in this post-occupation period, there has been no baseline study asking the youth themselves about their views on the crisis and conflict. Furthermore, defining youth by age could be problematic. Marriage as a social construct is a marker of adulthood. And East Timor's struggle for independence offers clues about the process of the "collective self-discovery of youth," particularly with regard to the late 1980s, when youth groups began to organize themselves in a clandestine movement along with community-based groups with linkages to political parties and the Falintil guerrillas. In fact, in 1999, the mass organization of Timorese youth began as an outfit that provided food supplies for the militants and assisted villagers with evacuation. This process of self-discovery, according to Streicher, counters the simple explanations by various researchers who conveniently blame the youth or the "youth bulge" for much of the violence during the post-Indonesia. In other words, according to Streicher, by framing the youth as a discouraged, lost generation with a tendency to embrace mob violence due to feelings of frustration and alienation, international reports fail to grasp the complexity of the situation.

The extent to which it really was mostly "youth" engaging in violent clashes during the crisis is, however, still unclear. These claims have not been substantiated and no baseline study has been conducted to support them, according to Streicher. In fact, most young people—85–90 percent according to one study—tried to avoid the fighting. As already noted, marriage is a marker of adulthood, and unmarried men are referred to as "young men," even if they are 35 years old. Aside from the gendered institution of marriage, generational classifications are also manifest in the Timorese language. Despite the traditional differentiation between men and boys in East Timor society, it is not clear when the category of "youth" emerged (Streicher 2011).

A World Bank report, "Timor-Leste's Youth in Crisis: Situational Analysis and Policy Options," pointed out that engaging in violence is not new to East Timorese youth. Leaders of the rebel forces promoted violence as a legitimate form of resistance.

"Thus, violent behavior amongst youth has been a prominent feature of Timorese life for the generation of those who lived through the resistance movement. It would be a mistake, however, to rationalize such behavior as inherent to Timorese (youth) culture and society, and accept it as inevitable. Rather, there are concrete economic, social and political factors that place Timorese youth 'at-risk' of, and push them to engage in, violent behavior." (World Bank 2007)

Cause

USAID's toolkit, "Youth and Intervention," explores the reasons why young people participate in violence. While it does not identify all relevant factors linked to violence, the toolkit does shift through numerous potential causes of conflict and offers recommendations about how to make development and humanitarian assistance more responsive to conflict dynamics.

Among the potential causes for young people participating in violence are economic incentives, as demonstrated in Sierra Leone and Uzbekistan. Another issue is limited opportunities for political engagement, resulting in youth resorting to the intimidation of rivals and the destabilization of opponents, as in Haiti where a broad range of political parties have relied on youth gangs to protect political turf and carry out violent attacks against their opponents. "Youth, who are never integrated into community and social structures or who never acquire the skills needed for peaceful and constructive adult lives, are at high risk. A deprived, frustrated, or traumatized youth cohort, if left without help, can continue to foment conflict for decades." And in ethnically diverse countries, such as Pakistan and Nigeria, failing school systems have provided radical groups opportunities to reach out to youth (USAID 2005).

Sex-selective Repression in Southern Thailand

Men's experience must be considered in any gender analysis; otherwise, men tend to be viewed as perpetrators, a point raised in Malin Nilsson's "Suspect, Detainee, or Victim? A Discourse Analytical Study of Men's Vulnerability in Thailand's Deep South." Accounts of men as victims are rare, and the public often perceives violence against civilian men in armed conflicts as more legitimate than they would violence against civilian women, Nilsson argues. And while men attract the most attention from the state, the discourse about Thailand's Deep South insurgency "reproduced a number of traditional ideas about men and women and renders men's vulnerability invisible" (Nilsson 2012).

Local and international human rights organizations concurred that the special security laws were key to the rise of a culture of impunity among security officers working in southern Thailand. None of these organizations identified the violations as sex-selective or gendered, but the names of the victims were all male. According to reports by local and international human rights organizations, enforced disappearances, extra-judicial killings, arbitrary detentions, and torture—all directed against men—are commonplace for Thailand's ongoing insurgency. Even CSOs tasked with ensuring civilian security sometimes share this view. "Exploring the idea of men as legitimate targets of violence means exploring the gendered ideas about men and women that shape both the way we talk about violence and the ways we attempt to tackle it," Nilsson argued. "A key explanation for targeting men in this sort of strategy is, as discussed earlier, the almost universal perception of men as the greatest threat to a conquering force. The fact that these violations are not represented as sex-selective in reports by CSOs suggests that the perceptions about men are deeply ingrained and that civil society actors also subscribe to the idea of the 'naturalness of targeting men in counter-insurgency activity'" (Nilsson 2012). CSOs claim that the perception of men as threatening was generated by the state, but Nilsson argues that when CSOs concede the argument that men are more likely to participate in the insurgency, they are supporting this perception.

"As Carpenter explains, understanding men's socially induced vulnerability remains a key challenge for the civilian protection community, as it severely limits the range of responses to civilian vulnerability they develop. By not problematizing the link between men's vulnerability and the perception of men as threats, the informants reproduce male experience as engendered. This further illustrates the claim of masculinity studies, that male experience is taken as the norm and rarely problematized" (Cornwall 1997).

CSO accounts in Nilsson's work indicate three attributes that significantly increase the risk of being perceived as a threat in Thailand's Deep South: being young, being male, and being Muslim. In other words, the men's vulnerability was a consequence of the Thai state's perception of them as "threats" and "violence makers." Moreover, men of "battle age" are often considered the greatest threat to the "conquering force," which, in this case, is the Thai security apparatus. But the state's perception of threats is not limited to young men. A number of Islamic religious teachers—all men—are also under constant surveillance by security officers and agencies. The teachers and religious leaders are thought to be behind the indoctrination of the current generation of militants on the ground. Many of the religious leaders are heads of traditional private Islamic schools, known locally as *ponoh*, and this leads some to make the simple connection between Islam and the campaign of violence on the ground instead of understanding the conflict in the context of nation-state building in which two historical and cultural narratives—Patani Malay versus the state-constructed version—are competing against one another. The public can be drawn into a discourse that is misleading and fruitless in terms of policy recommendations and exit strategies (Nilsson 2012).

Some key points emerge:

- Researchers studying masculinity argue that men have not been adequately studied as gendered beings. Instead, they have been viewed as the norm, and therefore not problematized. Masculinity studies are “inspired by but not parallel to feminist research of women” (Nilsson 2012).
- The theory of hegemonic masculinity demonstrates that all men do not necessarily have power, and that having power depends on conforming to certain types of “masculine” behavior. This idea can be a useful tool for practitioners addressing the development needs of men and boys. For Cornwall, the greatest value of hegemonic masculinity theory is its capacity to recognize consequences for men that do not conform to a hegemonic type of masculinity (Cornwall 1997).
- The issue of sex-selective killing illustrates many of the key points in this vein—namely, that men are not only the main perpetrators of violence but also the most likely victims of lethal violence. Battle-aged adult men are, in fact, more likely to be killed during an armed conflict than groups more commonly described as vulnerable, such as women, children, and the elderly.
- According to Carpenter, a key factor in the sex-selective killings of men is the definition of “civilian.” International law requires a distinction between “civilian” and “combatant” based on actual participation in armed violence but in practice, gender is often used as a shortcut for categorizing people (Carpenter 2006). A counter-argument, often used to justify the targeting of men, is that men are, in fact, more prone than women to armed violence and more likely to pose a threat to their enemies. However, in many conflicts, a significant number of men choose not to take up arms, and women now constitute 5–15 percent of the regular armed service.
- The emerging literature on the security concerns of men and boys identifies a number of areas in which they are more vulnerable, including, sex-selective killing/repression, recruitment, militarization, and gun violence. Of these examples, sex-selective killings have received the most attention due to highly publicized cases, such as the Srebrenica massacre, in which 8,000 men and boys lost their lives.
- In Thailand’s Deep South, a number of offenses, including enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detentions, and torture, can be summarized under the heading of “sex-selective repression.” The special security laws that govern most of the three border provinces make many of these violations possible. In a report to the Universal Periodic Review of the Human Rights Council, several organizations asserted that the special security laws had led to human rights violations by officers. The organizations did not identify the violations as sex-selective or gendered, but all of the examples presented in the report involved men (OHCHR 2011).
- The Small Arms Survey concludes that gun violence must be tackled by limiting young men’s access to firearms and by challenging the cultural ideas of masculinity that posit weapons as a source of security and power (Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva 2006). In Thailand’s Deep South, the government has chosen to do the exact opposite, increasing access to weapons and cementing militarized forms of masculinity by maintaining a military presence in all aspects of life in the Deep South.
- The increased military presence in the Deep South has significant consequences for the construction of hegemonic masculinity in the area. The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers and the Justice for Peace Foundation, focusing on the effects on children, demonstrate that, in addition to the physical risks of living in these conditions, children’s psychological development is affected by their daily contact with security forces (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers and JPF 2011).

- While nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) often challenge the Thai state's narrative of the conflict, with regard to perceptions of men, they mirror it. The majority of insurgents are of course men, but by incorporating this discourse, civil society contributes to an understanding of this "fact" as a legitimate reason for targeting men in general.
- While accounts of men as irresponsible and lazy challenge conventional ideas about men as breadwinners and responsible patriarchs, the way in which these accounts are expressed make it clear that men are being judged according to traditional norms, and the inability of men to live up to these masculine ideals is thought to be caused by innate qualities rather than by societal changes, including the increased risk involved in rubber tapping (the process by which latex is collected from a rubber tree) and the restriction of movement for Muslim men.

From Socioeconomic Factors to Ideological Underpinnings

In 2011, extensive research was conducted by the science and technology faculty at the Prince of Songkhla University, Pattani Campus, to evaluate the social and economic situation in the three southernmost provinces of Thailand—Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. It revealed that some aspects of the government's development plan had failed to achieve their stated goals, especially with regard to women and children. A total of 1,676 villages in the three provinces were studied, 366 of which were selected through sampling techniques. One target group—the Zakats—comprised poor families whose names were provided by local mosques in the three Muslim-majority provinces. The survey divided the participants into three groups by age: 15–25 years old, 26–35 years old, and 36 years and older. Although the research did not specifically focus on men and male youth, it still revealed their awful state of affairs. The findings suggest that the dire situation, which includes job security challenges, a lack of social mobility, an inability to improve livelihoods, a dearth of opportunities, and inadequate health care, make it easy to understand why young men feel vulnerable. These factors, combined with anti-state sentiments and historical mistrust—not to mention the perceived injustice stemming from the culture of impunity among security officers as documented in various human rights reports by foreign governments and international organizations—help nudge young men in the region toward taking up arms against the state. According to information from the survey, 15- to 25-year-old youth face great uncertainty and can therefore be appropriately described as the most vulnerable group (Prince of Songkhla University 2011). However, the report did not claim that the dire socioeconomic situation was the main cause of the conflict; it merely highlighted the predicament facing the people in this restive, highly contested region where successive waves of insurgent violence have emerged, disappeared, and then re-emerged.

Social and economic factors are crucial to analyzing the overall situation in Thailand's Deep South, but some reports suggest that another important factor pushing young men to take up arms against the state is related to ideological underpinnings expressed in historical narratives. This very point was raised in the International Crisis Group (ICG) report that explored the grand narrative that provides the context and justification for the armed insurgency (ICG 2008). According to the report, the narrative painted the region as an occupied territory. Islam is used as a reference point to the extent that it justifies uprising against the perceived unjust and illegitimate rule. The report pointed to the Tak Bai massacre and the Krue Se standoff, both in 2004, as examples that fed into this grand narrative and served as a powerful recruiting tool to draw young men into the armed struggle. Film footage of the Tak Bai demonstration and the handling of it by security officers were quickly disseminated. Of the 87 demonstrators who died, 78 suffocated to death after authorities stacked them one on top of the next on the back of military transport trucks. The total absence of prosecutions over this incident reinforced the narrative that the "invading" Siamese will never treat the Malays as their equals. ICG reported that the Muslim Attorney Center documented an increase in incidences of torture in 2007 that followed a massive troop surge into the Deep South and pointed to one of the most notorious cases—the beating death in March 2008 of Imam Yapa Kaseng at an army camp in Narathiwat's Rueso district (ICG 2008).

In a statement marking the 2013 International Day of the Disappeared, the New York-based Human Rights Watch critiqued the Thai government for failing to honor past promises to hold the people behind the forced disappearances accountable for their crimes. In a report published in March 2007, Human Rights Watch strongly implicated the Thai security forces in more than 22 cases of enforced disappearance. No perpetrator has been criminally prosecuted. “For many years Thai officials have committed enforced disappearances with little fear of being held to account for their actions,” according to Brad Adams, Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “The government proclaims its opposition to this heinous crime, but has done nothing to end it” (Human Rights Watch 2007b). Today, more than ten years after the current wave of insurgency began in Thailand’s Deep South, at least 39 people have been reported disappeared. The Thai penal code still does not recognize enforced disappearance as a criminal offense (Human Rights Watch 2013b).

In August 2008, fighting resumed between the Philippine government and the separatist Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The violence displaced approximately 700,000 people in this highly contested region. Limited educational opportunities, the proliferation of firearms, and the constant state of fear have pushed young men toward taking up arms against the state. Aid workers on the ground posit that becoming a combatant allows youth to earn respect. Whether one is part of a separatist movement or the security detail of a local entity, being armed brings with it a certain status (Rajendran et al. 2006).

Gender and Violence in East Timor

Streicher drew on the concept of *habitus* that said “a power structure that needs to be constantly reproduced through agency, so that violence emerges as both a result of and a mean to construct gender structures” (Streicher 2011). She established that constructions of adolescence are intertwined with those of gender and that gangs represent potent spaces of gendered experience. Streicher’s analytical points of departure include the following:

- Since gang respondents view their communities as central reference points for their actions, Streicher drew on a theory about the positioning of men in a community context. Positioning is the idea that gendered patterns of thought position men and women differently with respect to the practice of violence.
- Because most gang members grew up during the Indonesian occupation, Streicher introduced approaches that relate the experience of violence to the normalization of violent practices.
- East Timor was going through a period of major social change. Unemployment and urbanization were the two issues mentioned most often by respondents in relation to gang violence. Gender approaches assume that social change can weaken male dominance in society. Feeling threatened by these changes, some men resort to violence in order to construct masculinities.
- Gang violence with constantly shifting alliances in Dili continued well into 2007—eight years after independence. This prompted Streicher to consider a theory that conceptualizes violent practices as stakes in competitive masculinity games. The critical discussion of the interview results includes qualifying some theoretical assumptions, and the use of the terms “youth” and “gangs” in this context is questioned.

Taking up Arms in Mindanao

In their 2008 annual report, the London-based Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers made note of the ongoing use of children in government-linked paramilitaries and Mindanao armed groups, including the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, which acknowledges that there are children at its 21 base camps scattered around Mindanao but insists that they only perform simple chores in the community-like camps. But even if the child members of the armed groups are not combatants, the coalition has consistently argued that their

presence at the camps exposes them to extreme risks (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 2008). The coalition makes the same argument with respect to the presence of children in the defense volunteers' working environment in the southernmost provinces of Thailand. A critical report jointly authored by the Justice for Peace Foundation about well-known Thai human rights activist Angkhana Neelapaijit makes a similar claim but did not address the issue of how such an environment impacts youth. The report on southern Thailand was part of a larger campaign to get the Thai government to enact additional preventive measures (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers and JPF 2011).

Impact

According to the Secretary-General to the United Nations Security Council, as of May 2014, children were still continuing to suffer from indiscriminate violence stemming from attacks directed at civilian targets. The United Nations said there was a significant spike in the killing and maiming of children in several conflicts, including Afghanistan and Iraq, and added that the fighting in Syria has led to widespread violations against children. Throughout 2013, the use of children in conflict-affected areas became endemic in the Central African Republic and South Sudan conflicts, while in Nigeria, the extremist group known as Boko Haram stepped up their attacks on schools and young students. While both boys and girls suffered from the violence, it is too often the boys that get caught up in the conflict. The following are some of the incidents involving boys in 2013 that are documented in the report (United Nations Security Council 2014).

- Ninety-seven boys, as young as eight-years-old, were recruited by armed groups in Afghanistan. Nine of the boys were recruited to conduct suicide attacks.
- Child casualties in Afghanistan increased by 30 percent in 2013 compared with 2012. At least 545 children were killed and 1,149 injured in 790 documented incidents. The use of improvised explosive devices and suicide attacks, including by boys in at least two instances, resulted in the deaths of 229 children and injury to 396 others.
- At least 15 boys detained by Afghan national security forces on national security-related charges claim to having been raped or to having been threatened with sexual violence at the time of their arrest or while in detention. During the reporting period, 12 incidents of sexual violence against 11 boys and 5 girls were verified. The perpetrators included the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and the national police.
- According to the Ministry of Justice, since December 2013, 196 boys were held in juvenile rehabilitation centers across the country on national security-related charges, including alleged associations with armed opposition groups.
- In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the United Nations documented 910 children (783 boys and 127 girls), who had been newly recruited and used by armed groups. Among them, 609 were Congolese, 28 Rwandan, 5 Ugandan, and 268 of undetermined nationality. Almost half of the children were reportedly used as combatants, but children were also used as porters, cooks, informants, and in other support roles.
- In 2013, 1,722 children (210 girls and 1,512 boys) who had been recruited that year or earlier were separated from armed groups or armed forces.
- According to the Iraqi government, as of December 2013, at least 391 children, including 18 girls, were being held in juvenile reformatory detention facilities under indictment or conviction for terrorism-related charges under the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2005. The children had been detained for periods ranging from two months to more than three years.

- Palestinian and Israeli children continue to be affected by the prevailing situation of military occupation, conflict, and closure. In 2013, eight Palestinian children (six boys and two girls) were killed and 1,265 injured in the occupied Palestinian territories.
- In 2013, Palestinian children continued to be arrested and detained by Israeli security forces and prosecuted in juvenile military courts. By the end of December, 154 boys, aged 14–17 years, were held in Israeli military detention for alleged security violations. The United Nations documented 107 cases of ill treatment during arrest, transfer, interrogation, or detention, including five cases involving children under 12. Every one of the 107 boys reported having been subjected to cruel and degrading treatment by Israel Defense Forces and Israeli police, including painful restraint, blindfolding, strip-searching, verbal and physical abuse, solitary confinement, and threats of violence.
- The United Nations documented the killing of 14 children (12 boys and 2 girls) between 4 and 17 years of age, and the injury of 5 others (4 boys and 1 girl) due to crossfire, improvised explosive devices, or heavy weaponry.
- Abductions of children by the Lord Resistance Army remained stable. There were 65 cases reported from the southeastern region of the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo's Haut-Uélé district. Children are used for looting and the transport of pillaged goods. They are released after a short period of time. Importantly, children who are abducted or recruited by the Lord Resistance Army, particularly girls, are regularly subjected to sexual violence.
- The government of Myanmar recruited 37 children into the national army (Tadmadaw) in 2013, adding to the 196 recruited in previous years. Tatmadaw continues to deploy children to the frontline as combatants and in other roles, particularly in Kachin State. Armed groups, including the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), continue to recruit and use children. In the northern Shan State, the United Nations observed approximately 20 children suspected of being associated with the United Wa State Army (UWSA).
- In Somalia, the United Nations documented the recruitment and use of 1,293 children by various groups, including Al-Shabaab, the national army, and Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama'a (ASWJ). In 2013, at least 237 children were killed (179 boys and 58 girls), and 494 children were injured (383 boys and 111 girls).
- Before the crisis in South Sudan, the United Nations verified the recruitment and use of 162 children—all boys—and mostly between the ages of 14 and 17 years.
- In Sudan's restive region of Darfur, the United Nations documented the killing of 91 children (71 boys and 20 girls) and injury to 98 others (64 boys and 34 girls). Forty-three children were shot and killed and 32 injured during clashes between government forces and armed groups and as a result of inter- and intra-ethnic fighting. At least 62 girls were raped in 40 separate incidents. Most cases were perpetrated by unknown armed elements, some wearing military uniforms.

Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao

Research on the impact of armed conflict on male youth by the Philippines-based NGO Community and Family Services International indicates that many young men continue to look to education and skills training as the best way to improve their lives despite the violent environment that forced many of them to reduce their attendance at school or drop out entirely. United Nations Children's Fund-Philippines pointed out that boys are more disadvantaged than girls when it comes to accessing education—especially in Mindanao (Philippines Department of Health, UNICEF, and World Food Program 2009). Compared to girls, boys are more vulnerable to health problems, child labor, gangs, and other types of violence, among other risk factors. In the

conflict-affected areas of Mindanao, especially in ARMM, this problem is more pronounced. Compared with other regions in the Philippines, the level of education in ARMM has consistently been the lowest in the country. According to the most recent survey by the National Statistics Office in 2003, the overall literacy rate was 93.7 percent for males and 94 percent for females. It was 71 percent for males and 69.4 percent for females in ARMM. The number of children dropping out of school was also the highest in ARMM at 23 percent compared with major provinces such as Luzon and Visayas where rates are less than 8 percent. Findings from the Mindanao insurgency indicated that the four-decade conflict has killed and displaced hundreds of thousands of people. Boys have been forced to shoulder responsibilities for which they are not prepared (Rajendran et al. 2006).

The following excerpts reflect key points raised by the Community and Family Services International research (Rajendran et al. 2006).

Despite the popular perception that male youth are militarized, a large majority do not get involved in violence. In fact, the conflict has propelled many youth into roles for which they were not prepared but with which they are coping as best they can. The top concerns of the surveyed youth included the lack of educational opportunities the inability to earn a decent livelihood. Physical insecurity and threats of violence were other commonly expressed concern.

In some of the barangays (villages) visited, male youth were of the firm conviction that that there are only two ways of becoming influential in their communities: through arms or through education.

Internal Displacement and Food Security in Mindanao

Over the past decade, an estimated three million Mindanaoans have experienced displacement as they fled from outbreaks of armed warfare, counterinsurgency operations, paramilitary violence, and clan conflicts. Most internally displaced persons are women and children. New forms of insecurity often emerge in the communities of refuge, especially when local residents differ ethnically and religiously. In addition to facing uncertainty in their daily struggle to obtain sufficient food, clean water, and other basic needs, internally displaced persons are often exploited for cheap labor. The enormous number of displaced persons makes tracking them extremely complex. Furthermore, the government has often been accused of underestimating the total numbers of the displaced and for failing to count the internally displaced persons who take shelter in places other than registered evacuation centers. A study by the World Food Program found that nearly half of the population of conflict-affected areas in ARMM faced food insecurity (Philippines Department of Health, UNICEF, and World Food Program 2009). Further, most internally displaced persons do not have sufficient access to water. A 2009 study of 42,000 displaced people in Maguindanao and Cotabato identified one water collection point for every 680 people and one latrine for every 252 people (Dwyer and Cagoco-Guiam 2009).

Gender and Mobility in Mindanao

Restrictions on mobility as a result of conflict are highly gender-specific. During rido conflict—periodic outbursts of retaliatory family and clan violence—men are especially vulnerable as the primary targets for revenge. According to the 2009 study, it is common for them to respond by drastically limiting their social movements to avoid attacks. Women are far less frequently targeted for rido killings, which means that often they must take on activities traditionally performed by men. Similarly, in cases of conflict between armed combatant groups, men run the risk of being mistaken for combatants by state forces, or of being pressured to join insurgent groups, leading them to restrict their travels outside of the home and to rely on the women's ability to move more easily in public spaces. For Mindanaoan men, this restriction of mobility often creates a deep sense of social and political paralysis. Men in conflict-affected regions of Mindanao express feelings of being sandwiched between rival combatant groups; others compared themselves to a kind of local rice cake (bibingka) that is

toasted on both sides. This feeling of paralysis can ultimately lead to long-term effects, including the calling into question of deeply embedded cultural definitions of masculinity. The severe curtailment on the mobility of men during conflict has serious consequences for society, impacting local economies; political processes; and men's relationships with women, their families, and their communities. With men subject to suspicion as potential combatants or under direct physical threat, women are often required to take on new livelihood or leadership responsibilities outside of the home; common tasks include tending fields and livestock, bringing goods to market, escorting children to school, searching out wage labor, and working to identify and resolve community concerns. In cases of armed violence between rival combatant groups, a woman might also take on the role of emergency medics or rescue agent, risking crossfire or interrogation by armed forces to retrieve the dead and wounded. Since women are seen as less likely physical threats, they may also be tasked with negotiating with occupying forces for access to subsistence needs during a conflict (Dwyer and Cagoco-Guiam 2009).

Psychosocial Concerns

In Mindanao, protracted armed conflict has had far reaching effects on the psychosocial development of its youth. Some youth join armed groups to feel safer and satisfy their quest for identity while others choose a life of crime or drugs. Young men report feelings of hopelessness, isolation, and a diminished sense of self-worth as a result of the conflict that they attribute to a variety of factors such as:

- Trauma caused by the loss of family members, especially parents or close relatives.
- Destruction of their homes and, in some cases, wholesale destruction of their villages.
- Repeated displacement and being forced to live in evacuation centers for several months.
- Disruption of their education and dreams of a secure future.
- Loss of control over their lives and frustrations over having to start all over “from zero.”
- Loss of self-esteem and therefore of self-worth—especially among older youth—and not having “anything to do” (Rajendran et al. 2006).

Sexual Violence

The conflict in the former Yugoslavia dramatically raised awareness about the use of rape as a war weapon, but it is unclear when the issue of sexual violence against men made it into mainstream discussions among members of CSOs. A paper pointed out that of 4,076 NGOs working in the area of “war rape and other forms of political sexual violence,” a mere 3 percent mentioned sexual violence against men and boys in their programs or informational literature. The mainstream media gives similarly little attention to the issue (Sivakumaran 2010).

According to a Human Rights Watch report, in the context of Thailand's southern insurgency, sexual violence against men is said to have been carried out during the interrogation process when the detainees were kept incommunicado for at least a week under various special and security laws that permit detention without formal charges, legal counseling, or representation. When a specific instance surfaces that cannot be denied, the government dismisses it as an isolated case, denying it is policy. A number of foreign governments and international/local human rights organizations have been looking into this issue—as well as allegations of target killings—and these points have been raised in their respective annual reports. Human Rights Watch, in a 2007 report, implicated Thai police's Crime Suppression Division for the arbitrary arrest and torture of Asae Manor in March 2004 in connection with the investigation on the raid on the Narathiwat military camp. According to Asae Manor:

“... one night, the village chief told me that police wanted to talk to me and assured me that I would not be harmed if I surrendered. When I was taken to Sakor district police station, there were many police waiting for me. I was blindfolded and put in a passenger cab of a pickup truck. The interrogation began inside that pickup truck. I was questioned about the stolen guns. I was punched and slapped in the face many times. The pickup truck stopped occasionally and I was taken outside and was beaten up more. Those men told me they were kongprab police. The pickup truck stopped and I was put inside a building. I was stripped naked and tortured. I was kicked, punched, and slapped. Those police beat me up with wooden clubs. While I was blindfolded, they electrocuted my testicles and my penis more than 10 times. It was so painful that I passed out. But when I woke up, the torture started again. Each time I was hit or electrocuted, those police told me to give information about the stolen guns. They kept me in pain constantly. They did not give me food or water. At one point, they told me that they would take me to Ban Ton Airport in Narathiwat to be transferred to Bangkok. I completely lost the sense of time—did not know how long the detention and torture went on. Eventually, I was dressed up and put inside a pickup truck. When they removed the blindfold, I was outside Su Ngai Kolok district police station. The police said I was not suspected of committing any crimes, but I must keep my mouth shut.” (Human Rights Watch 2007a)

In the article, “Sexual Violence Against Men in Armed Conflict,” published in the *European Journal of International Law* in 2007, author Sandesh Sivakumaran points out that there is an underreporting of sexual violence in general, especially when it involves male victims. “This is due to a combination of shame, confusion, guilt, fear and stigma. Men also may be loath to talk about being victimized, considering it to be incompatible with their masculinity, particularly in societies in which men are discouraged from talking about their emotions,” Sivakumaran said. Even if male survivors want to talk about the abuse they suffered, they may find it difficult to express themselves because they are also victims of masculine stereotypes (Sivakumaran 2007).

The following are the key points raised by Sivakumaran:

- The most thorough investigation of sexual violence in armed conflict is of the atrocities committed in the former Yugoslavia. During and after that conflict, examples of male sexual violence were found at all stages of the investigative process— NGO reports, individual statements, reports of United Nations experts, court pleadings for cases, and indictments and convictions of individual offenders.
- The general consensus appears to be that male sexual violence in armed conflict happens, its frequency is underreported, and that it would be useful to pay more attention to the subject. These are well-meaning comments and their presence is certainly better than their absence—the issue has now been flagged for further consideration and the silence has been broken. But, in terms of providing constructive suggestions for combating nonreporting and underreporting, for fighting the stigma attached to male sexual violence, and for addressing the problem, they are not altogether helpful.
- Numerous dynamics are present in any instance of sexual violence; it is rarely committed for only one reason. The dynamics will also be different depending on if the violence is inflicted on civilians or on combatants, against interned people or against people in the community.
- Notions of power and dominance are present in the construction of chastity and virility. In some cultures, women are thought to represent the chastity of the family and the community. Accordingly, sexual violence against female members of a community is intended to suggest that the men of the community have failed in their duty to protect “their” women. In this way, female rape is a form of communication between men. It reinforces the “conquered status of masculine impotence.”

- The intention of the rape may be to “lower” the social status of the male survivor by “reducing” him to a “feminized male,” described by one observer as “[o]ne of the most lethal gender roles in modern times.” The same observer asks, “What greater humiliation can one man impose on another man or boy than to turn him into a de facto ‘female’ through sexual cruelty?”
- Given the hidden nature of the offense, when medical workers are treating male survivors, they should be on the lookout for signs of sexual abuse and encourage its reporting. When documenting abuse, medical workers should consider how it is categorized, as torture, sexual abuse, or both.

The Perception of Children

Tens of thousands of children have been affected by the unrest in the historically contested predominantly Malay Muslim region in Thailand’s southernmost provinces, but only a few studies have been carried out considering the issue. UNICEF commissioned a study in 2006–07 to get a better understanding of children’s perceptions of the violence and the effect it has had on their lives and communities. UNICEF defined children as people 18 years of age or younger. Responses were collected from 2,357 Muslim and Buddhist children living in the far south, as well as from 283 children living in central Thailand who formed a control group for the research. Ten research methods, or tools, were specifically designed to elicit responses from the children. A total of 11,444 pieces of data were systematically collected, most of which could be analyzed quantitatively and qualitatively. According to the study’s findings,

“children suffer anxiety and stress associated with the ongoing threat and anticipation of violence, as well as their own violent experiences and their proximity to places vulnerable to violent attacks. Their everyday experiences include witnessing attacks and other violent incidents associated with injury and death” (UNICEF Thailand 2008).

The research also noted that, despite the tension, none of the children expressed a negative view of other religions or referred to religion or religious differences as being the cause of the unrest. While few children expressed negative opinions of soldiers and police, those who said they were afraid of soldiers and police “linked this fear to the perception that a group of men in uniform are an easy target for insurgents and the children fear being nearby if such an attack were to occur.”

“Although more than a third of the child respondents in the South seem to have feelings of revenge and injustice, these feelings were more related to regular childhood experiences than to the unrest itself, and most did not indicate that they were resentful of anyone or any group. This, combined with their expressed visions of peace, indicates that there is a window of opportunity to prevent the vicious cycle of violence becoming inter-generational if timely actions are taken for peace-building efforts directed at children and youth” (UNICEF Thailand 2008).

The absence of anger toward other ethnic groups supports the long-standing argument that prejudice and hatred are taught—children at that age may not have been taught to hate yet.

Coping

Southern Thailand’s Former Detainees

On February 28, 2013, six months after the Thai government announced the start of official peace talks with *Barisan Revolusi Nasional*, a key rebel group, nine Justice for Peace Network (JOP)⁷ members were shot dead—all at close range. On August 28, 2013, Human Rights Watch issued a statement accusing

⁷ JOP is a network of former detainees who have been taken in by Thai security forces under special security laws that permit detentions of up to 30 days without formal charges. It is based in Thailand’s southernmost provinces, the conflict-affected area.

a government and/or pro-government death squad of carrying out attacks against former detainees as well as community leaders and religious figures suspected of collaborating with insurgents. “The killing in southern Thailand goes on but officials do little to bring those responsible to justice, especially when the victim is a Malay Muslim,” said Brad Adams, Human Rights Watch Asia director. “The failure to prosecute these killings is widely interpreted in Muslim communities as a government attempt to cover up for state security forces and protect them from criminal responsibility” (Human Rights Watch 2013a).⁸ Moreover, the killing of former detainees was used as an excuse by Hasan Taib, the designated liaison officer for *Barisan Revolusi Nasional* during the ongoing peace talks, to pull out of a planned ceasefire for Ramadan in 2013 (Pathan 2014a). JOP members—all former detainees—believe that they have been targeted by gunmen for some time. As part of a coping strategy, members formed a civic organization together as part of a self-healing process and as a way to form a collective voice to raise public awareness about their plight and predicament.

Growing up in Mindanao

As for the young people in Mindanao, no aspect of their young lives has been left untouched by the conflict, which has broken down traditional community structures that once provided support during times of crisis. The youth are constantly worried about losing their homes and families, and they are uncertain about their futures. Studies on how they are coping with the situation point to religion, namely Islam, and the support of peer groups as sources of comfort. Participants in the focus group discussions offered the following suggestions to improve the situation (Rajendran et al. 2006):

- Peace, access to education and livelihood opportunities, and livelihood-skills training programs are identified as the first steps for youth to gain control over their lives.
- A frequently expressed need expressed at all of the locations where focus group discussions were held was for “a basketball court and/or other venues for recreational activities, because if youth have something to do then they do not engage in illegal activities like selling or using drugs.”
- Participants expressed a desire to have contact with youth in other barangays in the region and network. Focus group discussion participants in the communities visited were eager to take part in any activity that would improve their lives or enable them to contribute to their communities. Almost all of the focus group discussion participants were willing to contribute their time and efforts as needed.
- All focus group discussion participants accorded great importance to religion in their lives and expressed a need for spiritual development activities (Rajendran et al. 2006).

As the research pointed out, surveyed youth placed education as their top priority. They consider it to be the main solution to their problems and a passport to a better future for themselves and their families. They know it is the only way for them to secure the skills and qualifications needed to gain employment and a better quality of life. Education, according to the surveyed youth, can also help them earn respect and prestige in their communities, offer them better opportunities to participate in community organizations and aspire to leadership positions within them, improve their self-esteem and confidence, and act as a catalyst for change that will promote peace. In this respect, education, or at least the striving for it, appears to be one of the ways that Mindanao youth cope with their situation (Rajendran et al. 2006).

Voice to the Voiceless

Sexual assault survivors—both male and female—should have open access to counseling services, although sessions will likely be segregated by sex in order to encourage both groups to talk more freely.

⁸ A Human Rights Watch statement cited six killings, but the number of JOP members killed by suspected pro-government death squad had reached nine by the end of November 2013.

Moreover, according to Sivakumaran, survivors should be able to choose the sex of their medical workers, counselors, and interpreters. Although female survivors of sexual violence often choose to speak to someone of the same sex, it is not clear that this will be the case for male victims of male sexual violence (Sivakumaran 2007).

The need for men to be heard was pointed out in Nilsson's research. The author warned against the tendency among conflict and development practitioners to romanticize women's "community-minded selflessness." "If men are not represented in civil society, a number of male voices are silenced. Men will remain strong stakeholders in conflict and security matters, but only those men who represent state, police and military" (Nilsson 2012).

Conclusion and Recommendations

There is not much existing academic literature on how subnational violence affects men and youth, except for a handful of reports from advocacy groups such as the Philippines-based NGO Community and Family Services International and the London-based Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers. Community and Family Services International's report, "The Impact of Armed Conflict on Male Youth in Mindanao, Philippines" was funded by the World Bank in Manila. The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers had also worked with Bangkok-based Justice for Peace Foundation (sometimes confused with the Justice of Peace Network) to raise concerns about the presence of children in the working environment of the various government-trained and armed village defense volunteer groups. But these are advocacy publications in nature, part of a campaign to change government policy or, in many cases, to get a government to enforce existing laws and live up to commitments made through various international agreements, conventions, and protocols. Nevertheless, some of the publications provided recommendations for actors and stakeholders from various conflicts to consider.

Direct Intervention

With the help of the International Labor Organization, the government made a short-term attempt at addressing the problem of youth violence by launching a cash-for-work program. Although this type of effort is commendable, the World Bank, in its 2007 report, "Timor-Leste's Youth in Crisis: Situational Analysis and Policy Options," argued that only a comprehensive understanding and strategy can address the challenges over both the short and long term. The following is a summary of the report's recommended interventions.

- Expand cash/in-kind school programs that directly incentivize youth to stay in school.
- Reestablish youth centers to keep young people in school, to connect them with the community, and to strengthen informal social controls. The centers would establish a national infrastructure for future art, music, athletic, and cultural programs for youth.
- Expand labor-intensive youth employment programs to address the crucial need to increase employment opportunities for youth.
- Reestablish community-driven development programs with a youth focus to help to create employment opportunities, connect youth with the community, and empower them to participate in the nation-building process.
- Support a youth-led communications program to connect youth with community members, particularly their peers, and to strengthen informal social controls.
- Support a community justice and safety program to end impunity and reduce incentives to engage in opportunistic violent behavior. Increase the capacity of formal institutions, including police and courts, to investigate and prosecute youth violence and crime (World Bank 2007).

USAID's toolkit, "Youth and Intervention," asks the question: Why do young people participate in violence? Although the publication did not identify all of relevant factors linked to violence, it did, shift through the

many potential causes of conflict and made recommendations on how to make development and humanitarian assistance more responsive to conflict dynamics. Some of the recommendations are listed below.

- Identify at-risk youth, especially in areas where there is evidence of religious or ethnic extremism. Then identify gaps where the full spectrum of youth needs are not being met and create programs to address them.
- Integrate at-risk youth into the society through programs that bring together youth from both inside and outside the target group.
- Promote the idea of program ownership among youth so they can develop critical leadership skills and be able to productively collaborate with adults. This type of training could include practical citizenship skills, such as public speaking, negotiation, advocacy, and budgeting.
- Keep in mind the need to be gender-sensitive in program design and evaluation. Moreover, the program should be mindful that young women tend to carry the greatest burden in meeting the daily needs of their families and may therefore be less available to participate in programs than the young men.
- Understand that youth have a wide range of needs, including economic self-reliance, as they prepare for their adult roles. In high-risk regions, conflict resolution should be built into all activities.

As noted earlier, the USAID's toolkit was not designed to identify all relevant factors linked to violence, and the potential causes stated in the report may not necessarily apply to the ongoing conflict in southern Thailand. For example, there is no apparent economic incentive for a young man to join a separatist movement, whose armed combatants are scattered throughout the entire southernmost Malay-speaking provinces.

In the "Impact of Armed Conflict on Male Youth in Mindanao, Philippines," recommendations are offered regarding interventions in the education, health, and agriculture sectors. The peace agreement between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front will probably include resolution to the problem of the conflict-affected population in Mindanao, including its male youth. But it is argued that immediate efforts are crucial to demonstrate to the young men that they have not been forgotten. Following are some of the recommendations.

- Education is a key intervention that provides an excellent means of introducing a daily routine, a sense of purpose, and order into the lives of youth. Piloted in 2003, the "Youth Pack" model was developed by the Norwegian Refugee Council; Action Aid; and the Sierra Leone Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology. It is a one-year, full-time learning program for young people with little or no formal education who cannot or will not participate in the mainstream education system.
- The livelihood needs of young men can best be addressed by adopting an integrated approach that combines functional literacy, life-skills training, agricultural skills development, and vocational skills training. Similarly, partnerships with the local business sector in the form of apprenticeships and mentoring will enable youth to develop the right skill mix required by the labor market.
- The Ago-Mechanical Training and Entrepreneurship for Rural Youth Project is a mechanical skills training program focused on repair, maintenance, and fabrication of small farm machinery.
- The construction of sports facilities, such as basketball courts; the provision of basic sports equipment; and the establishment of youth clubs and centers will foster "safe zones" for youth to meet, network, and interact with their peers.
- Building peacebuilding and psychosocial skills capacity among local government officials, police, and service providers can sensitize them to the situation of the youth in general, and they can then use existing avenues to create a supportive and nurturing environment for the youth (Rajendran et al. 2006).

Sandesh Sivakumaran, in his assessment of the state of knowledge and work in the field of male sexual violence, argued that further analysis and research needed to focus on empirical data and that more could be done to raise awareness of the issue. “The current disconnect between the grand pronouncements on the problem of male sexual violence in armed conflict and the lack of measures taken to address it cannot continue,” Sivakumaran said. The following are some of his suggestions.

- Consider the relationship between male sexual violence and female sexual violence.
- Develop a deeper understanding of sexual violence against boys.
- Examine the situation of the male victim and the female perpetrator.
- Explore sexual violence against men and boys and in the context of what works to combat sexual violence against women and girls. It may reveal reasons to focus on one particular aspect of the problem (Sivakumaran 2010).

Recommendations from the United States Institute of Peace’s Special Report were mainly directed at policy makers, urging them to develop general approaches and recommendations for crisis and post-conflict settings. The following are some of their suggestions:

- Develop, implement, and evaluate interventions that address drivers of conflict through the lens of male identity and that proactively engage men in peacebuilding and conflict prevention efforts.
- Identify concrete ways that men can be allies in the women, peace, and security agenda by supporting women’s leadership in peace negotiations and by sensitizing men on the importance of gender equality in the peace negotiations process.
- Raise awareness and promote the exchange of lessons learned of research on engaging men in the peace and security agenda.
- Conduct additional research on how hyper-masculine identities and gender norms contribute to factors that drive violent conflict.
- Develop an emergency response system to quickly address sexual and gender-based violence in post-conflict settings and ensure that it engages men both as active participants in the response and in prevention components.
- Implement and evaluate programs that help men—both former combatants and civilians—construct healthy, nonviolent, and gender-equitable post-conflict identities.
- Engage male partners in women’s economic empowerment programs, including education for men on gender equality, sharing of caregiving and household tasks, gender-based violence prevention, and economic cooperation in households. Such programs could include job training, skill-building classes, or low-paying jobs that allow men to financially contribute to their families and communities.
- Promote men’s involvement as mentors or equitable, nonviolent, and involve fathers and caregivers—this will contribute to the intergenerational transfer of positive norms.
- Understanding men’s lived experiences in conflict settings and thinking of men as gendered beings whose lives are shaped by social norms—as women’s lives are—in no way takes away from the women, peace, and security agenda (Vess et al. 2013).

Programs of Government Service Providers

The following summarizes the support programs and government assistance agencies for Thailand's southern provinces.

Assistance for Affected People

To alleviate the impact on conflict-affected people, the government has laid down criteria and means of assistance for: (1) people who have been injured, disabled, killed, or have suffered property damage by terrorists in the Deep South; and (2) people affected by actions of the authorities in response to the situation in the southern border provinces that led to injury, disability, loss of life, or property damage. In cases of death, disability, injury, and property damage, a rehabilitation process—e.g., education, employment, and security—and unbiased justice is provided in accordance with the victims' religion, culture, and way of life to allow victims to return to their normal lives.

1. People who have been injured, disabled, killed, or have suffered property damage by terrorists in the Deep South

- The Southern Border Provinces Administration Centre (SBPAC) pays for physical injuries and property damage through the compensation centers in provinces and districts.
- The Ministry of Social Development and Human Security provides compensation in the case of death or severe injury in the form of a monthly allowance for the children of the victim, according to their education level. If both parents are deceased, an allowance is given to family of the victim/s. If the victim is disabled, an allowance is provided for rehabilitation.
- The Ministry of Education provides compensation in cases of death or severe injury in the form of annual scholarships for the children of victims according to their education level.
- The Rights and Liberties Protection Department provides compensation for medical costs and loss of income.
- The Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation provides compensation for medical and funeral costs.

2. For people affected by the actions of the authorities in response to the situation in the southern border provinces, the government provides compensation in the following four cases:

1. A victim was injured, disabled, or killed by the action of the authorities in response to the situation in the southern border provinces.
2. A victim was forced to disappear or was suspected of involvement by the authorities in response to the situation in the southern border provinces.
3. A victim was accused, prosecuted, or incarcerated under Martial Law Declaration Act B.E. 2457, Decree on Public Administration in Emergency Situation B.E. 2548, Internal Security Act B.E. 2551, or the Code of Criminal Procedure but was later released by the authorities, was not prosecuted, or was acquitted.
4. A victim is being tried in a court of law and requires assistance or legal representation, including hiring a lawyer; conducting an investigation, questioning witnesses; forensic analysis, and other expenses related to the legal procedure.

Assistance for Young Men

The Office of Non-Formal Education delivers accessible, efficient, and reliable education; provides occupational education for career advancement and lifelong learning; and promotes reading to ensure the literacy of the entire population.

Ministry of Labor

The Department of Employment promotes employment, provides support to people looking for work, and analyzes the labor market and employment trends. It serves as an employment information center, promotes employment, and provides consultation, support, and advice regarding career possibilities.

The Department of Skills Development is responsible for improving the skills of workers so they meet international standards, promoting and developing a skilled labor development network, improving labor efficiency, and raising income levels. The department also provides occupational training for any one aged 15 years or older who does not have the ability to pursue higher education or who is unemployed. The aim is to teach the basic skills needed for employment or self-employment. No prior knowledge about mechanics is required to participate in the program.

Qualitative Research Findings⁹

This section presents the findings of qualitative research undertaken in Thailand's four southern provinces: Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and Songkhla. Data was collected from focus group discussions and in-depth interviews. Interviews were semi-structured and used open-ended questions.

The population and sample groups for the study are the men and young men aged 15–25 years (youth) affected by law enforcement and assisted by service providers.

- Men directly impacted by the conflict:
 - Male detainees and former detainees who have been charged under the criminal procedure code, including men detained during their trials, men out on bail during their trials, and men who have been acquitted.
 - Men on the government watch list, including men who were interrogated and those called to answer questions under the Emergency Decree.
 - Male youth (aged 15–25 years), both Buddhist and Muslim, who have lost family members to the conflict.
- Men indirectly impacted by the conflict have not suffered loss of or injury to family members or loss of property and they have not been affected by security cases, but they have been impacted economically and socially. Unemployed young men/male youth (aged 15–25 years) can be categorized in three groups.
 - Completely unemployed and idle youth, most aged 15–18 years, and not attending school for 1–3 years.
 - Young men not attending school but who cannot find work other than helping with their families' businesses, which helps the families but leaves the young men without a steady or adequate income or ability to be self-reliant.
 - Young men with part-time work but no steady income and occasional periods of unemployment lasting for months without any income.
- Service providers are workers from government agencies, private development organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that provide support and assistance to people directly or indirectly affected by the conflict in the Deep South.

The study focuses on impacts, their causes, and the coping strategies and needs of the conflict-affected in Thailand's Deep South. It also touches on the assistance and support provided by relevant organizations and service providers. The purpose of the study is to provide recommendations to local and national government agencies and service providers about the treatment of and support for conflict-affected people with the aim of decreasing negative effects on the men in the conflict-affected areas and hopefully mitigating the conditions that led to the insurgency.

⁹ This section was written by World Bank consultants Nuchanad Juntavises and Somkiat Pitakkamolporn.

Men Directly Impacted by the Conflict

6.1 Detainees and Former Detainees

Detainees and former detainees are men who were charged with security offenses, with or without evidence, usually related to terrorism, mafia rackets, possession of firearms and weapons, and offenses against people's lives. Among the men charged, 61 percent got out on bail and 39 percent remained in detention while they defended themselves against the charges against them (Muslim Attorney Center 2011).¹⁰ Most of the men were charged with several offenses, with each case being handled separately and taking an average of one to two years. Most men spend a long time defending themselves.

The respondents in this study include detainees, men defending themselves in court, and men who escaped arrest but then surrendered by joining the Returning Home Project.¹¹ Men who are not given bail can be detained for 3–6 years, until their cases are decided, settled, or dismissed. Most of the respondents are married men (aged 25–40 years) who are their family's breadwinners. Their occupations include fruit farmers, rice farmers, vendors, business owners, and religious leaders, among others.

The study examines the impact of the conflict at the individual, family, and community levels. See Figure 6-1 for a representation of the impacts, coping strategies, and support available for men charged with security offenses.

Impacts at the Individual Level

Living in Fear

Detainees and former detainees live in fear for their lives not only while in detention but also after being released. They find they can no longer live normal lives. They must be very careful when travelling, meeting people, earning a living, and participating in social activities. One incident that exacerbated their fears and insecurities was ten detainees being released and eight of them being subsequently killed and the remaining two injured.¹² This incident left other detainees and former detainees feeling like targets, not only of the state officers who firmly believe that the detainees to be insurgents who cannot be dealt with through the justice system, but also of relatives seeking revenge for victims killed in the incidents. A former detainee reflects:

"The high court does not judge. So they use a self-appointed tribunal. Although I have been relieved from being an offender, I have not been able to go anywhere freely without fear. Two of my neighbours who were relieved from being offenders, went out to work but finally both of them were killed."

Even after the cases against them are dismissed, former detainees are still monitored by security officers. And if violent incidents occur in their neighborhoods, they are sought out by the authorities.

Men have been threatened by state officers while being interrogated and also after being released. A former detainee recalled, *"During interrogation by the officers, I was told to stand at the flag pole. They said they will try to shoot and see whether they shoot it precisely."* Another former detainee claimed that during his detention, *"An officer threatened me saying that 'Staying in here is better. If you stay outside, you may be killed.'"* Another former detainee reported that state officers situated near his home threatened him with the warning, *"You are back. Be careful!"*


The insurgency has caused tremendous distrust between the Buddhists and Muslims. Men charged with security offenses living near Buddhist communities do not feel safe when travelling.

¹⁰ Information on detainees charged with security offenses was gathered from two main sources: the voices of the directly affected detainees and the organizations that have provided support to this target group.

¹¹ This project is a part of the government's Army Area Fourth that aims to help men who have fled summonses but now want to return home.

¹² Anchana Heemmina, 2014. The alleged offenders against security and insurgency offenses (4): Statistics and impacts of illegal and extrajudicial murders. Deep South Watch, January 2014, [http:// www.deepsouthwatch.org](http://www.deepsouthwatch.org).

Figure 6-1. Men Charged with Security Offenses



Psychological Impacts

Men who were detained have been psychologically affected in multiple ways. The severity level depends on their treatment during their detention and interrogation, the length of time they were detained, and their former social status and roles. Some of the main psychological impacts are described below.

Loss of freedom. Detainees feel that they have lost their freedom—both during detention and after being released. However, there are differences between the two periods. While detained, the men report feelings of having lost their freedom in a severe way, causing many great stress and profound depression. A former detainee reflects, “It was an unexplainable feeling.” One man who kept *jumbal* birds as hobby had to ask his family members to release all of the birds. Many detainees were kept chained at all times—even during religious worship. Now, every time they see chains, they are driven to tears. (Chains are no longer used during detentions.) The only vocational training available in detention is for fishnet weaving. Training in woodworking or mechanics is not offered to the detainees because it involves sharp or dangerous equipment. These limitations cause increased dissatisfaction.

After being cleared of all charges, former detainees feel a loss of their freedom in other ways. They are unable to freely go anywhere. They must be exceedingly careful when travelling because they feel unsafe. One former detainee remarked, “*Out of the state prison, and into our own prison.*”

Disgrace and anger. Feelings of disgrace and anger are especially common among men who believe themselves to be innocent and who have not received justice. One said, *“I feel terrible. Encountering the police or soldiers, I wish I don’t see their faces. I do not want to cooperate in any of the state activities. I did not do anything wrong and why did they do such things to me?”*

A detainee charged with a security offense recalls:

“I was detained in the year 2009. My village was enclosed by the soldiers. They charged those who were not at home. That time I was not at home because I went to work in Had Yai. That was why I was detained. In fact they could check by looking at a close-circuit monitor that I was really at work but they did not listen, claiming that was their way of charging process. I was a suspect just because I was not at home. And it took me two years until the case was dismissed by the court.”

Shame and loss of dignity. Men suspected of security offenses are considered criminals by most people in society, especially if they have been detained or if the arrest is reported in the news. This causes the men to feel ashamed and that they have lost their dignity. Religious leaders and religious teachers (ustaz) are particularly affected by these feelings because they used to be respected by the local people. A detainee who was a religious leader says, *“I was respected by local people but from now on I do not know what they would think about me.”* In much the same way, another community leader says, *“After being released, I have mostly stayed at home and not wanted to meet people. Most people think that the detainees are wrongdoers.”*

Distrust. Former detainees can feel paranoid and distrustful of others, partly because they are worried about their personal safety. They must take care when travelling. *“When driving, if I see teenagers riding on motorcycle following me, although they are just talking on cell phone, I am frightened.”* There is even more distrust of security officers. Former detainees do not want to talk much less collaborate with state officers. Many who had already been charged with security offenses without evidence are afraid of being falsely accused again.

As one former detainee describes, *“It happened at Rue Soh. I was on the way for rubber tapping. I happened to meet security officers and I was charged and investigated. They doubted that I was involved in the insurgency. This happened to me twice even though I was just on the way to work.”*

Hatred and anger toward security officers. Detainees who are bullied and physically and mentally abused by state officers under detention often feel they have lost their human dignity, which in turn, fosters feelings in term of hatred toward state officers. *“I wish I could kill the ones who bullied me. It is tit for tat,”* one former detainee explains.

Mental health. Due to intense stress, anxiety, and pressure, detainees—especially if they were abused, tortured, or threatened during interrogation—can develop symptoms of mental disorders, including hallucinations, for a few months after being released from prison. Some men are so frightened that their bodies shake when meeting or passing a state officer or soldier. Some experience a sense of panic just from hearing the sound of a car or motorcycle because they fear being taken away again.

After being released from prison, men who have been detained for a long time can feel depressed, lethargic, and unresponsive to the people around them.

Physical Impacts

Some detainees were physically abused during their detentions and interrogations in a number of ways. They were bullied and suffocated, their heads were pushed into water, and they were left in extremely cold or hot weather for lengthy periods, as examples. For the most part, the bullying and torture of the detainees occurred in 2005–07; there have been fewer instances since 2007 due to the increased role of human rights organizations in local operations.

Some men who were detained for a long time find they cannot sleep in dark places after being released because they are accustomed to sleeping with a light on in prison.

Social Impacts

A loss of social status and roles. Detainees lose their social status and roles for a number of reasons, including the perception of society that they are criminals even though their cases were dismissed, resulting in the men feeling less respected. Some people avoid contact with former detainees for fear of becoming targets of monitoring themselves. And former detainees constrict their own roles to keep from being targeted by state officers. Religious and community leaders feel a sense of lost social status and roles much more profoundly than the overall population.

Decreased participation in social activities. Former detainees being targeted and monitored by state officers have to reduce their roles, avoid interacting with others, and avoid participating in community activities. They fear being accused of gang assembly, which would cause trouble to themselves and their communities. With regard to local politics, they can only participate as voters. They cannot serve as political leaders because no one wants to join their campaigns.

Decreased participation in public religious activities. Worried about their own safety, some former detainees do not dare to go a mosque for prayers at night. Some avoid joining village meetings; some *bilals*¹³ stop going for *khutbah*¹⁴ reading on Fridays.

Reduced interactions with friends and people in communities. During the initial period after detainees have been released from prison, their friends and community members usually have fewer interactions with them. They do not engage in conversations with them in the same way they did in the past. Former detainees are not invited to social functions. As time passes, these relationships improve, but they are never exactly the way they were before. And whenever there is an incident in their neighborhood, state officers come to inspect their homes, feeding feelings of paranoia among people in the communities. One former detainee explains:

“...after being released, I feel that friends are gone. No one dare to accompany me when I ride a motorcycle. At a tea house, when I walk in to join a group of friends, they all stand up and disappear...” and “...at every intersection in the district there are pictures of me. People see my pictures every day. It has taken years for them to socialise with me.”

Some community members assume that former detainees were released on the condition that they would act as spies for the state. A former detainee reveals, “...people are afraid that I am a spy for state officers. They think I was released on that reason.”

Economic Impacts

Detainees and former detainees face obvious economic impacts while they are in the process of defending themselves and after their release. Examples of these impacts follow.

Inability to resume past career/employment. Although out on bail or cleared of charges, many former detainees are unable to resume work due for several reasons apart from their safety. Some of the men need to take time off to concentrate on their legal defense. They might quit a regular job and take temporary jobs that leave them with time to work on their cases and so they can be available for frequent and unpredictable demands on their schedules. Rubber tappers have less time for rubber tapping—they dare not go out before dawn. Some do not dare to go to rubber plantations far from their homes for fear of being attacked. As a result, others are hired in their place.

¹³ A bilal is the person who calls the people to Friday prayer at a mosque.

¹⁴ A khutbah is a sermon based on the Koran

Fewer career or employment options. No employers, particularly government organizations, want to hire people who have been charged with a security offense. One former detainee declares, *“I was proposed to be a villager head’s assistant but I was denied because my resume showed a record about being charged with security offense.”* Some ustaz (religious teachers) can no longer teach.

Some men cannot resume their careers because state officers are monitoring people in those professions as likely insurgents, including electricians, television mechanics, and anyone involved with equipment that could be used as a weapon.

Need to make career change. Rather than rubber tapping at plantations near their homes, some former detainees have had to take jobs in other areas for which they do not have skills.

Impacts at the Family Level

Psychological Impacts

Family members have worsening mental health. These psychological effects are due to the stress and anxiety about the safety of the person facing charges or who is being monitored for alleged crimes. Family members also worry about family finances and how they can help during the legal process.

Children of detainees who are old enough to understand their situation have been deeply affected. Some children feel sorrow that their fathers are seen as criminals. Others become isolated and avoid socializing with friends.

Family members have negative attitudes toward security officers. Family members sometimes feel frightened that they are also targets. When soldiers came to visit one former detainee’s home, his children expressed hatred toward them. *“When seeing the soldiers, my 4-year-old son will hit them with a wooden stick. When he was asked why, he replied that they have come to arrest my dad.”*

Economic Impacts

When men are charged with security offenses, the families suffer economic impacts as described below.

Increased expenses and debt. Families have to spend money on bail, which requires very large securities worth around 500,000–800,000 Baht, depending on the severity of the charges. (Currently, the securities requirements have been reduced to 300,000–600,000 Baht). Most families rent land title deeds to use as securities, forcing them to pay 10,000 Baht for every 100,000 Baht needed. Some families are cheated out of their money. And some families are asked to pay up to 70,000 Baht. Further, there are additional expenses involved in a criminal defense case, including travel costs for family members and buying gifts for the person in detention. Many families have experienced financial problems that have resulted in ongoing outstanding debt.

A former detainee explained, *“After being charged with security offense, my wife’s gold jewellery has been sold, and pawned...it became her burden to visit me twice a week.”* Another notes, *“During detention and defending the case, my family applied for a loan from the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Co-operatives to pay family expenses. Even now that I have been released, we still have to pay the debts.”*

Decreased family income. Most detainees had been the main income earner for their families. While detained, the livelihoods of their families suffered, and women had to become the main breadwinners.

With increasing expenses and decreasing incomes, many families struggle to pay for their children’s education. A former detainee shares, *“...My life totally collapsed. Unlike in the past when I had money enough to spend and to pay for children’s education, now I can hardly make ends meet.”*

Social Impacts

Relationship problems among family members. The severity of the strain on relationships varies significantly, as described below:

- Family bonds are shattered. Some of the wives of men convicted of security offenses and sentenced to death or life imprisonment have filed for divorce.
- Children feel alienated. The alienation stems from the fact that the men were detained when their children were still quite young. After they are released, their children are afraid to get close to them. A former detainee explains, *“I have been back at home for two years but I still cannot hug my youngest son.”*
- Siblings and relatives sometimes do not want to take the risk of socializing or providing support for the former detainee. They fear being associated with the same group as their relative or sibling by the authorities. Some former detainees have been refused overnight visits with relatives.

Families have fewer social interactions. Children and family members of detainees and former detainees are viewed as children and family members of criminals. Community members rarely socialize with the families even after the detainees are released and even if they are believed to be innocent for fear that they themselves might become targets of monitoring by state officers.

In some cases, relatives of former detainees have been affected. The nephews of some former detainees, who were *toh bilal*, had to stop the regular *khutbah* reading on Fridays due to criticism from people in the community.

Impacts at the Community Level

Security officers monitor the communities where detainees and former detainees live with their families. If an incident occurs nearby, a community is surrounded and inspected by security officers. Some communities are visited regularly, leading to a number of impacts as described below.

Community members cannot live normal lives because they worry about their safety. They feel they must be careful and that they cannot move about freely, particularly when many state officers enclose a community and inspect some of the homes.

Community members and families of detainees can lose faith in community and religious leaders who seem to have only a small role in helping men charged with security offenses or in maintaining community peace and who cannot be relied on to help when people are threatened by state officers. Religious leaders must themselves be careful because they are watched by both the community who sees them as allies of the state and by state officers yet they are distrusted.

A former detainee reflects about the roles of religious leaders, saying, *“In fact they have to help us. They know all about our daily activities. We go rubber tapping in the morning, and then teach the Quran and tadika. We cannot expect anything from them.”*

Impacts on Gender Issues

In Muslim communities in southern provinces, men are leaders playing numerous social roles. The insurgency has had tremendous impact on men charged with security offenses, and this has led to a change in roles of men and women in society.

Men charged with security offenses usually lose their roles as leaders and breadwinners. With the men engaged in their legal defense and/or under detention for long periods, women—wives, sisters, and mothers—must assume the male roles, shouldering more of the family burdens. Many women must also serve as the contact for state officers with regard to the legal cases because the men who are charged feel ashamed and have lost both their confidence and social status. One former detainee describes his feelings about losing his role as a leader this way:

“Being charged with security offense, I am viewed as a lazy man, letting my wife work outside the home. For the past four years during detention, my wife has taken responsibility as family leader. After being released, I still cannot go to work due to safety reason. I feel ashamed, very ashamed. I am like a kind of birds, whose female partners go out to find food while male partners raise children at home.”

In conclusion, the data indicates that the main impacts on men charged with security offenses are insecurity, loss of freedom and dignity, and an inability to live normal lives even after being cleared as offenders. Psychological impacts are profound and the loss of confidence is great. The economic and social consequences may be considered lower priorities by the men but these impacts also must be addressed because they are necessary factors in restoring their and their families’ lives as soon as possible.

Being charged with a security offense is a sensitive issue with tremendous consequences not only on the men charged and their families but also on their relatives, involved persons, and community members, which is why many seek to maintain a safe distance and play only a small role in helping the detainees, former detainees, and their families.

Coping Strategies

Men charged with security offenses—and their families—demonstrate a number of coping strategies from the time of arrest, through the legal proceedings, and after charges are cleared. Some of the coping strategies are described below.

Upon Arrest and During the Legal Proceedings

Consult close and reliable persons. Men who have been arrested and charged with security offenses usually consult reliable friends, including family members and relatives, to make social connections and get help and support.

Seek help from human rights and legal organizations. Men charged with security offenses consult reliable legal organizations, mostly civil society organizations (CSOs) and NGOs such as the Muslim Attorney Center and the Alternative Volunteer Lawyers Network. Currently, most reach out to the Muslim Attorney Center because its role is well known and services are easily accessed.

Find comfort in religion. Men charged with security offenses may find comfort by reflecting on religious principles. For example, Muslims believe that problems are a test from Allah and that they should live normal lives and ignore other people’s words and reactions.

Escape stressful environment. Men out on bail can feel a great deal of pressure from the surrounding community, which sometimes leads them to leave home for other places for a period of time.

Seek inspiration and quiet space. Some men stay overnight at mosques or with friends who are facing similar trials to help prepare themselves for going to court. Talking to others who have experienced similar challenges can make the men feel better. Sometimes they receive helpful advice regarding their defense from others.

Have family members inform others that they are working in Malaysia while in detention. This can reduce the impact on children who would probably be ridiculed or avoided by their friends if it became known that their fathers were detainees.

Receive financial support from relatives and communities. Occasionally, relatives and communities offer financial support to detainees and their families to use for household expenses and legal fees in the form of cash gifts or local fundraising efforts.

After Being Cleared of Charges

Men charged with security offenses are most concerned about their safety after they are cleared of charges. The experience changes their lives and behavior in many ways including as follows.

Changes in commuting and daily lifestyles. The men avoid certain routes that they perceive as too risky. They take extra care when commuting, planning their routes in advance and avoiding using the same route in both directions. While driving, they often look in the rear view mirror to see if they are being followed. They avoid riding motorcycles and choose to drive cars instead. They try to avoid going out after 6:00 p.m.

Avoid being monitored by all parties. Some men leave to work in other provinces or in Malaysia, some move away from their home to stay with friends or relatives, and some stay at home but try to stay hidden—sometimes for as long as six months without neighbors knowing.

Let women deal with state officers. To avoid conflict and keep from being monitored by state officers, men charged with security offenses let their wives or mothers talk to state officers.

Seek safe places. Some men join well-recognized networks and organizations to demonstrate their clear social status in an attempt to appear less suspicious to officers.

Gather in groups. Some men form or join formal groups so they will be accepted in society, for mutual support, and for their safety. Examples of these groups include Justice for Peace, which now has around 300 members and the Alternative Volunteer Lawyers Network, whose work includes providing information on basic rights and laws, visiting and helping to heal conflict-affected families, preparing conflict-affected families for welcoming detainees who are returning home, and collaborating with state organizations when problems arise. A member of the network says, *“I join the network for social work, to build up social acceptance, to make my family proud of myself because being charged with security offense is likened to having a sin.”*

However, members of these groups can also worry about being monitored by both state officers and insurgents. With regard to the state officers, the groups try to foster an understanding with them, keeping them informed of their ongoing activities and requesting financial support, when possible.

Flee to Malaysia to avoid summons and arrest. Based on rumours and reports from former detainees, men summoned and charged under the Emergency Decree are afraid they will be tortured. Some flee to Malaysia, resulting in them being automatically charged with another criminal offense.

Surrender by joining the Fourth Army Area’s Returning Home Project. Men who avoided their summonses but who later, tired of being on the run, wish to go home, sometime choose to join the Fourth Army Area’s Returning Home Project because it is a safe option for returning to their communities. But making this decision is difficult because the men are not certain that they will be safe. One man who return through the program says, *“It took me years to make this decision. I consulted my family, relatives and friends to make sure that it is a safe option to go back home.”*

Coping strategies can be divided into two categories:

- (1) Strategies for coping with psychological impacts: family support and religious principles
- (2) Strategies for coping with safety concerns: changing daily living and commuting routines; finding temporary and/or permanent safe places; and joining reliable organizations, mainly NGOs, that can provide advice and legal help.

Help and Support from Service Providers

See Table 6-1 for a summary of assistance from the state, NGOs, and CSOs.

After Being Cleared of Charges

Legal services are provided to men charged with security offenses, including consultations and securing defense attorneys, by two main service providers: the Muslim Attorney Center and the Alternative Volunteer Lawyers Network. Both organizations are trusted, but the Muslim Attorney Center is better known and considered the primary provider of legal services for the men. From 2007–13, the Center worked on 861 cases; of the 669 cases that were adjudicated, 506 (75.6 percent) resulted in the men being cleared of charges (Muslim Attorney Center 2013). However, the Muslim Attorney Center is limited in its ability to provide services. There are insufficient number of attorneys to properly handle and efficiently support the number of cases, as each case takes a long time. In addition, the Center must also seek its own funding. This also contributes to the limitation to provide continuous services.

The Alternative Volunteer Lawyers Network, taking all the evidence into consideration, offers two options to a man charged with security offenses: defend himself against the charges or negotiate a deal. The network also coordinates with other organizations for additional assistance.

The Muslim Attorneys Center and the Damrong Tham Center receive complaints about the injustice and violation of the rights of detainees, including torture. They seek ways to provide further support, including making requests to collaborate with state organizations, submitting cases to the National Human Rights Commission, and contacting the Internal Security Operation Command and the Southern Border Province Administrative Centre (SBPAC). Between 2007–13, the Muslim Attorney Center received a total of 3,465 complaints from men charged with security offenses (Muslim Attorney Center 2013).

**Table 6-1. Summary of Help and Support from Service Providers
for Detainees and Former Detainees**

Assistance provided	CSOs/NGOs				State organizations		
	Muslim Attorney Center	Alternative Volunteer Lawyers Network	Duay Jai Group	International Red Cross	SBPAC	The Fifteenth Mental Health Center	Damrong Tham Center
Rights and judicial procedures							
Giving advice and finding attorneys	✓	✓					
Receiving complaints about violations of rights and unfair treatment	✓						✓
Providing information on rights and laws for men charged with security offenses	✓	✓					
Spiritual healing and psychological support							
Visits during detention	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	
Visits to families of men charged with security offenses			✓				
Financial compensation					✓		
Meetings with detainees to listen to their opinions on ways to help them further		✓	✓		✓		

Source: From the interview which might not include all providers

Organizations providing information to men charged with security offenses on their basic rights and the law include the Muslim Attorney Center, the Alternative Volunteer Lawyers Network, the Cross Cultural Foundation, and SBPAC. The Muslim Attorneys Center is the primary organization offering these services because it is located in the target areas unlike the other organizations that cannot provide continual services.

A number of organizations encourage men cleared of charges to help one another and help men currently facing security charges. They include Justice for Peace, which uses the Muslim Attorneys Center as its consultant and the Alternative Volunteer Lawyers Network, whose main activities involve providing information about rights and the law, visiting families of detainees, and helping to coordinate with state officers when group members encounter problems. The group is still in its initial stages and needs many forms of support, such as access to information and funding, if it is to operate at its full potential.

The Fourth Army Area helps men charged with security offenses who have fled in order to avoid state summonses or who have committed acts of violence against the state to return home via the Returning Home Project. To date, the project's success has been limited to the men who were accused and fled their summonses out of fear. It has not achieved positive results for men who have engaged in violence against the state because if those men do return home, they feel like losers who have lost their dignity. Moreover, they feel that they are being used as a political tool by the state in its fight with the insurgents.

Psychological Support and Spiritual Healing

State organizations, CSOs, and NGOs provide psychological support and spiritual healing for men being detained during their trials and men who have been cleared of charges.

The state organization that has direct responsibility for visiting detainees during their detention and trials is the Fifteenth Mental Health Center. Staff members visit with detainees and assess their mental health. SBPAC organized a special project implemented in 2013 that provided for the women's civil society networks to bring the families of detained men to visit them. The Muslim Attorneys Center, the Duay Jai Group, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and others have also provided either continued or occasional support. In many provinces, the Duay Jai Group pays visits to the families of detainees.

One detainee found this kind of support helpful. *"I felt I was not left alone. At least some people still offer care."*

Visiting detainees reduces rights violations and physical abuse by state officers because visitors are channels for the detainees to voice their issues. Unfortunately, these types of useful visits are not done on a regular basis.

SBPAC is responsible for providing mental and financial support to detainees after they are cleared of all charges.

- Mental support involves meeting with men cleared of charges to seek helpful solutions and collaborate with relevant organizations to provide more comprehensive support. For example, some men need help removing their names from the government watch list even after they are released. However, there is no guarantee of positive results because the outcome mainly depends on the security organization's considerations.
- Support in the form of monetary compensation has been given to 705 former detainees, worth a total of 29,297,400 Baht according to 2004–11 data (SBPAC 2013). This is an ad hoc policy of the secretary of SBPAC, and is therefore likely to prove to be inconsistent as administrators change.
- In accordance with the criminal injuries and damages compensation act B.E. 2001, compensation has been given to people who were sued and to detainees. People who were sued prior to 2011 were given 15,000 Baht each; people who were sued after 2011 were given 30,000 Baht each. In addition, each of the detainees was compensated at 400 Baht a day, but no more than a total of 200,000 Baht.

Needs of Detainees

The highest priority needs among detained men are related to their safety and security as well as their legal rights and judicial procedures. Secondary priorities include mental health and vocational support.

Safety

Men charged with security offenses need safety for their own lives and for the lives of their family members. They need to live normal lives without fear or anxiety during their trials and after they are cleared of charges. Incidents in the past have left them feeling insecure. “During trial, I need to make sure about life safety and which organization can guarantee safety for me,” explains one detainee.

Legal Rights and Procedures

Men charged with security offenses find current legal and judicial procedures to be ambiguous, including arrests, interrogations, and the resolution of criminal trials. The following ideas are proposed:

- During an arrest, the officer states the offense for which the person is arrested. Most of the men charged with security offenses in the past did not know what offenses they were charged with.
- An intermediary is required to jointly investigate and draw clear conclusions acceptable to all parties.
- The state officers should accept the judgment of the court and put it into practice. If detainees are exonerated, state officers should no longer monitor them.
- When a case is closed and a person cleared of charges, state officers should inform all state agencies of the person's status so do not have any problems contact governmental organizations in the future (e.g., passport office).
- Relevant information must available at every rotation of military personnel and must be clearly communicated. In the past, people have been questioned repeatedly, which is frightening for them.
- Information about basic rights and the special laws for the conflict areas must be given to anyone charged with an offense, to the general public, and to state officers in order to promote mutual understanding. An increase in knowledge about rights and laws could lead to a decrease in rights violations and unjust acts.
- The special laws should be reviewed to determine whether or not they can really solve the problems and whether there are more disadvantages than advantages. In the past 10 years, the special laws used in the areas have not been able to solve the insurgency problems but instead have largely affected the violation of rights of local people. This reflects that *“using powerful methods for a long time can result in chronic impacts.”*

Psychological Healing

Men charged with security offenses feel that they are stigmatized by society as wrongdoers. They often feel that they lost their human dignity while in detention. After being cleared of charges, they want people in the society to acknowledge their innocence. They hope to change people's attitudes toward detainees experiencing lengthy trials.

Civil society and former detainees should play roles helping and healing detainees. Former detainees know something about how the current detainees must feel and many people do not trust state officers to do this job. As one former detainee expresses, “It is hard to accept helping and healing from the ones who arrested us.”

Many detainees and former detainees think that compensation regulations should be adjusted. People “being given benefits of the doubt due to insufficient evidence” should be legally and rightly compensated in the same way as people who are exonerated. People in this category have been receiving compensation in

accordance with SBPAC's policy, not as a matter of law. The policy is likely to change with a change of administration at SBPAC.

Support and spiritual healing services should be provided to the family of detainees during their trials because the lives of their children and wives are also impacted.

Vocational Support for a Better Quality of Life

Men charged with security offenses do not see vocational support as an immediate need, but it is considered necessary over the long-term to help men cleared of charges pursue promising careers. They propose the following measures.

- Individual support in accordance with the person's former career/skills. Alternatively, conflict-affected people can gather in informal groups to help and consult with one another.
- Unions and cooperatives (e.g., agricultural cooperatives) should be supported.
- Help and support from involved organizations should be continuous, not occasional. Organizations should not just conduct surveys about community needs and then disappear.

Educational Support for Children

Former detainees cleared of charges want educational support for their children to allow them to pursue a higher education at the university level.

Overall Problems of Detainees and Former Detainees

Based on the multiple impacts experienced by detainees and former detainees and the support provided by involved organizations, the overall problems of detainees and former detainees can be summarized as follows:

- Detainees and their families no longer trust the formal legal and judicial process, particularly with regard to arrests, investigations, and interrogations that led to many innocent people being arrested and charged with crimes, especially during the initial stage of the conflict. For example, between 2010–11, 72 percent of security cases were dismissed at the court of first instance (SBPAC 2013) despite improvements to the investigative process aimed to reduce the number of wrongful arrests.
- State security officers do not understand the religion and culture of the local people, and this contributes to wrongful arrests and violence during interrogations. For example:
 - Security officers from the area are ignorant about the prevalent use of some common family names among Malay people and the similarity some names have to each other in terms of their pronunciation. When this lack of knowledge is coupled with the absence of proper investigations, wrongful arrests become likely.
 - Some detainees believe that the reason they were physically tortured during their interrogations was because the security officers had a limited understanding of the local language and culture. For instance, a man experiencing stress during an interrogation could cry out, "Allah," and because a security officer thinks that is a challenge, becomes more violent toward the detainee.
- The slow pace of the legal filing and judicial process results in long detentions. Most of the cases take one to two years each because they involve several indictments and postponements—82 percent of indictments were postponed seven times (SBPAC 2013). In addition, 73 percent of court dates are postponed. When a man is charged with multiple offenses, the legal process is lengthy because each case is handled separately.
- Most former detainees who have been cleared of charges are still monitored by security officers. They do not feel personally secure and believe that they are always under suspicion.

- In the eyes of security officers, the insurgents are criminals, not people with different ideologies, which is why they are prepared to use violence against them. When the justice system fails to prove a suspected insurgent is guilty of any crime security officers often become violent toward the men or become self-appointed tribunals.
- Government assistance still does not include the psychological support that could help men cleared of charges feel that they are being fairly treated. Support should include efforts to help the men restore their sense of dignity after they have been misjudged as criminals by society. One former detainee remarks, “When I was arrested, it made headline news. But, when I was cleared as offenders, no public announcements were made.”
- The existing spiritual healing services have not been widely accessed by conflict-affected people. Many do not trust and do not want to associate with state officers. Further, state support is not proactively delivered to target groups. The conflict-affected person needing services usually has to request them, and some application procedures are too complicated, fostering an increasingly negative image of state officers. One former detainee expresses, “Being charged with security offense, I feel terrible. This time I have to contact them by myself, asking for services. Isn’t it like I am a beggar?” Moreover, most of the state’s healing methods are carried out without a good understanding of the needs of the conflict-affected group.
- Spiritual healing services for detainees, former detainees, and their families have only been provided by a handful of state agencies and CSOs even though they are a vulnerable group who, if not well care for, could choose to join an anti-state group out of an utter sense of injustice.

Challenges

The most difficult challenge for former detainees who have been cleared of charges is to return to their normal lives to the greatest extent possible. In addition to being judged as wrongdoers by society, the men face bias from state officers who consider them to be insurgents; the insurgents themselves who consider them to be state spies, and people who have lost loved ones due to the insurgency who want revenge on those who participated in violent incidents.

Recommendations for Supporting Men Charged with Security Offenses

Support and spiritual healing services must be provided to conflict-affected people systematically and comprehensively. The processes for delivering the services must be clearly indicated in the policies of the Office of National Security Council to ensure that they are carried out earnestly and continuously.

Legal Rights and Judicial Procedures

- The investigation process must be standardized and recognized by all parties.
- The choice to defend oneself or negotiate should be offered. A committee or organization dedicated exclusively to this issue should be established.
- Fair, socially-recognized mechanisms, such as CSOs and educational institutions, should be involved in providing justice for conflict-affected people. They could help develop mutual understanding and negotiate with state officers when suspects are being unfairly treated during investigations, interrogations, or the legal filing process.
- When a state officer is found guilty of a crime, the legal penalties should be made public in order to build trust and confidence in the state judicial system among the general public.

- Information on legal rights and special laws used specifically in the conflict areas must be provided to accused persons, operation officers, and the general public to foster mutual understanding.
- Arrested persons must be kept separate from convicted criminal detainees until their case is heard.

Psychological Healing

- Former detainees should be helped to return to normal lives by providing them with life and vocational skills.
- Safe zones must be created in the three provinces for former detainees to live together and earn a living.
- The state should focus on the psychological well-being of conflict-affected men to earn their confidence that they will be treated fairly. For example, state officers should hold press conferences to publicly declare that men have been found not guilty of the security offenses with which they were charged. The names of the exonerated men should be removed from the government watch list and the behavior of officers should reflect those changes.
- The state should provide proactive, comprehensive emotional health services, including information and evidentiary documents; it should not have to wait for the conflict-affected person to ask for help.
- The state should foster a relationship of trust with conflict-affected people. For instance, officers should meet with former detainees cleared of security offenses and men charged under the Emergency Decree in order to seek solutions to the problems they face.
- The state should encourage local civil society to work with men who have been arrested with the aim of healing other conflict-affected people. Civil society has garnered trust with and has better access to all of the conflict-affected groups.
- Groups of conflict-affected people, such as the Justice for Peace and the Alternative Volunteer Lawyers Network, should be encouraged to better help one another.
- Criteria for receiving compensation should include people judged by the court “to be given benefit of the doubt due to insufficient evidence.” The calculation for compensation should be based on actual days of detention without limit because these men have been impacted by the justice system itself.
- Information should be shared and linked between civil society and the state in order to jointly design comprehensive and effective support/emotional healing programs for the conflict-affected people.
- The media should report on the humanity of men charged with security offenses to help the public better understand them so they can be ready to welcome them back to live in their communities.

Vocational Support for a Better Quality of Life

- Vocational support should be provided to enable conflict-affected people to have home-based, sustainable, and self-sufficient careers.
- Vocational support should build on the past careers of detainees when possible. For instance, a man who was a religious teacher (ustaz), should be encouraged to resume his teaching work because it will otherwise be difficult for him to find a new job.
- Working in groups—such as agricultural cooperatives that include production and processing—should be supported to promote self-sufficiency over the long term.

Educational Support for Children

Children of the conflict-affected men should be encouraged to pursue a higher education at the university level.

6.2 Men on the State's Watch Lists

State officers monitor men (aged 18–50 years) charged with offenses or called in for questioning under the Emergency Decree. The watch list includes religious leaders, tadika teachers, and ustaz in ponoh and private religious schools. Also on the list are men who take leadership roles during social activities locally or throughout the three southern provinces, men whose family members are charged with security offenses, and young men and students who are social activists and who graduated from private religious schools, because state officers believe that private religious schools instill students with the ideology of the insurgency.


Initially, the Emergency Decree was issued with a warrant sweep. During the years 2004–13, 1,305 people were investigated and charged with offenses under the Emergency Decree but not referred for prosecution. Some had fled out of ignorance and fear (SBPAC 2013). In addition, the decree was likely be used as tool.

Since 2007, legal organizations have operated in the conflict-affected areas, allowing them to provide support to men charged with security offenses in a more systematic way. This has resulted in fewer people fleeing or being tortured. At the same time, the state's working system and issuance of laws is being carried out more systematically with less frequent warrant sweeps. A charge made under the Emergency Decree is valid for one year, but extensions are given in some circumstances. If there is insufficient evidence, charges are dropped.

Respondents providing information in this study include men on the government watch list and men charged with offenses under the Emergency Decree, aged 30–50 years with various occupations, including fruit farmer, rubber tapper, rice farmer, fisherman, general laborer, vendor, employee of private company, media professional, and ustaz (religious teacher). Participants also included religious leaders and CSO workers. Most had been charged with offenses under the Emergency Decree between 2004–07. Some had been called in for questioning and then were considered suspects by officers. Others were questioned and then released but were then questioned a second time, became frightened, and fled the area; they were consequently charged with the offenses. Some men fled to Malaysia while others hid within the three southern provinces.

Men on the government watch list and people charged with offenses under the Emergency Decree have provided information about the impacts they have experienced at multiple levels, their coping strategies, and their needs (see Figure 6-2).

Figure 6-2. Men on Watch Lists



Impacts at the Individual Level

Loss of Freedom/Inability to Enjoy a Normal Life

Men on the government watch list cannot live normal lives. They worry about their safety and are so afraid of being charged with security offenses that they do not dare go anywhere. They try to stay within the scope of state officers so they will not be charged with more serious offenses.

Living in fear/feeling unsafe. Men on the government watch list live in fear because they do not know what might happen next. They feel their lives and the lives of their family members are not safe. They are monitored constantly and their homes are occasionally surrounded for inspection, particularly when an incident occurs in the area. Their fear increases when they hear rumours of people being tortured and threatened during interrogation. They fear being charged on the basis of false evidence and not being able to defend themselves.

Voices of men charged with an offense under the Emergency Decree

"I live in the area where insurgency incidents often occur. I normally don't have fences around my family's rubber plantation. One day, state officers came for inspection but found nothing. After that they came twice. I doubt that someone may try to hide something in here. It is most likely that I will be alleged."

"During interrogation, state officers showed me pictures of my wife and children. I fear that their lives may be at risk."

"They have made a warrant sweep. Friends of those charged with offenses against the Emergency Decree are also suspected only because they are close friends. One day they will be included."

Men cleared of charges still feel a loss of freedom. Many are still monitored by security officers. In practice, they feel that even though they have been cleared of charges, they cannot go back to leading normal lives. If an incident occurs in their neighbourhood state officers usually surround it and inspect their homes. If they pass a military checkpoint, they are inspected, detained, and interrogated for long periods of time.

Unable to roam freely. Those who are monitored by state officers are followed and occasionally inspected. Sometimes, state officers visit their homes or ask them in for questioning. If state officers come to their homes and cannot find them, or if they do not report to state officers when asked, they automatically become suspects. Therefore, they try to remain close to home as much as possible.

"After being asked to report and later released, most of us are always afraid of being arrested again. If we go outside the areas, we will always be questioned. This is why we cannot go anywhere freely. I feel I have lost my freedom."

Some men, even after being cleared of all charges, cannot travel abroad because their names have not been removed from the government watch list at the immigration bureau. A former detainee says, *"After being informed that my offense was lifted, I wished to go to Malaysia but on the departing day, I was informed that I could not go because my name has not been removed from the name list of people charged with offenses under the Emergency Decree."*

Physical Impacts

Some of the men requested for interrogation or charged under the Emergency Decree were physically abused or tortured. Physical torture included being kept in rooms with air conditioners set at the coldest setting or turned off and being suffocated with plastic bags.

Men charged under the Emergency Decree believe that they were physically tortured because the state officers thought they were allied with the insurgents. They experienced more violent forms of torture than did general suspects. Men suspected of being insurgents or of killing or injuring soldiers and police experienced even more severe forms of torture because state officers were infuriated with them. But men whose relatives were state leaders or who knew someone with connections to state networks, NGOs, or CSOs, received more lenient treatment because state officers were concerned that complaints would be levied against them. Also, these men are better informed about their basic rights and the law and have connections with legal organizations and the media. Well-educated men and men fluent in Thai also received more lenient treatment and are not monitored as closely.

Voices of men requested for interrogation and charged with offenses under the Emergency Decree:

"During the enclosure and inspection of target areas, some state officers have biases and discrimination. Those who are well-educated and can speak Thai fluently will be released while those who cannot communicate with state officers will be detained and sometimes treated violently despite no evidence to prove them guilty."

"State officers rounded up a group of young men playing football and a group standing on a flyover. They were arrested and physically abused. But after the officers found out that a few of the young men are children of village heads, they released them and made apologies to their families."

Psychological Impacts

Men who are monitored by state officers, including those requested for interrogation and those charged with offenses under the Emergency Decree, experience psychological impacts to varying degrees during interrogation and detention. Men charged with offenses face more severe impacts than men only requested for interrogation. Common psychological impacts include:

- Feeling continuous stress and anxiety. Men experience continuous stress and anxiety because they are unable to roam freely or join activities with friends and community members—even men cleared of charges are still monitored. The men also fear repeated summonses, which could lead to accusations of even more serious crimes.
- Feeling hurt and indignant. Innocent men feel that they have been unfairly treated. Most had been called in for questioning and were accused of offenses under the Emergency Decree without sufficient evidence. They feel they have already been judged as criminals. A man says, *“I feel hurt. I haven’t done anything wrong. Why did they do such thing to me?”*
- Feeling disgraced. Community and religious leaders who are monitored feel they have lost their dignity. One religious leader reflects, *“During the initial stage of being alleged with offense against the Emergency Decree, people have lost respect for me. Being often visited by state officers, I have lost face.”*
- Mental disorders. Men who have been interrogated and are being monitored by state officers and men who have been charged under the Emergency Decree have suffered mental disorders, including constant anxiety and panic attacks. They do not dare to leave their homes. It can take years to recover. A witness says, *“A young man was arrested, and severely physically abused. Even after returning home, he is still in shock and confused.”*
- Distrust of state officers. Many men have been visited by state officers without any apparent reason, causing them to fear that they will be accused of being involved in insurgency activities.

An Ustaz at a school says, “The soldiers often come to my house. This causes fear among my family members. However, the soldiers cannot find any allegations as there are not enough evidences. I found out later that I was denounced by my enemy, who provided false information to the military.

Economic Impacts

Men monitored by state officers experience fewer economic impacts than men charged with criminal offenses, including shrinking incomes and fewer promising employment opportunities.

Shrinking incomes are caused by:

- Inability to work as usual
 - Men being monitored by state officers are held in suspicion if officers visit their homes and they are not there, or if they do not appear when summoned. Men involved in rubber tapping outside the area must refrain from it.
 - Some men have to reduce the amount of time they work for reasons of their personal safety. For example, a man might normally start rubber tapping at around 2:00–3:00 a.m. but now has to start at around 6:00 a.m., resulting in the collection of less latex.
 - The men cannot work as permanent employees. They have to take frequent leave because they receive periodic state summonses and are often visited by state officers. *“Having to report to the*

state officers 10 times, I took leave very often. If my boss knew about the summons, he would kick me out. I finally had to decide to quit my job."

- Employers do not want to associate with people who are charged with offenses under the Emergency Decree for fear of being involved in any kind of trouble. Buddhist plantation owners are particularly likely to terminate the employment of a man charged with offenses under the Emergency Decree.

Fewer promising career opportunities. As a rule, companies do not like to employ people with criminal records. A man charged with an offense under the Emergency Decree explains, *"I used to work at the defense volunteer force but after being charged with offense against the Emergency Decree, I was fired."*

Social Impacts

The main social impacts experienced by men on the government watch list is in their reactions to state officers and their relationships with family, friends, and community members. Men charged with security offenses experience these impacts to an even greater extent.

Loss of status and social standing. especially among religious leaders in the conflict areas. When first charged with offenses under the Emergency Decree, the men faced decreasing social acceptance because they had not yet proven their innocence. Trust can be regained but it takes a long time.

Participating in fewer community activities. The roles of men monitored by state officers or charged under the Emergency Decree have been reduced because they attend fewer social activities and meetings for fear of being accused of gathering with anti-state groups. One conflict-affected person noted, *"I have tried to make myself "small," not to go anywhere even within the same subdistrict for fear of being watched."* Many do not want to make their neighbors uneasy if they are frequently visited by state officers. And sometimes the neighbors assume the men to be insurgent allies so they limit their interactions with them. One man explained, *"Local people dare not talk to me because they think I am allied to the RKK."* Even when neighbors and friends learn of their proven innocence, they still avoid socializing with them for fear of also being accused of the same offense. A man reveals his feelings about being charged with offenses under the Emergency Decree: *"I feel terrible. Being charged with an offense under the Emergency Decree is likened to having a sin so deep-rooted that I do not have any friends."*

Impacts on Education

Young men in school who are being charged with offenses under the Emergency Decree have to periodically stop studying, and this has psychological impacts as well. Many lose interest in studying, which lowers learning performance. Some have to drop out of school.

Family Level

The families of men charged with offenses under the Emergency Decree or monitored by state officers experience impacts economically, socially, and in terms of personal safety.

Family members worry about the safety of men charged with offenses under the Emergency Decree. One family member explains, "After he has been accused, we worry about his safety especially when he goes out." In addition, some of the family members of the men charged with offenses or being watched have been monitored themselves, and therefore the men also worry about the safety of their family members.

Loss of key breadwinners leads to difficult living conditions. Men charged with an offense under the Emergency Decree usually cannot earn a normal living. Some get fired. Others flee and leave wives to take on the sole responsibility for parenting. Many families experience economic problems, and this impacts children's education. A man says, *"My wife has to take care of seven children. We now can just make end meets and we do not have enough money to send them to school."*

Community members reduce interactions with families out of fear of being monitored by the state themselves. A man says, *“Friends and people in the community come to visit us less frequently because they are afraid of being viewed as being involved with people charged with the offense. However, my children are still able to play with their friends.”*

Impacts at the Community Level

Soldiers often monitor the communities of people charged with offenses under the Emergency Decree. If a violent incident occurs, nearby communities are surrounded for inspection. People in these communities feel uneasy about being monitored. Having soldiers patrol the area makes them feel that their lives are insecure and that they must be very watchful. This affects their ability to earn a living. For example, people do not dare to go rubber tapping in areas frequently monitored by soldiers.

In addition, the community activities become less frequent as participation rates decline because events are monitored and the people attending them are questioned by soldiers. Many people are afraid that these situations could cause them problems.

Impacts on Gender Issues

Women assume men's roles. Men charged with offenses under the Emergency Decree have to be very careful. They must restrict their movements and cannot earn a normal living. Some of their responsibilities fall on their mothers, sisters, and wives. Many of the men let women be the contact for state officers in their place in order to avoid any potential problems. In cases of men fleeing from home (these occurred mainly in 2005 and 2007), women had to shoulder all of the family responsibilities, including parenting, earning a living, and participating in social activities.

More women are becoming *tadika* teachers. In Muslim culture, *tadika* teachers play a crucial role in their communities. In addition to teaching, they act as the coordinators of social activities that bring people together. However, since the rise of the insurgency, religious leaders, *takida* teachers, and *ustaz* in private religious schools have been the primary targets for being charged with offenses under the Emergency Decree because state officers believe they are spreading the ideology of insurgency. Some of male *tadika* teachers choose to stop working. More women have to assume the role of *tadika* teachers. Out of the total number of 11,999 *tadika* teachers, 60 percent are females (Office of Private Education n.d.) even though it is still not socially acceptable for a woman to play a leading role in Muslim culture.

In conclusion, most men monitored by state officers are religious leaders, *tadika* teachers, and *ustaz*, including young men studying in private religious schools.

Impacts on men monitored by state officers include stress, fear, and loss of freedom to live normal lives. Further, being cleared of charges does not make them free because they continue to be monitored by state officers.

These men have faced tremendous economic and social impacts, especially early on, but the effects do lessen over time. The impacts they have faced have been less severe than impacts felt by men criminally charged with security offenses, but participating in social activities is still difficult because they are under constant watch by state officers.

Coping Strategies

Men on the government watch list and their families report using the following coping strategies.

Seek help from numerous sources. including formal figures, such as village leaders, because they are responsible for putting the men in contact with district officers and the police in order to find ways to solve problems; people and organizations, including the Muslim Attorney Center and the Hilal-Ahmar Foundation, who help men get cleared of charges against them under the Emergency Decree and ensure that they are not physically abused by state officers; balanced and reliable sources, such as the National Reconciliation Commission (which is now closed) and CSOs; and influential people, such as senators and members of provincial councils.

Collaborate with state officers according to procedures. For instance, men report to state officers, participate in activities, and practice dawah in hopes that cooperation with state officers will get their names removed from the government watch list. These men do not dare flee because they worry about their families.

Skip scheduled court appearances out of fear. People who skip court appearances are ignorant of their basic rights and judicial procedures. They have heard rumors that others who had been arrested were treated badly. There was a spike in defendants missing scheduled court appearances between 2004–07.

Limit social activities. The men seek to draw less attention. They reduce their time commuting and socializing, especially outside their villages, in order to decrease suspicion and avoid any potential allegations.

Change commuting and other daily behavior. Many men do not go out at night or routinely commute in order to avoid being monitored. They also avoid deserted or risky routes. When driving, they often look in their rear mirrors. Some of the men avoid riding motorcycles, opting instead for cars whenever possible. Because they are concerned about their personal safety while commuting, some men make phone calls to friends to let them know their routes so that they can be traced if something happens to them.

Create clear and new roles for themselves. This fosters their acceptance by the public and state officers and can lead to less intensive monitoring. Some men do social development work with widely recognized organizations. Others befriend local security officers and inform state officers when they are attending social activities to mitigate suspicion.

Build up broader networks to help guarantee personal safety. Having a broad network with many friends around makes state officers more careful because there are more witnesses, providing protection for the men. One man being monitored says, *“I was frisked by state officers once. This time I was investigated and had to stay at a military camp for two nights. On the first day of detention, a friend of mine recorded the event using a video camera and posting it on YouTube, which put some pressure on the officers. When they found out that I had friends and worked for civil society media, they finally released me.”*

Seek out influential people. Some men try to temporarily stay with local influential friends. A man says, *“I made the last decision to stay at ...’s house because I had no other way to go. Simply put, I had to depend on the “mafia” to reduce conflicts. I just seek the shade of a big tree but not wanting its fruits.”*

Relocate to safe places. Men closely monitored by state officers can be in constant fear. Many respond by relocating to safe places, and even settling down and getting married elsewhere.

Rely on soul-soothing religious principles to build confidence and reduce anxiety and fear.

Search for information about relevant laws. Having an understanding of relevant laws, including the Security Act and the Emergency Decree, can reduce fear and anxiety.

Cut family expenses and find extra income. Families of men on the government watch list face negative economic impacts and have to reduce family expenses and to find additional income in varying ways. Some families have to find extra jobs while others have their children drop out of school to work.

Community Coping Strategies

Communities affected by the state's monitoring have the following coping strategies: (1) inform state officers when holding social activities to lessen suspicions. In some cases, state officers are invited to join activities or to be consultants; (2) some villages have female village heads to lessen the state's interest in them. State officers are usually less suspicious of women, making it more convenient for female village heads to contact state organizations; and (3) the number of female *tadika* teachers is increasing as the male *tadika* teachers are more likely to be suspected by state officers.

Coping strategies for men on the government watch list include efforts to have their names removed from the lists and taking great precautions to ensure their own personal safety.

Most of the men reduce their roles with regard to daily and social activities. If they feel they are in risky situations, they escape to find safe refuge elsewhere. Psychologically, they rely on families and soul-soothing religious principles.

Help and Support from Service Providers

Government agencies, NGOs and civil society have provided help and support to people affected by the government watch list. See Table 6-2 for a summary of assistance provided by State, NGO, and CSO service providers.

Rights and judicial procedures

Coordinate with the security agency to remove the men's names from the government watch list. After the men come forward, SBPAC and the Alternative Volunteer Lawyers Network contact the security agency asking that the conflict-affected people's names be removed from the government watch list. However, whether their names will be taken off depends largely on the judgment of the security agency.

Receive and take action on complaints about violations of rights and unfair treatment. The Muslim Attorney Center and the Damrong Tham Center have received complaints from people who said they have suffered violations of their rights, including torture. Actions taken in response to the complaints include contacting government agencies to ask for help; petitioning the National Human Rights Commission; pursuing meetings with security agency officials (Southern Border Provinces Police Operation Center); and seeking meetings with administrative agencies (SBPAC). To date, most complaints have been filed with the Muslim Attorney Center because men on the government watch list trust the center more than the government agencies. Between 2004 and 2011, persons detained and released under the special laws (no criminal prosecution) had lodged 1,677 complaints with the center (Muslim Attorney Center 2012).

Educate men facing summonses under the Emergency Decree as well as the general public about the law and their rights. Several organizations have worked on this cause, including the Muslim Attorney Center, the Alternative Volunteer Lawyers Network, the Cross Cultural Foundation, and SBPAC Friends of Defendants. The Muslim Attorney Center has worked in the local areas and has been the primary player in this mission. Information provided by the center suggests that the number of complaints has decreased as a result of the increased awareness. However, efforts at educating people about these matters are not comprehensive or consistent because of financial and human resource limitations.

Remedial Actions and Psychological Rehabilitation

Financial compensation for detention (without prosecution). From 2004–13, SBPAC awarded 109,621,400 Baht in compensation to 1,305 people who had been detained but not ultimately prosecuted (Muslim Attorney Center 2012). However, the compensation is being paid in response to a special policy of SBPAC secretary

general, which means that if a new secretary general is appointed, the policy could be discontinued.

In line with the Compensation for Victims and Defendants in Criminal Cases of B.E. 2544, men prosecuted before 2011 receive 15,000 Baht while men prosecuted in 2011 onward receive 30,000 Baht. If the man was detained, he receives 400 Baht per day in detention but not exceed a total of 200,000 Baht.

It takes 6–12 months after submitting a request, for a victim who had been detained but ultimately not prosecuted to receive any compensation payments. Some were never compensated because the compensation budget was only approved in 2012, and they were unable to acquire the documents required for the compensation-payment process. These documents are issued by the detaining authorities, but these didn't exist from 2004–11. For many local people, especially the elderly who tend to lack fluency in the Thai language, it is complicated and difficult to get the documents from the detaining authorities years later.

Visits and remedial offers by government agencies: Government representatives from local military units and the remedy unit of SBPAC agencies have been sent to visit the conflict-affected men. The visiting officials arrive with gift baskets and other goods, but for most men who have faced summonses under the Emergency Decree, these visits are uncomfortable and cause them anxiety.

Organize forums to listen to the opinions of men who have been detained and released under a special law (without criminal prosecution). SBPAC has held forums to listen to the conflict-affected men in an effort to develop guidelines for the delivery of assistance and the facilitation of support from relevant organizations (e.g., what to do if a man's name is still on the government watch list).

Table 6-2. Summary of Help Provided by Service Providers to Men on the Government Watch List

Assistance Provided	Civil Society Organizations/NGOs		Government Agencies		
	Muslim Attorney Center	Alternative Volunteer Lawyers Network	SBPAC	Damrong Tham Center	Local Military Units
Rights and judicial procedures					
Coordinating with security agency to remove names from government watch list	✓	✓			
Receiving complaints about violations of rights and unfair treatment	✓			✓	
Informing men who have received summonses under the Emergency Decree and the public about the law and their rights	✓	✓			
Healing and psychological support					
Paying visits to detainees			✓		✓
Providing financial compensation			✓		
Holding forums to listen to persons detained and released under special laws		✓	✓		

Source: From the interview which might not include all providers

The Needs of Persons on the Watch List

The most important thing the men on the government watch list want is the freedom to live without fear. Therefore, they really need help regarding their rights and legal procedures. In particular, they want their names completely removed from the government watch list. After their names have been cleared from the lists, they need remedial actions, psychological rehabilitation, and vocational assistance to improve the quality of their lives.

Rights and Legal Procedures

Men on the government watch list believe that the issuance of summonses under the Emergency Decree is not transparent—that the information and evidence used in the process is vague, weak, and overly broad, which results in a considerable number of innocent people getting put on the government watch list. Many men on the government watch list have also faced summonses under the Emergency Decree's, especially prior to 2007. Men on the government watch list, therefore, want the following with regard to their rights and judicial procedures:

- Security agencies should carefully crosscheck information prior to issuing a summon under the Emergency Decree or before including a name on a watch list.
- The removal of any name from the watch list must be done—not just on paper, but also in practice. Men no longer on the watch list should not be monitored by security officers.
- Files kept on men who were summoned under the Emergency Decree should be destroyed so the men can fully return to their normal lives. For example, when applying for a job, there should be no record of their previous summonses under the Emergency Decree.

Healing and Psychological Support

The government should proactively deliver emotional support to conflict-affected people; they should not have to ask for help. Also, in an effort to restore the reputations of the men, the government should directly explain to local communities that they are innocent.

Communities should play a role in rehabilitating the affected men by organizing activities that they can participate in and by helping to create a positive atmosphere that encourages the men to engage in the society. Remedial actions for conflict-affected men who were once leaders in their communities should include support for them to engage in social work; this will help to restore their self-pride and confidence.

Vocational Support to Improve Quality of Lives

Vocational support should focus on the needs of the conflict-affected men and the participatory process, and it should relate to the former jobs of the men. It could include providing additional training or capital to allow the men to develop more secure ways of living. If possible, the support should seek to ensure that the men are able to get jobs in their hometowns. Finally, vocational support should be comprehensive and continuous, especially in terms of management and marketing.

In addition, men who own little or no land and whose names have been removed from the government watch list should be allocated land plots to help them secure a livelihood through agriculture and farming.

Support should also be given to children of conflict-affected men to access employment once they have completed school.

Overall Problems

Based on the impacts they have faced and the constraints of relevant organizations in delivering assistance, the general problems facing men on the government watch list can be summarized as follows:

- The process used by security officers to compile the government watch list or issue summonses under the Emergency Decree is not well understood.
- In practice, the relevant authorities have failed to remove the men from the government watch list, which makes it impossible for the men to return to fully normal lives. For example, the security agency has continued to monitor some of the men whose names have supposedly been removed from the lists. And the immigration bureau has failed to update their database, which has resulted in some men being unable to freely travel or abroad.

- The remedial process has not done enough to restore the dignity and reputations of the men who are on the government watch list and who received summonses under the Emergency Decree even though they had done nothing wrong. Men eligible to receive compensation for their detentions under the special laws feel that the government has burdened the victims with a process that, rather than proactively making payments, requires victims to come forward and complete many steps before they can receive any compensation. Some victims are left without any compensation and others must wait for long periods of time before receiving their payments. These kinds of problems have increased the conflict-affected people's dissatisfaction with the government.

Challenges

How can a process be developed that would allow the authorities to use watch lists, conduct surveillance, and deliver summonses under the Emergency Decree without contributing to further conflicts or the sense people have of being unfairly treated?

Recommendations for the Care of People Affected by the Watch List

Rights and Judicial Procedures

- The processes for issuing Emergency Decree summonses and compiling the government watch list should be transparent and include a careful review to ensure that innocent people are not affected.
- Officials should clearly inform suspects of charges before inviting them in for interrogation.
- Once they have removed a man's name from the government watch list, officials must update the database and inform all relevant agencies. Keeping information current must be given serious attention to prevent adverse impacts on men whose names are removed.
- Removing any name from the government watch list should take effect in practice in a way that allows the affected people to feel that justice has been restored and that they have the freedom to their lives without fear.

Spiritual Healing and Psychological Support

- The state should proactively deliver spiritual healing and psychological services to men whose names have been removed from the government watch list to help them to regain a sense of dignity and enjoy a better quality of life. A proactive approach by the government would demonstrate its sense of responsibility, which could ease the dissatisfaction felt by many of the conflict-affected.
- Communities should be encouraged to contribute to the rehabilitation of the conflict-affected men in a way that allows them to resume normal lives in their communities. Community activities should be structured in a way that encourages conflict-affected people to participate, which would mitigate their feelings of alienation.
- Young men who received summonses under the Emergency Decree during their school years and who, as a result, had to interrupt their education, should be given opportunities and support to resume their studies. Otherwise, if the youth do not go back to school, their futures may be ruined, and some may join insurgent movements.

6.3 Young Men Who Have Lost Family Members to the Unrest

Respondents for this part of the study were young men aged 15–25 years, Buddhist and Muslim, who have lost family members (mostly fathers) to the unrest in Thailand's Deep South. The deaths were caused by violent attacks by various groups of insurgents and a number of incidents, including Krue Se and Tak Bai.¹⁵ Data for this study were collected from three groups: male Buddhist youth studying at institutes of higher education; male Muslim youth studying at religious schools (privately-run religious schools/*pondoks*); and unemployed male Muslim youth.

Young Muslim Men Who Have Lost Family Members to the Unrest

The young Muslim men who are still students are 16–19 years old; they lost their fathers (or other family members) between 2004–12 when they were approximately 8–14 years old. Some study at *ponoh* schools, others at private religious schools for senior secondary education, and still others at universities. On average, each youth has five or six siblings, and most of them live with their mothers, who have become their family's breadwinners. Their fathers, before they died, had various occupations and roles in society, including farmers, rubber tappers, community leaders (assistant village heads and village-protection team members), religious leaders, and mosque board members who had been actively involved in government work. Most had been shot dead in their villages. Several died in bloody incidents such as at the Krue Se Mosque, Tak Bai, and elsewhere.

The unemployed young Muslim men, including youth with irregular employment, are 18–23 years old. Most have completed secondary education at privately run religious schools. Some have only completed their primary education while others have managed to get their Bachelor's Degree.

Young Buddhist Men Who Have Lost Family Members to the Unrest

These young men, aged 18–23 years at the time of this study, lost fathers to the unrest between 2006–11. Educational levels range from Upper secondary (*mathayom* 6) to Bachelor's Degree. Buddhist youth have 1–3 siblings on average. Their mothers are their family breadwinners. Some of the youth are currently living with relatives. Their mothers work in various occupations, including odd jobs, vendors, and private sector employees. After losing their fathers, several of the young men dropped out of school. Some have completely given up their studies, but others have found ways to work and study simultaneously.

The fathers of most of these young Buddhist men held jobs in the government, including village-protection members and janitors, or in the private sector, including jobs in construction. Most were killed travelling to or from work and the perpetrators remain unknown.

According to study findings, families that have lost members to the unrest can be split into two main categories based on the delivery of government support and services:

¹⁵ Krue Se: On April 28, 2004, more than 100 militants carried out terrorist attacks against 10 police outposts across the Pattani, Yala, and Songkhla provinces in southern Thailand. Thirty-two gunmen retreated to the 425-year-old Krue Se Mosque, regarded by Muslims as the holiest mosque in Pattani. After a tense seven-hour standoff, there was an all-out assault on the mosque by the Thai military. All of the gunmen were killed.

Tak Bai: In October 2004, the town of Tak Bai in Narathiwat province witnessed the most publicized incident of the insurgency. Six local men were arrested for supplying weapons to insurgents. A demonstration was organized to demand their release and the police called in army reinforcements. Hundreds of local people, mostly young men, were arrested, bound, and thrown into trucks by soldiers, and were then taken to an army camp in the nearby province of Pattani. The prisoners were stacked five or six deep in the trucks in the heat of the day, and by the time they reached their destination five hours later, 78 men had suffocated to death.

- Families receiving support from the government. These are the families whose losses are confirmed by three government agencies as having stemmed from insurgency, from the actions of government officials, or from specific incidents, such as Tak Bai or Krue Se.
- Families not receiving any support from the government. These are families of men who died from extrajudicial killings by government officials whose family members are also suspected of being insurgents.

The loss of family members from the unrest has affected young men in various ways, at both the individual and family levels. See figure 6-3 for a summary of impacts, coping strategies, and support provided.

Impacts at the Individual Level

Psychological Impacts

Young men who lose their fathers suffer quite serious psychological impacts, particularly when they are old enough to understand what is happening and can capture their father in their vivid memories (aged 6 years and older). The psychological impacts are manifested in various forms.


Grief and sadness over death of father. Upon hearing about the death of their father, the first reaction of the youth was shock, including actual physical shock if the loss was very sudden. One boy says, *“When I found out that my dad was dead, I collapsed. I couldn’t believe it. We talked the day before.”* Sadness and grief are intense at first, and never really goes away. If something in their surroundings reminds them of their fathers, the sad feelings return. A young man explains, *“When I saw my father’s lifeless body, I couldn’t stop crying ... Those (sad) feelings are still with me. When I see my friends going anywhere with their fathers, I am in tears.”*

Stress. The death of their fathers was a big turning point in the lives of these young men. They have suffered from extreme stress due to the sudden changes. They worry about their own living conditions and futures as well as that of their families. Those who want to continue to pursue their education worry about whether or not they will be able to do so. One mother admits, *“At the time his father died, my son was still studying in mathayom 3 (lower-secondary) class. He’s very worried about his studies. He keeps asking if he can still go to school.”*

Many of the youth reported that when they attended school, friends and teachers—out of concern—would ask them about their loss, but these conversations just added to their stress. Some youth who were questioned repeatedly about their losses did not want to go to school anymore.

Deep doubts about the death of their father. Most of the youth wonder why their fathers were killed, they don’t believe their fathers were ever in conflict with anyone. Culprits have not been arrested in most cases of violent incidents in the Deep South. Investigations barely progress. Some families have tried to follow up with police, but with little or no progress being made, they finally lose hope of bringing the culprits to justice. The families and their young members can only keep wondering, *“Who did it? And why? We want to know why they killed our family members.”*

Figure 6-3. Men Losing Family Members



Anger and craving for revenge. After their fathers died, most young men felt enraged and vengeful. Many wanted to take revenge on the killers, a craving that for some has eased with time. But others are determined to get jobs that will allow them to fight instigators of violence. For example, some young men believe their fathers died at the hands of insurgents or influential figures. They want to be soldiers, rangers, or policemen so that they will be able to take their revenge. A mother says, *“After what happened, I’ve talked to many of my son’s friends and found out that my son has tried to gather information from various sources in a bid to identify the attacker. He’s determined to further his studies and become either a soldier or a policeman. After he has heard that the attacker had already died, he says it’s regrettable that he can’t take revenge.”*

Young men who believe their fathers died at the hands of officials feel hatred toward government officials. Driven by this hatred, some have explored ways that they might take their revenge. Some have skipped classes at school to learn black magic in the hopes of becoming immortal and then having the power to fight the state.

Lack of family warmth and emotional stability. The young men were usually close to their fathers so they experienced a major loss. And the fathers died when the sons were 8–15 years old, an age when they were spending a lot of time together. They are closely tied to their many fond memories of their fathers; the deaths hit them hard—the emotional wounds are deep and severe and continue to affect them.

Young Men Share Their Feelings Regarding Life Without Their Fathers

“My life has changed. I used to watch TV and played with dad. Whatever I wanted to eat, my father used to buy it for me. It’s the happiness I’ve lost forever.”

“I don’t want to join (Hari) Raya Festival because I don’t have dad by my side anymore. My friends go there with their dads.”

“Sometimes, I miss my dad and really want to hug him”.

Mental health problems. The severity of mental health problems depends on how much the young men were involved in what happened to their fathers. After losing their fathers, the personalities of most of the young people changed from a cheerful disposition to one of self-imposed social isolation. Some became aggressive. Youth who witnessed their fathers’ killings suffer with serious mental health problems. Some experienced hallucinations; others needed treatment from psychiatrists for several years.

Mothers say that after losing their fathers, their sons have changed:

“Every afternoon, he keeps to himself at a corner of our home”.

“My second son saw his father being shot. The incident has changed him. He’s no longer talkative. He spends most of his time in his room. He doesn’t want anyone to get close to him. When his younger brother gets too close, he gets angry. Sometimes, he even kicks his brother out.”

These psychological impacts are observed in young men who have lost family members, regardless of whether or not their families have received remedial actions from the government.

Additional Psychological Impacts on Families Not Receiving Government Support

The government has not offered remedial actions to the families of suspected insurgents that have been killed. The young men from these families have demonstrated a number of psychological impacts including those listed below.

Bad attitude or hatred toward the government. Believing that their family members died at the hands of the government, these young men feel that they have not received any justice. Therefore, they reject the authorities and are prone to join the insurgency. One person who tried to deliver help to the youth recalls, “We once planned a visit to a family that had just lost a member. But once we arrived at their place, they refused to let us in because they suspected that we were government officials.” Some youth have also planned to use violence against government officials to vent their anger.

Social Impacts

Lack of male role models. Most young men feel that they lack a role model and guide in their lives since their fathers died because it was their fathers who primarily used to play these roles. One young man says, *“In the past whenever I had problems, I could discuss them with my father. As a man, my father understood me better. He would give practical advice.”*

The Muslim youth have faced more serious impacts in this regard because, in the Muslim culture, sons often learn about social norms and activities by following their fathers to mosques and tea shops. Some of the Muslim youth learned how to raise birds and how to participate in bird competitions from their fathers. One young man says, *“Without my father, there is no one who takes me to social gatherings. There are many things that mother could not do for me.”*

Lack of self-confidence and fewer interactions with others. Society has paid special attention to the young people who have lost fathers to the unrest because this type of loss is considered to be uncommon. If a young man’s father died in incidents like the one at the Krue Se Mosque, the attention can be particularly intense, making the youth feel they are being watched and monitored. Feeling different, they are uncomfortable among the crowd. They lack self-confidence and do not know how to behave in the company of others. As a result, they have limited interactions with other people.

Young men whose fathers died at the hands of government officials at the Krue Se Mosque or Tak Bai incidents or due to an extrajudicial killing suffer additional serious social impacts. Most people in the community consider the men killed by government officials and their family members to be insurgents and criminals, and the children of the victims of the extrajudicial killings are stereotyped as “sons of insurgents.” A young man participating in this study notes, *“I’ve overheard my neighbors say that ‘They are insurgents. His dad is dead but his son must be following in his footsteps. They are the RKK members.’”* After the Krue Se incident, children in the community were often told by their parents to neither play with nor get close to the children whose fathers were killed. As a result, the youth do not have any friends of the same age in their neighborhoods.

This type of stereotyping has occurred in most of the affected communities. Exceptions include the red (high-conflict) zones where the victims of the extrajudicial killings are seen as heroes. In these areas, family members of victims receive support from their neighbors and can live normal lives in their communities.

Educational Impacts

Most of those who have lost their family members to the unrest experience two main impacts affecting their education: Weaker academic performance and lower levels of attendance.

Weaker academic performance. Declining performance in school can be caused by a lack of moral support. Before their fathers died, many of their sons tried to behave well partly out of fear of their fathers. One mother explains, *“After their father’s death my sons did not study well anymore. Their academic performance has dropped.”*

Lower levels of attendance. Some of the youth skip classes or drop out of school since losing their fathers to the unrest. Some later return to school, but others have yet to return for a number of reasons.

- Lack of financial support. The family's changing financial status affects their education. Even though the government offers scholarships and other financial assistance, it is insufficient for a poor family with many children. Some young men have dropped out of school to help their mothers. A few of them disclose, "I feel sorry for my mom. She has to work alone. So, I've decided to stop studying. If I go to school, no one will help her." Other youth have transferred to ponoh schools, which are less expensive than private religious schools. When a family has many children, the oldest usually sacrifices his educational opportunities to allow younger siblings, especially ones with better academic records, to continue with their studies. Young men whose families do not receive government support experience graver impacts on their education.
- Emotional trauma. After losing their fathers, many youth were not emotionally fit for studying for a time. Some stopped attending school after the loss of their family members. Some never resumed their studies; others have returned to class. The youth who have returned to their studies say, *"I remember that my father always told me to study. So, I went back to my class"* and, *"I promised to my dad on his death bed that I would complete my education."*
- Relocation. In some instances, families of the youth moved because of safety concerns and the young men needed time to adjust to their new surroundings. As a result, some put their educations on hold temporarily.

Impacts on Safety

Safety concerns. The young men are worried about their own safety after losing family members to the unrest. Because their family members were attacked, they think they could also be victims. For a few months after the attack on their family members, they avoided going out. Now, if they do have to go out, they are very vigilant.

Youth who lost family members at the Krue Se Mosque or to extrajudicial killings by government officials feel particularly targeted. They believe the officials see them as dangerous because they are the sons of insurgents. Information and rumors from neighbors and acquaintances add to their anxieties. Some are so concerned about their safety that they do not dare live at home anymore. Some have relocated to other places or have gone to boarding schools elsewhere. A young man says, *"My friends have told me to watch out. My friends say someone is investigating or keeping watch on my family."* A neighbor has told this young man, *"Your father is dead. When you grow up you must be careful. The government is after you."*

Concern about the safety of their families. The young men are particularly worried about the safety of their mothers because they have already lost one parent. A young Buddhist man says, *"I am worried about my mom but I don't dare to speak up about this. So when my mother left home very early one morning, I told my brother that we must follow her with a motorcycle to watch over her. On one occasion, she went to a meeting for healing support without telling anyone. She also turned off her cell phone that day and failed to return home by 8:00 pm. My brother and I were so worried that we ran around trying to find her. We cried when our efforts seemed to be in vain."* Some men have left the Deep South and moved to their mother's hometown; some want to relocate but are unable to make the hard decision to start over from scratch.

Impacts on Families

The sudden loss of a primary breadwinner significantly impacts the families of victims psychologically, economically, and socially.

Psychological Effects on Spouses

The sudden death of a spouse and family breadwinner turns the lives of the surviving parent upside down. These mothers feel they have lost everything. Some consider suicide. Women who were once only

housewives have had the most difficult time coping with suddenly having to shoulder all of the family burdens, including learning how to do the new tasks. A young man says, *"My mother has to take over all the duties of my father. She weeps every night."* In some cases, psychological impacts are so serious that the women have to consult psychiatrists. This further affects the fragile feelings of their sons.

Concerns by Families About the Safety of Family Members

Mothers and other relatives of victims worry about their family members' safety, especially the men and boys. A topmost concern is for the safety of the sons of victims because they are the most likely targets. Whenever these young men leave their homes, their mothers and other relatives remind them to be careful, drive safely, and check rearview mirrors constantly. They do not want the young men to go out at night. Families are also concerned that their sons might try to seek revenge.

The mothers of sons whose fathers died in the Krue Se incident or due to extrajudicial killings worry that their sons will be tempted to join the insurgency. Mothers say their sons are often asked why their fathers were killed. One young man told his friends that, *"My father is dead. Soldiers shot him. I feel sorry for him..."*

Economic Impacts

The loss of breadwinners means tougher living conditions, especially for families with many children. Some mothers cannot afford to raise all of their children alone so they leave some of them under the care of relatives. Some mothers borrow money from relatives when their savings run out because they are unable to work. The relatives of some families help with gifts of rice and other foods. But, despite the assistance from various sources, some families get into debt. It is a big burden for a mother to support her entire family alone, particularly when many of her children are attending school. Some youth say, *"After my father died, our lives were so difficult at first. My mother had to seek loans to make ends meet. But the situation has improved during in the last few years."*

Families that are not receiving support from the government experience the most severe economic impacts. Mothers in these families have to shoulder all of the living expenses and all of the educational expenses for their children. A young man says, *"Life is really difficult for our family. My mother tries all possible means to get income. She does all kinds of work—sewing, rubber tapping, and cooking desserts."* Most young men in these families stop going to school after they complete primary school because they want to find work in order to ease their mothers' burdens.

Social Impacts

Higher risk of family problems. The loss of a father or family leader can cause many family problems. Without their fathers, some young men feel that no one understands them or that there is no one who can give them practical advice. These young men are at higher risk for dropping out of school and developing drug problems. Many young men feel that there is no longer anyone in their families to fear. Many mothers, meanwhile, feel they can neither understand nor deal with their sons. As one mother says of her sons no longer listening to her in their teenage years, *"They are not afraid of me. They only fear their father. No matter what warnings I give, they don't listen. I don't know how to talk to them. We have never been close."* One likely reason for these kinds of issues is the lack of interaction between males and females in Muslim families because of the different roles they play in Muslim culture. As a result, mothers may find it difficult to understand the needs and problems of their sons. Some mothers have remarried, and they worry that their sons will not accept their new relationships and will have problems with their stepfathers.

Family members having to live separately. Some mothers cannot afford to raise all of their children alone so they leave some of them in the care of relatives. Some have to seek employment outside their communities so they leave their children to live with relatives or on their own. One young man says, *"After my*

father died, my family faces much difficulty. My mother has to work in Malaysia. I have to go to a ponoh school while my youngest sister has to go live with an uncle in Bangkok. Our home is now deserted.”

Impacts Related to Gender Roles

After losing a male family member who was the leader and breadwinner of the family, a female member must take over the duties of supporting the entire family—a very heavy burden since the female member will then have to play multiple roles. She must continue to be the mother who cares for her children and then must also be the father who leads and feeds the family. She will also have to play social roles normally filled by the male member.

In shouldering such heavy burdens, these women face several constraints. There are many ways in which mothers cannot compensate for the absence of fathers, including giving advice to sons on men’s issues and taking sons to social gatherings for men. Mothers cannot, for example, take their sons to Friday prayer sessions at mosques. Nor can they take their sons to tea shops. Further, women in Muslim communities are not supposed to act as leaders. A woman serving as her family’s representative in community meetings after the loss of her husband is still considered inappropriate in some communities.

In summary, the main impacts on young men who have lost family members, usually their fathers, are psychological, educational, and economic.

The psychological impacts are enormous because of the sudden nature of the loss of the beloved parent and because the losses were experienced by children still too young to adequately cope. A boy needs a male role model by his side. When such a model is lost, the effects are enduring.

Economic impacts arise from the loss of the family breadwinner. This then causes many other problems. Some families must live apart from one another because of financial difficulties. The educational opportunities for the youth are also threatened.

Educational impacts are directly related to economic and psychological impacts. Education shapes the future of the youth. When their educational opportunities are impacted, their future life options are diminished.

Youth who have lost family members to extrajudicial killings experience these impacts even more intensely because they do not receive any much-needed assistance. They believe that they are unfairly treated and often feel hatred toward the government. The government finds it difficult to deliver assistance to the youth in this environment and the youth become more likely to use violence against the state in the future.

Coping Strategies

After the loss of their family members, young men and their families try to cope with the psychological and economic impacts and safety concerns in various ways, summarized below.

Psychological Impacts

Consult trusted people. When faced with problems or feeling stress, the young men consult with people they feel close to and trust as well as people they believe might be able to help them with the issues that arise. For example, if their problems are men’s issues, they turn to their male relatives, such as uncles or older brothers. However, when faced with serious problems, they consult their mothers believing that, *“In the end, my mother will help me anyway.”*

Seek help from psychiatrists. The families of the men who have died due to the unrest usually receive help from mental health units. Some young men suffer serious psychological impacts; they are able to meet with psychiatrists at state hospitals. Sometimes, all surviving members of a family need mental health care. At first, most affected young men are very reluctant to see psychiatrists by themselves; some bring friends with them at first.

Build up courage to face the situation and live a normal life. After losing their fathers, many young men tell themselves that they must continue living in the violence-plagued zone. “No one can escape death. If the time comes, let it be. We live in areas where violence erupts every day, after all.” These young men try to live normal lives. For instance, they go to the market and participate in sports. Some are very determined not to bow down. Speaking from his heart, one young man says, *“If I do nothing and simply hide inside my home, they (attackers) will think I am afraid and they will stage more attacks.”*

Find comfort in religious beliefs. Some families encourage their sons to study kitab so that they will know about religious concepts. When their sons have doubts about their lives, mothers bring them to religious experts or to trusted Muslim teachers. The mothers hope to ensure that their sons have the right kind of guidance in their lives to prevent them from getting involved in any criminal activity. A widow of the Krue Se incident says *“I don’t want my son to have doubts about their lives and get misled. I have told my sons that they must consult reliable religious teachers or experts if they have doubts.”*

Use memory of fathers as motivator. When they feel discouraged or encounter a problem regarding their studies or anything else in their lives, the young men will focus their minds on their fathers to motivate them to struggle through it. One of them says, “When my spirit runs low, I think of my father. My father had always told me to study well and be strong so that my younger siblings can count on me.”

Mothers try to reduce their sons’ anger and cravings for revenge. In many families, the sons become enraged and want to seek revenge. Their mothers, however, try to ease their sons’ anger and thoughts of vengeance by emphasizing to their sons, as one mother put it, *“If you hit back at them, their sons will take revenge on us. And the cycle will continue. The violence will never end then.”*

Attend healing activities for the conflict-affected. Many of the young men and their mothers have attended remedial activities for the conflict-affected people. Such participation has made them aware that they are not alone and that many others have shared the same fate. A conflict-affected young man says, *“It’s like we are among the people who have been in the same shoes. It’s not just I who have lost family members. Many others have lost theirs too. So, we feel we are among friends.”*

Doing social work to realize their self-worth. After losing their family members, some young men join activities through organizations such as Deep Peace Junior Group that deliver assistance to other orphans. These youth want to help children facing their same fate because doing so gives them a sense of worth.

Study black magic. The coping strategies of young men who have lost family members to extrajudicial killings carried out by government officials can differ from that of other conflict-affected youth. While some of these young men consult with close friends, and some eagerly turn to their Deep Peace mentors for support, others become so enraged that they seek out black magic in hopes that they can achieve immortality and then be able to rise up against the state.

Safety Concerns

Cautious about travel time. Both Muslim and Buddhist youth avoid traveling at night after losing family members, especially passing through communities populated by people of another faith. Buddhist youth only travel between their schools and home when village-protection teams are patrolling their routes.

Greater vigilance. Both Muslim and Buddhist youth become very worried about their own safety after losing their family members. They become much more vigilant. While traveling by car, they keep a close check in the rearview mirror to make sure they are not being followed. If they are, they look for a safe spot to pull over. One Buddhist boy says, *"On one occasion, I felt like a helmet-wearing motorcyclist was following me. So when I found a checkpoint, I quickly stopped there. I waited till that motorcyclist went far ahead before I resumed my traveling."*

Mothers relocate children. Some mothers relocate their children because they are worried about their safety or because they want their children to be in different surroundings to help their emotional wounds heal more quickly. One mother says, *"After his father died, my son didn't want to go to school. He locked himself in his room most of the time. So, I have decided to send him to Udon Thani. I have had him live there with his grandmother for one year. When he returns, he will be in a much better shape. He can study mathayom 4 [upper-secondary school] here without any problem."*

Families relocate to a safer place. Some who have experienced the loss of a family member worry about their own safety and that of the rest of their family, and make the decision to move. Some families moved to their mothers' birthplaces so that their maternal relatives could help them resettle themselves. Others just settled down in other provinces.

Join organizations that win the government's trust and to reduce suspicion. Youth who have lost family members due to the Krue Se incident often believe that the government is keeping close watch on them. In an effort to reduce the government's suspicion of them, some join organizations that the government trusts or become volunteers at charity organizations.

Economic Impacts

Mothers do odd jobs. The loss of breadwinner forces many mothers to shoulder the burden of feeding their families. The mothers do whatever is necessary to earn income, taking on any odd jobs they can find. Some even work in Malaysia in order to financially support their families.

Young men take up jobs to help support their families. Both Buddhist and Muslim youth who have lost family members have tried to ease their mothers' burdens by getting jobs. Youth who have not dropped out of school work on holidays or when the school is on break. Some switch to *ponoh* schools because they are less expensive and allow them more free time to work and earn income. Many of these youth drop out of school after completing lower-secondary school (*mathayom* 3) at 13–15 years of age because they want to ease their mothers' burdens. They work in construction, as small vendors, or as part-time school van drivers, as examples. Some even work at Thai restaurants in Malaysia, usually as illegal workers.

Borrow money from relatives. When families run out of cash, they borrow money from relatives.

Seek student loans to cover education expenses. Although the government provides scholarships to the conflict-affected youth, some families must still take out student loans as of the scholarships funds are used for other family expenses.

In summary, most young men who have lost family members (usually their fathers) mainly depend on their mothers and the rest of their families to cope with what happened. At such young ages, they are not able to deal with such serious problems by themselves, especially the psychological impacts. Some are not even aware of the serious impacts they have suffered and must be monitored by others. Coping abilities vary by age. Youth aged 15 years and older are better able to cope. Some older boys can even be of help to the rest of their families.

Help and Support from Service Providers

Remedial offers to a family that has lost one of its members to the unrest come from government agencies, NGOs, and CSOs. The government delivers help to families whose losses are confirmed by three key agencies to have actually stemmed from the unrest. A family that has lost one of its members due to the Krue Se incident in 2004 had to wait until 2012 before government help arrived. A family with a member suspected of being an insurgent who died due to an extrajudicial killing has not received any remedy from the government. Families like these rely on assistance from NGOs and CSOs. See Table 6-3 for a summary of the assistance provided to families that have lost members to the unrest.

**Table 6-3. Summary of Help and Support from Service Providers
for People Who Have Lost Family Members to the Unrest**

Assistance	Government Agencies							NGOs and CSOs			
	SBPAC	Social Development and Human Security Offices	Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Offices	Primary Educational Service Area Offices	Mental Health Center 15	ISOC	National Human Rights Commission	Technical Affairs Coordination Center	Happy Community Foundation	Deep Peace	Others
Financial help											
- Compensation	✓	✓	✓								
- Scholarships		✓		✓						X	✓ (Ummah Foundation)
Mental health											
- Visits to conflict-affected families	✓	✓			✓		✓	✓		X	✓
- Mental health assessments					✓						
- Group activities/educational trips	✓				✓			✓			
Vocational support											
- Fund for vocational training	✓						✓	✓			✓ (Young Muslim Association)
- Urgent Employment Project											
- Care for orphans									✓X	X	
Empowerment									✓X	X	

✓ Families receiving help from the government

X Families not receiving help from the government

Source: From the interview which might not include all providers

Safety Concerns

Families receive financial compensation and scholarships mainly from government agencies. They receive mental health and vocational support from both government agencies and NGOs.

Financial Compensation for Conflict-Affected Families

The government provides financial compensation to families whose losses have been certified by three agencies: SBPAC, the relevant provincial social development and human security office, and the relevant provincial disaster prevention and mitigation office (see Table 6-4).

Table 6-4. Government's Financial Assistance for Families That Have Lost Members

Remedial Action	Amount of Financial Help in Baht			
	SBPAC	Social Development and Human Security Offices	Disaster Prevention Mitigation Offices	Primary Educational Service Area Offices
Compensation				
- Government officials	500,000	-	50,000	
- Civilians	500,000	6,000	50,000	
Scholarships		Monthly allowances - Primary education: 1,000 Baht - Secondary education: 1,500 Baht - Higher education: 2,000 Baht		Annual scholarship - Kindergarten/primary education: 6,000 Baht - Secondary education: 10,000 Baht - Vocational education/higher education: 20,000 Baht

SBPAC. Current financial compensation is 500,000 Baht per death regardless of whether the victim was a civilian or government official. However, if the death of a government official due to the unrest occurred between January 1, 2004–August 13, 2012, the family received an additional payment of 100,000 Baht.

Victims of government operations or other specific incidents receive compensation of up to 7.5 million Baht. Families first receive the minimum rate of 500,000 Baht. Then the committee on strategic development for the southern border provinces decides on the amount of any additional payments.

- For the Krue Se incident, the committee approved compensation of up to 4 million Baht per victim killed inside the Krue Se Mosque and no more than 500,000 Baht for most of the related incidents that took place outside the mosque. However, compensation is 7.5 million Baht for young victims killed in Sabayoi because they died in such a shocking incident. Compensation rates are based on recommendations by a fact-finding panel that investigated the violent incidents of 2004.
- For the Tak Bai incident, which claimed 85 lives, the committee approved compensation of 7.5 million Baht per death.
- For other shocking incidents or for families hard hit by the loss, additional compensation was set at 500,000 Baht.

Relevant provincial social development and human security offices have given 6,000 Baht to every family who lost a civilian member to the unrest.

Relevant provincial disaster prevention and mitigation offices have given compensation payments of 50,000 Baht each to families that lost their breadwinner regardless of whether the victim was a civilian or government official.

Financial Support for Education

Youth from families that have lost members to the unrest receive financial support for their education from government agencies and NGOs. The support is available in various forms, including scholarships, waivers for education expenses, and lunch allowances.

Scholarships are given by the following government agencies to children of the conflict-affected families who are still pursuing their education.

- *Relevant provincial social development and human security offices* have given a monthly scholarship of 1,000–2,000 Baht to each of the conflict-affected children depending on level of education. A primary school student receives a monthly scholarship of 1,000 Baht; a secondary school student

receives 1,500 Baht; and a university student receives 2,000 Baht.

- *Primary education service area offices* (service areas 1 and 2) have given scholarships of 5,000–20,000 Baht per year to each of the conflict-affected children depending on level of education. A kindergartener or primary school student receives 6,000 Baht per year; a secondary school student receives 10,000 Baht; a university student receives 20,000 Baht; and a student in a nonformal educational program receives 5,000 Baht.
- *Provincial units for remedial actions* (provincial offices) provide scholarships of 6,000 Baht each per year to the conflict-affected children until they are 15 years old.

Scholarships and grants from NGOs to support education are summarized below.

- The Ummah Foundation for Education and Development has awarded annual scholarships of 10,000 Baht to selected children. Foundations working for orphans' causes in the three southernmost provinces, such as the Being Happiness Rural Development Foundation, have helped with housing, food, empowerment, and learning opportunities. These foundations have supported the conflict-affected youth in continuing their studies at their neighborhood schools until they complete their mandatory education. The foundations have also sought to persuade Malaysian universities to grant scholarships to the youth to allow them to further their education and ultimately graduate with an associate's degree or a Bachelor's Degree. Some private religious schools, such as the Santithamwittaya School, have waived tuition fees for the conflict-affected students.
- Lunch allowances for orphans are usually available at private religious schools, including the Thammawittaya School. Schools have also extended allowances to young people whose family members were lost to the unrest.

The delivery of remedial help by government agencies is often delayed for a number of reasons, including the need for conflict-affected families to have their losses certified by three key agencies. Some families wait up to six months to obtain the necessary documents because the agencies are waiting on the results of official probes into the deaths. District-level units for remedial actions, which are expected to provide one-stop service, are unable to fully meet expectations with regard to their coordination with SBPAC, relevant social development and human security offices, relevant disaster prevention and mitigation offices, and primary educational service area offices. It is clear that there is no efficient and updated database of the conflict-affected families. As relevant agencies face difficulty accessing such information, the delivery of remedial help to the conflict-affected families is mired in delay.

Mental health. Government agencies conduct visits and follow up with conflict-affected families. SBPAC operates provincial- and district-level units for remedial actions and local officials run the social development and human security offices. Two officials in each district are assigned to bring gift baskets to and organize activities for the conflict-affected families and their children. Educational trips have been arranged as part of their mental rehabilitation. In addition, the Mental Health Center 15 has worked with district hospitals to evaluate the mental health of the conflict-affected. Together, they have organized activities for the affected families, including forums where families can gather and talk with one another, with the aim of easing their stress and healing their emotional wounds.

The visits and mental health activities have experienced constraints because there are relatively few officials for the mission compared to the number of affected people. SBPAC, for example, employs only four to five officials per province to handle cases and only one at the district level. Social development and human security offices employ only two officials per province. These officials also face limitations related to working in red zones, which make visiting the conflict-affected families even more difficult.

NGOs and the CSOs also conduct visits. Working through the Technical Affairs Coordination Center for the Relief of People Affected by the Unrest in Southern Border Provinces, several organizations, such as the Network of Female Volunteers, the Women's Network, the Hearty Support Group, and the Young Muslim Association of Thailand, have visited the affected families to offer moral support. However, due to budget constraints, the visits are only made on an occasional basis.

Vocational support for a better quality of life. Vocational support usually focuses on the mother rather than the conflict-affected youth because a mother is expected to play the key role in supporting her family. The support has been delivered in various forms.

- Direct funding, empowerment, vocational training, and support for the establishment of vocational groups is delivered mainly by SBPAC. It has given 15,000 Baht to every affected family and coordinated with relevant organizations to give other forms of help, including empowerment training and marketing support. The Technical Affairs Coordination Center for the Relief of People Affected by the Unrest in the Southern Border Provinces has also played a role by giving 5,000 Baht to every affected family or person, and the financial support it provides has more recently expanded to also cover people living in poverty. The National Human Rights Commission has also organized vocational trainings for widows of the unrest.
- NGOs and civil society have given vocational support to conflict-affected families mostly in the form of projects with specific implementation periods. Some NGOs, including the Happy Community Foundation, have focused on empowering orphans, equipping them with learning skills, and making them self-reliant.
- To date, vocational support has not reached all of the affected families, and support that has been provided cannot continue over the long term due to budget limitations. As a result, many of the recipients of support cannot continue with the training that the vocational support allowed them to begin. Results from the delivery of the vocational support have not been monitored or evaluated, making it difficult to obtain the information needed to develop guidelines on how to improve the process.

Employment opportunities for affected families. The Urgent Employment Project implemented by the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) offered a monthly salary of 4,500 Baht to recruits for security and administrative tasks. ISOC decided to hire members of some conflict-affected families with aim of helping them cope with financial problems. But this project has been criticized for its lack of clear criteria. Members of some affected families feel unfairly treated when not offered jobs through the project.

Families Not Receiving Remedial Help from the Government

Families of men suspected of being insurgents who died due to extrajudicial killings carried out by government officials do not receive government assistance. These families are hostile toward and reject the government. Civil society and select NGOs are the only ones who can reach out to these families. The Deep South Women Association for Peace (Deep Peace) is the primary agency delivering help to families in this situation. It has set up the Fund for Orphans, asking for a donation of 1 Baht per day from each of its members and installing donation boxes at Malaysia-based Thai restaurants. In addition, it has planned a variety of projects and has sought financial support from large organizations such as Save the Children, the Asia Foundation, PACTA, and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC). The fund set up by Deep Peace has not only cared for orphans but also for the families not receiving government assistance, including the following.

- Visits to families not receiving remedial help from the government. The purpose of the visits are to assess how the families are faring and identify ways to help them. Most of these families live in

areas that representatives from other organizations want to avoid.

- Care for orphans of families not receiving remedial help from the government. Launched in 2010, the Children's Home Project cares for 64 orphans. Privately run religious schools were asked to recruit children orphaned by the unrest and their appointed mentors—teachers assigned to pay special attention to the orphaned youth. The ratio of children to mentor is at 20:4; there are currently approximately 64 young people and 10 mentors involved in the project.

The Children's Home Project sponsors the following key activities: bimonthly meetings among mentors to assess the status of participating youth; training for mentors to improve their skills in caring for the youth—such as mental health center-provided training on the care of children; and empowerment activities for youth that are held once every three months. Activities are designed to encourage the young people to express themselves and to boost their interest in education. Successful people are invited to address the youth to motivate them. The organization is also in the process of developing its own development program for children.

- Annual scholarships for 300 orphans. Most scholarship recipients study at primary schools. The plan is for the scholarships to continue until the orphans receive their Bachelor's Degrees.
- Summer camp. The summer camp seeks to empower participating youth and encourage their self-expression. The camp accommodates 300 participants per year. Up to 1,300 young people have registered.
- Psychological and mental health care. Deep Peace seeks to provide the young people it serves with a sense of affection and assurance that they have someone to turn to. One caregiver says, "Fundamentally, these youths have problems. Many are obstinate and aggressive. So, we have to pay caring attention to them. We have to hug them to make them feel warm ... This way, they become less stubborn." If a young person is experiencing a mental health problem, Deep Peace refers them to an orphanage in Bana where experts are on hand who can provide help in accordance with Islamic beliefs.
- Vocational support to mothers so families can earn supplementary income. Because most families in this group are in a difficult financial situations, Deep Peace encouraged a group of mothers to produce a spicy sauce that was then marketed by the organization to generate income. So far, thirteen mothers have joined the initiative.

Needs of Young Men Losing Family Members to the Unrest

The needs of young men who have lost family members to the unrest are primarily psychological and economic. If a young man's father died in a general unrest-related incident, he also wants clear-cut answers from the investigation into the death. If his father died at the hands of government officials, regardless of whether or not remedial help is received, the young men still seek justice from the society. They do not want to be stereotyped as sons who will be just like their fathers. A more detailed description of their needs is provided below.

Mental Healing

Remedial help should be comprehensive and constant. The affected young men feel that officials from remedial action units visited them often only at first. Many of the young men found that the visits boosted their morale but since they are not conducted regularly, they lose some of their positive effect.

Forums for conflict-affected youth to meet one another should be held regularly. The young men find that participating in activities like this assures them that someone cares about them. So far, however, these activities have only taken place in select areas and for only some of the youth.

The young men do not want government officials viewing the children of the victims of the Krue Se incident and extrajudicial killings with bias. They do not want officials to assume that if their fathers were suspected insurgents that they will be just like their fathers. One of the young men explains, *“I want government officials to understand that fathers are gone and their cases have nothing to do with their sons.”* The young men believe that stereotyping based on these assumptions is unfair and when government officials do view them with bias, they worry about their safety and about being watched by the government.

Rights and Judicial Procedures

The young men want serious investigations conducted into the deaths of their fathers so that the cases are solved in a clear manner. They want the real culprits brought to justice and to understand the reasons for the killings of their family members. *“The thing is constantly in my mind. I will be relieved only after the case is final.”*

Education and Learning

Many of the young men who have lost family members to the unrest want to take extra classes during school break that they hope will be fun and interesting. Most of these young men study at private religious schools. Because these schools teach both secular and religious subjects, the young men usually lack a solid general education. Although the schools offers some extra classes, the teaching techniques are fairly similar so they have not made much of a difference in the lives of the young men. Privileges should be granted to the conflict-affected youth to increase their educational opportunities, such as the right to study at various educational institutes.

Educational trips to areas outside the three southernmost provinces should be arranged for the conflict-affected youth. The youth themselves think these trips would allow them to learn about how others live, and this would make it easier for them to fit into society. The trips should include activities with local people in the communities visited so that the youth are exposed to the local culture. The trips might also offer learning-based activities that encourage the young men to think outside the box.

Occupational Support for Secure Livelihoods

The affected young men want help securing employment. They want jobs in the fields of their study. Some want jobs in the government sector but to date, this privilege has been reserved for the children of victims who were government officials.

The young men want access to short-term vocational training in areas that interest them. They first want a survey conducted to determine what their interests are so that trainings can be arranged accordingly. They think that other forms of ongoing occupational support should follow the trainings to ensure that their new skills can help them earn a living.

Most young men in families not receiving remedial help from the government say that their most basic needs involve receiving the government assistance. They also have an even greater need for mental health and financial assistance because they have not yet received either. The young men need support groups to help them heal, spiritually and mentally. They need a place to turn to where they can air their grievances, express their feelings, and call for attention. These are emotionally fragile young people.

The young men need scholarships to pursue their education because most of their families face financially difficult situations. They also need help for their families making a livelihood, such as vocational support for their mothers and for the youth. Some want to work part-time while they continue their studies in hopes of generating supplementary income for their families.

Overall Problems

Judging by the impacts they confront and the constraints faced by organizations trying to deliver help to them, the general problems experienced by young men who have lost family members—usually fathers—can be summarized as follows.

- Because most unrest-related cases remain unsolved, conflict-affected families and surrounding community members commonly lack confidence in the judicial system.
- The government's delivery of remedial help is inefficient. It is mired in delay and lacks an integrated database of conflict-affected people. Follow-up efforts regarding the affected people are neither comprehensive nor continuous. As a result, this remedial help clearly cannot raise the quality of the lives of the target population over the long term. Many families question the system of requiring the certification of loss by three agencies, finding the process impossible.
- Most young men are not aware of the assistance received because it is normally delivered to their mothers. This contributes to their feeling that the remedial offers are not equally distributed.
- The government has played a key role in providing remedial help. It has given communities only a minor role. This approach makes it harder to reach out to the target population and can alienate conflict-affected families from their communities.
- Because the government was late in delivering help to the young men who lost family members to the Krue Se and Tak Bai incidents (the incidents took place in 2004 but the remedial help did not arrive until 2012), lives have been deeply affected. The impacts continue to endure. The young people missed out on educational opportunities during their early years, leaving them with very limited occupational opportunities now.
- Because the young men who lost family members due to extrajudicial killings have not received any remedial help from the government, they missed out on various opportunities to advance their education, develop their potential, and gain life skills so they can successfully navigate living in the society. The young men feel unfairly treated and, as a result, have developed negative attitudes about and hostility toward the state, and this could induce them into joining the insurgency.
- The government is unable to reach out to many people who lost family members to the extrajudicial killings. These families distrust the government and do not want any contact with government agencies. They refuse to accept assistance from the government.
- Mental health monitoring of conflict-affected children and young men lacks seriousness and is not provided on a continued basis. Some children do not present with symptoms right away but they become more apparent over time, significantly impacting their lives.

Challenges

How will the government care for the young men who have lost family members suspected of being insurgents in a way that keeps youth from using violence against the state and in a way that does not trigger an oppositional response from society ?

Recommendations

Mental Health

All relevant government agencies and organizations as well as civil society should make it their mission to care for conflict-affected young men for at least five years. A clear timeframe will allow for the development of tangible plans for delivering the assistance.

Remedial help should be designed in a way that allows the conflict-affected families to heal their wounds and become self-reliant. They should not have to keep waiting for help.

Civil society should be engaged by the government to take a key role in delivering remedial help and facilitating government efforts because it has the trust of the families who have lost members to the unrest and an expansive network in the Deep South.

Religious organizations in the Deep South should play a crucial role in caring for orphans on a continued and serious basis. Religious organizations in Muslim societies already have funds that can be made available for this by, for example, allocating the *zakat* (tithe) to the good care of orphans in their community.

Networks of volunteers should be set up among conflict-affected people, all the way down to the sub-district level. This would facilitate mental rehabilitation efforts because volunteers can care for each other and actively coordinate with relevant organizations.

Affected groups can benefit from expanded social contacts that allow them to meet others, exchange opinions, and provide mutual support.

Remedial activities for conflict-affected youth should not include words like “children affected (by the unrest)” or “orphans of the unrest,” nor should activities be conducted exclusively for that group. Otherwise, the conflict-affected youth will feel their losses more profoundly and could become more alienated from peers.

Mental rehabilitation for the conflict-affected youth is a long-term effort. Monitoring must be constant by coordinating with organizations close to the children, such as subdistrict health promotion hospitals, local social development and human security offices, schools, and subdistrict administrative organizations. These organizations should monitor the conflict-affected children and provide relevant information to mental health centers.

The central database on conflict-affected people should be developed, updated, and accessible by SBPAC and local organizations for technical support.

Rights and Judicial Procedures

Security agencies must solve unrest-related cases through transparent and reliable processes that can be accepted by all sides, and they must clearly communicate with the public about the cases.

Education and Learning

Activities should be organized for the young men to learn more about society, expand their horizons, and develop their creative thinking. Learning centers should be established for the young men to develop ways of learning and thinking and to practice skills. After the young men have been given the time to experiment with various subjects to discover what interest them. Then skills training in these areas should be provided on a continued basis.

Schools should develop processes and alternatives for dealing with problem children. Dismissing a troubled young person from school only aggravates the problem and pushes him toward a wrong path in life.

Tadika schools should be revived, developed, and engaged in the care of conflict-affected young men. Because these schools can usually bring community members together, they should be able to encourage increased public awareness and community care for the affected youth.

Young men that find general education too difficult should receive support to further their studies with vocational programs that would allow them to secure jobs and support their families.

Young men who have lost family members to the unrest should receive a free education and access to better educational opportunities.

Vocational Support for Secure Livelihoods

The conflict-affected young men should receive the support they need to work and study at the same time because many need part-time work to ease the financial burdens of their families.

Conflict-affected young men who have decided not to continue their studies should receive support that allows them to secure a sustainable livelihood.

Recommendations for Families Not Receiving Government Assistance

The government should regard families not receiving government assistance after losing family members to the unrest as conflict-affected people needing help to mitigate the conditions that foster hatred toward the government and could lead to the use of violence against it.

The government should not provide services directly to the young men in these families. Support should be delivered through mechanisms and organizations acceptable to the families, such as provincial Islamic committees, subdistrict administrative organizations, NGOs, and civil society.

6.4 Youth Indirectly Impacted by the Conflict

Unemployed Male Youth

The ages of the unemployed male youth targeted in this study range from 15–20 years old. They are considered to be a group indirectly affected by the unrest, including both Muslim and Buddhist youth, as described below.

- Male youth, aged 15–18 years who have not been attending school for 1–5 years and who are either idle or uninvolved in productive economic activities.
- Male youth who left school to work as unpaid family workers (e.g., in rice or rubber fields). Some earn small incomes from sideline activities such as motorcycle repair. They do not earn steady incomes that could support them.
- Male youth employed as casual laborers at construction sites, for land clearance, or for rubber tapping on a temporary or part-time basis.

Muslim youth are further categorized according to the location of their community because physical aspects and local natural resources are key factors affecting youth employment. The categories are: (1) youth living in villages, on hill slopes, or in fruit orchard areas; (2) youth living in seaside communities; and (3) youth living in urban areas.

The study also includes unemployed Muslim male youth who completed their studies at a pondok or private religious school as well as those who graduated from Muslim colleges abroad. Once they have graduated or returned home from college abroad, the youth must learn to adjust to the Thai system to pursue higher education or to compete for jobs.


Most of the unemployed Muslim youth completed their education at the community primary school level, the early secondary level, or at private religious schools in their neighborhoods. Young men needing certificates or other documents to enroll in vocational school or to seek employment must continue their education in the nonformal sector.

Young men with five or six siblings commonly remain at pondok schools because of their relatively low cost. After they complete their studies at the pondok level, the youth might hire themselves out as casual laborers.

Most unemployed Buddhist youth stay in school until they finish the higher secondary level, but some drop out or attend school sporadically. Thai Buddhist youth average two or three siblings each.

See Figure 6-4 for a summary of impacts, coping strategies, and support provided to youth indirectly impacted by the conflict in the Deep South.

Figure 6-4. Unemployed Youth



Unemployed Youth—the Overall Situation

After leaving school, some youth remain idle at home. Some help their parents with household chores or engage in economically productive activities, such as rubber tapping or trading. Some hire themselves out to work in impermanent jobs, such as construction laborers or casual farm workers. And some go to Malaysia to take jobs in restaurants or on fishing boats. It would appear from the observations made by the young people themselves that unemployed youth outnumber those attending school.

Unemployed youth often spend a lot of time in activities such as riding motorcycles with friends around their neighborhoods or going to computer game shops. Some gather with friends to consume an addictive herbal drink extracted from krathom leaves. The so-called “worst cases” get lured into illegal activities—such as the distribution of narcotic drugs. Some unemployed Muslim youth are at a high risk of being exploited by the insurgents in a number of ways.

There are about 11,000 students attending classes in Muslim countries abroad, such as Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia (SBPAC 2013). The most popular courses studied include Islamic law, Arabic, and

educational science—the fields of study certified by the Thailand Civil Service Commission. Medical sciences, including dentistry and nursing, have not been certified. Students must pass tests to acquire certificates of professional competence before they can pursue a profession. If they do not pass the tests, the young men usually go to Malaysia or Brunei to work.

General Impact of the Unrest on the Male Youth

Indirect impacts affecting male youth are mainly social and economic. Their influence varies depending on the group—Buddhist or Muslim—as outlined below.

Muslim youth are mistrusted by security officials. The young men live in an atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion. They are often suspected of being involved with insurgency activities. It is difficult for them to live normal lives, such as participating in group activities or youth gatherings because they are under the close watch of the authorities. Their freedom of movement is restricted because they are thoroughly inspected at the many checkpoints along the roads. They are concerned about their safety when traveling, especially at night. Youth attending religious schools or studying Islam are often carefully watched and followed by security personnel, and their villages and schools are often searched.

The situation creates mistrust between Thai Buddhist and Muslim youth. Social interactions between the two groups have become less frequent; they tend to avoid passing through each other's neighborhoods. In some areas, serious conflicts have occurred between the groups. A leading factor contributing to this unfortunate situation is that the Buddhist and Muslim youth no longer interact in their everyday lives or at school as they did before the unrest. Children from Buddhist and Muslim families used to attend the same schools in their communities but this is no longer possible. Since the unrest began, school-aged children of both faiths have become distant from one another. The Buddhist children are now sent to schools in town while Muslim children attend private religious schools located in rural areas. The situation has deteriorated to the point that the two groups rarely interact with each other during childhood.

Buddhist youth reflecting on this mutual mistrust and conflict explain:

"During the peaceful times, Buddhist and Muslim youths attended the same schools in town. We Buddhists can understand some Yawee language. Talking was not a problem. Now we feel suspicious when our Muslim friends speak Yawee among themselves when we are sitting together. We are afraid they may be gossiping about us."

"Five years after the unrest began some incidents took place where youths were fighting each other in town. It was the Buddhist youths who started it first. After that there were a series of fights in retaliation. The fighting became more serious moving to assaults and robberies. Now it has escalated to some groups using weapons, sometimes causing deaths. The youths from both sides are afraid and avoid passing each other's zones. When we have to travel, we need to carry a weapon, such as a knife."

"Now when they see Muslim youths pass by, the Buddhist youths would gang up on them even though they have never met each other before. The Muslim youths do the same thing. I have a Muslim friend who offered to take me home but first he asked me, 'Do Buddhist in your neighborhood hit us Muslims?' When I said, 'No,' only then did he feel safe to give me a lift home."

Difficulty making a living because of personal safety concerns. Anxiety about becoming victimized by violence (e.g., by stray bullets) can lead young men to reduce their productive work hours or alter their work schedules in a way that impacts their economic opportunities. Moreover, the overall economic climate is depressed, adversely affecting employment prospects and income-earning potential. The following examples illustrate the issues.

Adjusting work schedule. Sometimes, schedules must be adjusted to the point that men are unable to do a normal day's work. Working hours for occupations such as coastal fishing and rubber tapping must be rescheduled for safety reasons. Fishing that used to be done at night has to be done in the early morning. A rubber-tapping shift from 1:00 a.m.–2:00 p.m. has to be rescheduled to start during the daylight hours (approximately 6:00 a.m.), resulting in lower yields of latex. In some areas, tappers work in groups, and if patrolling soldiers are spotted, they call each other to stop working out of fear that the soldiers might spray bullets in the area. In some neighborhoods, there are signs posted warning people not to go out for work on Fridays (prayer day). Many people took heed of those warning signs for some time and did not work on Fridays.

Economic activity is depressed. The unrest has restricted the movement of visitors and traders into numerous areas, resulting in a decline in productive activities and employment. Restaurants have to close earlier, and their customer base has declined. Few fruit traders dare buy fruit from the orchards. The youth are affected by the diminishing employment opportunities. The conflict situation also impedes large-scale investments, closing off another potential path for promoting youth employment.

Impact of Unemployment

The overall unemployment picture among male youth in the Deep South is high compared to other provinces and is getting worse. Unemployment data for men aged 20–30 years in the Deep South indicate an unemployment rate of about 8–9 percent whereas in other parts of Thailand, the average rate is about 3–4 percent (Social Research Institute 2006). This unemployment situation affects the social status of the impacted young men as well as that of their families to varying degrees depending on unemployment levels. Examples are provided below.

- Whilst, youth who are idle whilst still at home have less anxiety due to the financial support available from parents, it is stressful for young men who have irregular employment and unstable incomes, when others are dependent on them. They can easily become indebted to relatives or friends.

"One of my friends was in this situation. His father had passed away and as the eldest son, he had the responsibility of supporting his siblings. He was the breadwinner and had to find work on a daily basis. During the days of his failing to find work, he would come to see me. I would share some of my rubber trees with him for him to tap so he can earn some income from the latex for the day."

- Unemployed youth often feel ashamed of their status and experience a loss of self-confidence. They feel insecure and worthless, particularly when asked about their future prospects by family members or friends. They tend to isolate themselves from others, "I feel shameful in front of family members and friends who have jobs. After feeling self-pity and confusion I ask why I have to be in such a situation."
- Most unemployed youth have little education because they dropped out of school for economic or personal reasons. The primary concern of the parents of these young men is that they might easily be lured into criminal activity. Affluent families sometimes try to persuade their children to return to school. *"My father begged me to continue my studies in whatever field I wanted to learn."* Or, *"When I had no job and stayed idle at home my parents ordered me to go to work with my older brothers in Malaysia."*

Most unemployed and idle youth in the Deep South spend their time with groups of friends playing computer games or motorcycle racing. Some consume krathom drinks (addictive herbal drinks) to feel released from social pressures. Young men who become associated with such groups can be easily tempted into committing crimes, including theft and drug dealing.

Causes and Other Features of Youth Unemployment

Low Level of Educational Attainment

Low levels of education are equated with a lack of job opportunities. Most of the male youth did not continue their education beyond the primary level (prathom 6) or early secondary level (mattayom3). At the primary school level, boys constitute 52 percent of the student body and girls constitute 48 percent. This majority is flipped at secondary level where girls account 65 percent of the student body and boys only 35 percent (National Statistics Office 2011). The causes of the high drop-out rates are outlined below.

Impoverished Family Economy

Poverty caused by size of family. Families with many children cannot always afford to pay the education costs for all of their children. It is common in these cases that the eldest child leaves school either to seek employment or to provide unpaid labor in his family's business, allowing the younger siblings to attend school.

"The elder brother has to sacrifice for the sake of the family that has many children. He has to find a job but once he has earned enough money he can go back to school again."

"Education is an investment. We have to choose the ones who are good at learning to go to school."

Pursuing a higher education requires financial resources. Youth who are uncertain about their ability to achieve the higher-level standards or whether the education will lead to employment after graduation are more inclined to drop out of school. These youth prefer to hire themselves out as laborers, hoping to earn income for their families rather than having more money spent on their education.

"If I had continued my studies after Grade 6 I am not certain whether I would find jobs after graduation. So I decided to leave school and work. At least the chance of earning some money is there."

Some youth who cannot afford to remain in the mainstream education system gravitate to pondok schools, which are less expensive and which also allow students the time to work paid jobs and still engage in learning activities.

The loss of the family breadwinner (father or eldest brother) affects youth attending school. Whether the loss is due to death, arrest under the provisions of the security laws, or another reason, youth old enough to work drop out of school to help their mothers earn income.

"I decided to tell my parents that I did not want to continue my studies and that I need to help earn some income because my older brother had been arrested and charged by the authorities under the security laws."

Poor Thai Language Skills

The first language of the Muslim population in the three southernmost provinces of Thailand is Yawee, a variant of the Malay language. It is used in everyday life, limiting their ability to read and write in the Thai language—the official language of Thailand—or to understand the context of subjects under discussion. It limits their ability to succeed in the general education system. Muslim youth tend to feel bored in school and feel ashamed that they do not know how to read or write Thai fluently, if at all. Many drop out of school and lose their motivation to pursue higher education.

The Burdens of Two School Systems

There are two school systems in southern Thailand: the standard general education system run by the government and the Muslim religious school system. This limits the ability of the youth to learn in either—their performance in both is poor. It is a challenge for them to successfully pass national-level exams, partly because the private religious schools do not have sufficient educational standards. However, most parents still choose to send their children to religious schools for the cultural values taught. In 2009, 70 percent of the Deep South student population were attending secondary-level religious schools compared with 30 percent attending government schools.

The quality of youth education in the three border provinces of Thailand is poor compared with other provinces as is evidenced by the fact that the region's students had the lowest rate secondary level (Grade 6) educational achievement scores (74, 75, and 76) in the entire country and declining. The average score for Deep South students taking the O-net (Ordinary National Education Test) in 2006 was 31.3 percent; it fell to 30.4 percent in 2008 and 27.5 percent in 2009. The overall country average in 2009 was 33.6 percent (Social Research Institute 2006).

Coaching and Assistance Inaccessible

There is insufficient educational guidance for helping youth make educational choices in line with their interests. Most would rather simply follow their peers and choose to learn by heart or "reading and memorizing similar to learning the Koran." Some see older students study successfully and become religious teachers in tadika schools and want to follow in their paths, but later find the coursework too challenging and then drop out of school altogether.

Another problem is that when the youth struggle academically, they rarely consult their teachers. As the problems accumulate so does their stress. The students become bored in class and lose interest in continuing their studies.

"I left school because the boredom of learning gave me headaches. Teachers assigned too much homework. I'm sick of them."

Limited Employment Opportunities

Limited job prospects in the three southern provinces result in migration of youth to other countries, often Malaysia. The limited employment opportunities are due to the following factors:

- The limited resources found within different communities do not generate diverse employment opportunities, especially for youth. Fishing villages, for example, have only one resource—fish. If the resource declines in quality or quantity, villagers are left without alternative income-earning possibilities. In large families, there are not always sufficient family resources and capital to be shared among all of the children. Examples include a family with only one boat or a family with a small rubber field.
- There are scant large-scale enterprises that could generate employment in the Deep South. The unrest dissuades large-scale investors doubting the possibility of a return on their investment. The local economy continues to shrink. People are anxious and concerned about their personal safety, resulting in businesses shutting down after prolonged losses. In 2014, the confidence index for trade and investment in the three southern provinces rating was 45.6 out of 100 (Ministry of Commerce and Trade 2014), indicating a lack of confidence among entrepreneurs about the prospects for trade and investment.

Local Muslim people will not work for entrepreneurs from outside their communities, particularly if they are Buddhist. Many think they are unable to understand or are not aware of Muslim culture and that the environment might not be appropriate for Muslim workers.

Most Muslim workers prefer to seek employment in Malaysia, where they share a similar culture with the people and where wages are higher than in Thailand. Youth who live near the Malaysian border often cross over to work and return home on a daily basis.

Most entrepreneurs lack confidence about hiring local Muslim youth. They are thought to be impatient when tackling tough jobs or just irresponsible. Many of the youth lack needed skills. And migrant workers are readily available at low wages. According to one entrepreneur, *"If I have the choice I would rather hire overseas migrant workers because they are hard-working and cost less in wages."*

Male youth lack specialized skills, particularly in technical areas. Most employed youth work as assistants at relatively low wages and with irregular schedules because they have not been exposed to the necessary technical training. This is in part due to the fact that many parents do not want their sons attending vocational school because they believe it will lead them astray, making them less strict about religious matters. Vocational school students are often seen as trouble-makers. In 2014, there were 6,754 students enrolled in 33 vocational schools compared with 43,862 students in secondary schools (Ministry of Commerce and Trade 2014).

Limited access to occupational support and development. Government agencies have not been able to reach the male youth to help generate employment for them. There are a number of reasons for this:

- Most of the support schemes were of no interest to the youth.
- Access to information is limited; it is usually restricted through official channels rarely in contact with youth, such as village heads or the Tambon Administrative Office.
- Vocational support agencies tend to specialize on women or women's groups rather than on male youth because in their experience, this approach offers a higher chance of success. The male youth have limited attention spans and often do not know what they want. They also lack a sense of responsibility and enthusiasm. As recounted by one youth, *"If we want to work we won't be unemployed. Those who are without jobs are that way because they don't want to work."*

Limited access to information. Unemployed male youth have only limited access to the several channels of information on employment opportunities and capacity building. These limitations are caused by the following:

- The information is usually sent through formal channels, such as an announcement posted at government offices and on official websites or sent to community leaders, including the village head, district head and the Tambon Administrative Office. Information is rarely distributed to target groups in the communities. The male youth are usually unable or reluctant to access the formal sources of information.
- The local mechanisms used by the relevant government agencies are incapable of reaching the target groups. Many of the agencies operate mechanisms at the district level (e.g., the Labor Graduates and the Volunteer Graduates) that only coordinate with formal leaders. In many communities, youth are unaware that these mechanisms even exist. *"We never knew our district had Labor Graduates and we don't know who they are."*

In urban communities, access to official information is limited because the pace of daily life that involves going to work in the morning and coming home in the evening leaves little time for visits to government offices during operating hours.

The youth usually find out about employment opportunities through friends and acquaintances. Most jobs that are posted online require a degree, a certificate, or experience. Most of the unemployed youth have no such credentials or experience so even though some have access to the Internet, they do not usually seek employment through online sources.

Limited opportunities to join programs. Most projects work through formal leaders. Participants tend to be informed and are often the leaders' acquaintances, leaving many unemployed youth excluded.

"I have heard of projects like these and I once applied to join one, the 'Thai Khem Khaeng Project'. I did not get in because those who were selected were close to the village head."

Other vocational schemes such as *Tonkla Archeep* (vocational seedlings) and *Khlong Karn Tham Dee Mee Archeep* (to do well and gain employment) were usually provided to women's groups. Many women can more easily access to the information about projects early on, which gives them a better chance at participating.

Further, support agencies tend to directly fund projects to functioning and relatively strong groups that conduct ongoing activities—usually women's groups.

Incompatible certification. Many youth graduating from foreign schools in Muslim countries return to Thailand looking for jobs only to find that their fields of study do not align with Thai requirements. Youth with professional degrees in medicine, dentistry, or nursing from foreign universities must seek employment in Malaysia and Brunei because the Thailand Civil Service Commission does not recognize their qualifications. However, youth returning with degrees in Islam can become religious teachers in Thailand.

Gender Dimensions of the Unrest and Its Impacts

Female Muslim youth usually make continuing their studies a high priority, believing it will bring them employment opportunities and therefore higher status. They see it as a chance to break free from social oppression. While primary school enrollment rates for boys and girls are almost the same—52 and 48 percent, respectively, secondary school enrollment rates are reversed—with girls accounting for 65 percent of the student body and boys only 37 percent (Ministry of Commerce and Trade 2014). The male youth think that even if they do not pursue a higher education or find employment, their social status is secure—men are considered the leaders in Muslim culture. If the trend of women becoming more highly educated than men continues, it will surely impact male-female relationships and their respective social status and roles.

Coping Strategies

Unemployed youth in Thailand—Buddhist and Muslim—cope and manage impact of and problems associated with unemployment in a number of ways.

Mental Health Impacts

Consult with persons they trust. When an unemployed young man has a problem, he turns to someone he trusts. Youth aged 15–18 years turn to family members—fathers, mothers, or other close relatives. Youth aged 18 years and older seek advice from peers or older friends experienced in dealing with whatever difficulty is troubling them. If the issue relates to education, they might seek advice from an older friend or a teacher. If it is a work-related concern, they might consult with a friend. If the problem is very serious, the young men are likely to confer with close family and relatives for support and understanding. *"If a problem is too serious for me to cope with on my own I choose to go to my aunt to make her talk to my mother because my mother would not listen to me."*

Seek out friends to quell anxieties. When feeling anxious, the youth visit friends to talk about their fears out in the open, which calms them down. *"When I feel down I need to tell someone about it and then I feel better."*

Escape to a safe place. Some youth facing problems will go stay away from home with trusted friends in similar situations. *"When we are in a safe place and have time to think and let time pass, our troubled minds gradually calm down."*

Participate in joint activities. Youth find it helpful to gather with others for various activities; it helps them release their stress and tension. Some youth engage in constructive activities, such as raising funds for the orphans in their communities. But unfortunately, some engage in less constructive activities, such as motorcycle racing or even destructive behavior, such as gathering with friends to consume the addictive drink Krathom, which makes them feel high, temporarily relieves their tension, stress, and worries, allowing them to have a good night's sleep.

Financial Impacts

Unemployed young men depend on their parents for a daily allowance. If they are in real need, they will ask their siblings, close relatives, or friends for help. *"When asking from relatives the amount would*

be small, around 20–50 Baht. If more is needed—say 100–200 Baht—I would not quite ask directly but would do some small jobs like washing dishes or cutting grass in return for the money."

Borrow money from relatives or friends. Youth engaged in casual labor with no regular income might borrow money from close friends or relatives.

Employment Impacts

Find information on job sources. Young men employed as daily wage workers find jobs by telling others in their neighborhoods about their availability and by exchanging news with friends about any upcoming opportunities in construction, as an example. They and their friends might then go to site together to hire themselves out.

Enroll in non-formal education program. Male youth interested in earning a certificate or increasing their chances of finding employment commonly rely on non-formal education courses that allow them to work for wages and study at the same time.

Work in Malaysia. Some of the unemployed youth go to work in the informal sector in Malaysia where they can earn higher wages and find work on a daily basis. This is especially true for young men from fishing communities in border areas where jobs are scarce, including Sungai Kolok, Sungai Padee, and Tak Bai.

Create a group to develop projects for funding. Young graduates with Bachelor's Degrees sometimes form groups of like-minded people to help each other find jobs or to develop and seek funding for project ideas. This also helps to minimize surveillance by government authorities.

Youth graduating from foreign schools in Muslim countries. During the early stages of the unrest, young men returning to Thailand after studying abroad were closely watched by government officers. They had formed an Arab student alumni association to protect themselves from government surveillance. They drafted and sent proposals to the Civil Service Commission to facilitate the recognition of their degrees and they organized fund-raising efforts in support of local youth wanting to study abroad in Muslim countries.

Help and Support from Service Providers

Assistance schemes from various offices and agencies in education and skills development are mainly targeted at the general population of youth or at disadvantaged people of both sexes. No schemes exist that target unemployed male youth indirectly affected by the unrest. The assistance programs targeting youth in general are described below. See Table 6-5 for a summary of assistance for youth in general.

Educational Assistance

General education programs are provided to youth who do not participate in the regular school system. The Office of Non-Formal Education takes the lead in supporting the unemployed youth who are not in the regular school system. The office has mechanisms down to the district level, including full-time and volunteer teachers recruited from local communities. However, the general education program has not been able to entice youth from the conflict-affected areas to participate because most are not interested in learning. Coaching and follow-up activities have not been fully carried out due to the unrest. And responsible officers at the district and provincial levels are afraid to go into rural villages. These factors have led to poor performance rates in education.

Occupational Support

The provincial-level labor office is responsible for conveying information about employment opportunities. Job seekers must register themselves on the waiting list appropriate to their qualifications. The office has also organized so-called "occasional job markets" (Talad Nut Raeng Ngarn) and, together with district

offices, mobile units to recruit job seekers. However, most unemployed young men do not attend any of these activities because they lack self-confidence. They are too scared to enter government offices or even visit government mobile units in their communities. *"I feel shy to ask or to join; if I have some friends with me I may have the courage."*

Table 6-5. Summary of Help and Support from Service Providers for Youth

Type of Support	Government Sector						NGOs and CSOs				
	1	2	3	4	5	6	A	B	C	D	Other
Education											
General education for youth other than formal education		X									
Employment											
Provide employment	X										
Skilled labor development	X	X		X	X	X		X		X	
Provide employment via special programs	X										
Occupational loans	X										
Potential development and life skills improvement											
Youth potential development			X			X	X	X	X		X ¹
Set up learning centers for youth potential development							X	X			X ¹
Support organization of youth groups			X					X			
Create "neutral zone" where youth feel safe and confident											X ²

1. Provincial Labor Office
2. Office of Non-Formal Education
3. Human Resource and Welfare Office
4. Community Development Department
5. Vocational College
6. Internal Security Command

- A. Chumchon Pen Suk Foundation
- B. Suk-Kaew Kaewdang Foundation
- C. Fahsie Children's Safe House
- D. Phra Da Bot Foundation
- ¹ Social Welfare Centre Yala
- ² Ban Boon Tem

Source: From the interview which might not include all providers

Development of Skilled Labor

Short- and long-term training and development activities for skilled labor have been organized by the Provincial Labor Office, the Office of Non-Formal Education, vocational colleges, the Community Development Department, Phra Dabot Foundation, and several projects or schemes run by NGOs and CSOs. However, participation rates among unemployed male youth have been low because they are not interested in the type of skills training being offered, they would have to attend classes outside their communities and for a substantial period of time. The youth are not convinced that the training will help them earn a living and they find the process very inconvenient. In addition, the youth usually do not demonstrate much potential for entrepreneurial skills.

Examples of skills training programs offered are described below.

- The Office of Non-Formal Education organized short-term trainings, mostly suitable for women, such as candy making and mushroom cultivation—topics of no interest to young men. Technical training courses could not be offered because of a shortage of tools and equipment. The office did,

however, seek cooperation from vocational colleges, which operate 43 centers in the three border provinces, fully equipped with the needed materials. But the requirement that participants attend classes at the centers made the scheme unpopular due to the hesitancy of the youth to be outside their immediate neighborhoods.

- The Center for Skilled Labor Development (part of the Ministry of Labor) has organized short- and long-term courses on skilled labor development. Male youth accounted for only 10–20 percent of the total applicants.
- The Phra Dabot Foundation provides training in mechanics for youth on the condition that participants are not involved with drugs. The foundation partners with car repair centers in the area so that young men completing the training course will have jobs waiting for them. There have been four rounds of this project so far, each with up to 60 students. There were only a few participants in the first round and they all landed jobs upon completion of the course. By the fourth round, 58 of the 60 participants completed the course and found jobs. Applicants for the fifth round jumped to 400. This project has become hugely popular among male youth because they can see for themselves that it brings results.
- The Suk-Kaew Kaewdaeng Foundation provided vocational training to 61 youth groups in cooperation with the Office of the Vocational Education Commission. The foundation supports vocational education for youth who have organized themselves into work groups, such as the Goat Raising Group and the Coconut Milk Making Group.

Employment through Special Programs

Special employment programs implemented by the Provincial Labor Office helps generate employment based on community input provided through a public hearing process. The programs, coordinated by the Labor Graduates and implemented in conflict-affected areas, create jobs such as repairing a mosque, repainting gravestones, dredging canals, or digging ditches, as examples. However, the project only provides youth with temporary employment or extra income.

Provision of Loans to Make a Living

This scheme, based on the same principles as the national program and implemented by the Provincial Labor Office, is not popular among youth due to its complicated rules and conditions.

Potential Development and Life Skills Support

Government and nongovernment organizations alike operate programs to support and develop life skills for youth. In particular, some NGOs and CSOs have the knowledge and expertise to effectively reach the target groups. However, a lack of funding limits the implementation and continuity of the projects, some of which are listed below.

- Potential Development for Youth provides training activities, including leadership skills, media production, working in groups, project preparation, and study trips.
- Support agencies and offices include Provincial Labor Office and the Office of the Internal Security Command. NGOs and CSOs with support offices include the Suk-Kaew Kaewdaeng Foundation, Chumchon Pen Suk, the Fahsie Children's Safe House, the Surveillance Centre of the South, and the Civil Society Coordinating Centre of Yala Province, among others.
- Organizations providing learning centers that promote youth development and management skills through hands-on vocational training in fields such as alternative energy include the Suk-Kaew Kaewdaeng Foundation, Chom Chon Pen Suk Foundation, and the Civil Society Coordinating Centre.

Support the Setting up of Youth Groups

A number of organizations promote the formation of youth groups to encourage participants to work together in a constructive manner and to reduce the risk of their becoming addicted to drugs or getting involved with drug dealing or other crimes. Provincial Labor Office supports the formation of a “Children and Youth Council” in each of the three provinces. The Suk-Kaew Kaewdang Foundation has supported the formation of district-level youth groups in 141 districts and, using the local folk arts and culture as a focal point, helps set up youth organizations that are legally recognized as “Public Minded Youth Organizations of the Southern Border.” The foundation acts as a coordinating body linking the district youth organizations in the southern border provinces to one another in order to promote and develop the role of local youth in solving their own problems.

Create Safe Neutral Areas for Youth

Organizations such as the Fahsie Children's Safe House, Young Muslim Association of Thailand, the Suk-Kaew Kaewdang Foundation, Pattana Chumchon Pen Suk Foundation, and Ban Boom Tem (a mostly Buddhist youth group in Yala town) have tried to create safe neutral zones for both Buddhist and Muslim youth to use as places of refuge or to meet in groups. They also coordinate with other organizations and agencies assisting the youth.

Needs of Unemployed Youth

In general, male youth—both Buddhist and Muslim—need assistance in the areas of education, vocational support, capacity building, and life-skills development.

The Muslim youth have additional concerns about their safety because they believe that security officers are hostile to all Muslim youth, especially if they study Islam. They need to feel that justice has been served and that the bias of government officers against them is easing. One unemployed youth complains, “There should be justice in the procedures for officers and not to find us guilty on the spot. That is the case often faced by us Pondok kids.”

Educational Support

- Ease scholarship requirements to expand sources of support for youth. Student Loans Fund, as an example, set strict requirements for educational performance, cutting off opportunities for youth with relatively low grades who still want to continue their studies.
- Increase the quotas for enrollment in tertiary education so that youth in the three border provinces may have a better chance of acceptance. Currently, youth from the Deep South think their chances of being accepted at a university are very low if they have to compete with youth from other regions on the university entrance exam.
- Provide more remedial classes in schools, particularly in the Thai and English languages because the youth tend to be weak in these subjects.

Occupational Support

- Occupational support should be provided in various areas so youth can choose fields of interest to them, such as information technology, agriculture, technical skills, and craftsmanship.
- Vocational support for youth should be provided at the individual or small-group level with close friends from the same community because Muslim youth tend not to mingle with others at large gatherings and will not work in a large group for a long period. Further, establishing group rules is challenging if the participants are not already close friends.

- A participatory approach should be used to assess the occupational needs of the youth, including an evaluation of local-level demands for supplemental activities that are well suited to the specific needs of each male youth group in every locality.
- Vocational support should build on whatever previous experience and knowledge the youth have but, at the same time, should introduce new skills for those interested in having greater options.
- Vocational support of activities should be offered as a complete package, including training, study trips, and other resources—such as financial aid, equipment and tools, raw materials, work spaces, and marketing—to ensure the ultimate success of the youth. Additionally, monitoring and ongoing support activities such as advice and consultation should be conducted to strengthen the determination of the youth and to discourage them from leaving the project.
- Training activities should be intensive until the participants have acquired the necessary skills. The timing of the training should accommodate the restraint of the youth and if prolonged training is required, it should be organized in local areas—not in other provinces or in Bangkok.
- Opportunities for youth to access training activities should be expanded, including quotas for beneficiaries. Some projects have quotas as low as one youth per village and in those cases, selected youth are often connected to a network of community leaders. Further, when only one youth per village attends a training, he is unlikely to complete it, but if a group of friends attend a training together, they can help each other, share ideas, and even work together after they finish the training.

Capacity Building and Enhancing Life Skills

- Efforts to enhance the self-confidence of youth should include improving their Thai language skills and public speaking abilities. Most youth are not fluent in Thai so they lack confidence in their ability to express themselves and communicate with government agencies, limiting their opportunities for advancement.
- Activities that expand the worldview of the youth should be fostered. Muslim male youth from rural areas live in particularly closed societies, and being exposed to people outside their communities and finding ways to relate to other groups can help prepare them for the larger society outside their enclave.
- Activities organized for the youth should be fun, interesting, and entertaining. If the activities are boring, they will fail to capture their short attention spans.
- Ongoing and continuous activities should be organized where Buddhist and Muslim youth gather and get to know one another better. According to the youth, the unrest has put distance between the two groups and they have grown suspicious of one another. In some areas, the split is quite severe.
- Youth who have graduated from foreign schools in Muslim countries express the need for secure employment, including being recruited as religious teachers in schools under the government system. This would give them access to welfare benefits that would enable them to care for themselves and their families. They want private schools to provide welfare benefits similar to those of the government schools. More importantly, they want the government to stop thinking of graduates from foreign religious colleges as enemies of the state. Men under surveillance by the government find it difficult to lead safe and normal lives.

Recommendations

Providing support to male youth in Thailand's Deep South is an enormous challenge for the government and other organizations due to the current climate of unrest and evolving Muslim traditions that are adjusting to a modern world. Government policies should integrate their strategies by including men and male youth as target groups for assistance in its "provincial agendas." Budgets should be supported with efficient and consistent mechanisms. Policies and programs should be based on strategies that actually work by reaching the target youth and inspiring them to pursue their goals with a determined effort. Relevant government agencies, the private sector, NGOs, CSOs, and religious institutions should coordinate to ensure that the male youth development schemes are carried out efficiently and harmoniously.

Educational Support

- Increase opportunities to encourage as many male youth as possible to enter the formal education system—general and vocational—by promoting the value of education among the youth and their parents and by providing scholarships through tertiary education in both general and vocational fields.
- The government should impose its policy of providing special quotas for male youth in the conflict areas on local vocational education institutions to encourage potential entrepreneurs and build a skilled work force.
- Vocational education institutions should develop and standardize curricula and teaching methods in accord with local religious principles and culture, potentially fostering trust and acceptance among parents about sending their children to vocational schools.
- The quality standards of private religious schools should be raised, including consistent monitoring and evaluation.
- Schools should have alternatives to expulsion for dealing with troubled youth as expulsions cause more negative impacts on youth and could even push them into worse behavior.
- Using education as the foundation, instill the idea of mutual coexistence within a pluralistic society in the Buddhist and Muslim youth, particularly at the primary and secondary school levels when they should be learning together and finding out about each other.

Vocational Assistance and Support

- Local employment should be generated by:
 - Promotion of medium- and large-scale investments that take advantage of the supply of local raw materials, such as the *halal* industry, rubber product manufacturing, construction and building companies
 - Promote and support local people to become, medium- and large-scale entrepreneurs.
- Entrepreneurs must understand local Muslim culture and provide appropriate work environments.
- Support should be given to vocational training offering courses with short time commitments to meet the needs of men and youth who cannot enroll in the formal education system.
- Surveys and training needs assessments should be conducted before trainings are organized and so that employment support can be provided according to the needs of the men and youth.
- The selection process for male youth participation in capacity-building trainings should be conducted in a participatory fashion. The trainings should be open to all equally, including effectively promoting the trainings to youth.
- Training teams should be provided with a complete set of tools and modern training media. Training

activities should be held in the communities and should reach male youth directly in order to stimulate interest and access among the underprivileged target groups.

- Youth employment should be consistently promoted, including providing knowledge skills, capital support follow up, and management and marketing consultations.
- With regard to educational settings such as the traditional *pondok*, emphasis should be placed on life-skills training, including agricultural gardening, the raising of livestock, and animal breeding.

Potential Development and Promotion of Life Skills

- Enhance the life skills learning process by concentrating on opening up the worldviews and thinking processes of youth.
- Support the development of model areas for youth learning centers that nurture the learning process of youth as well as the development of their skills through practical training activities. This approach would allow youth to discover for themselves their real interests.
- Support the development of a model/prototype to inspire youth through a group learning process that will help them to better understand their common problems.
- A coaching system should be developed to follow-up with youth and support youth activities on a regular basis because working with youth requires trust and consistent availability.
- Creative youth groups should be supported according to their interests and needs, including cultural and social activities that help reduce stress and nurture feelings of self-worth among the youth.
- Officers dealing with youth development must integrate improved attitudes toward a new generation of youth into their routine work.
- Activities should be promoted that include Buddhist and Muslim youth learning together in the same environment on a regular basis to strengthen social interactions and mutual understanding.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

Review of Literature

Aside from a handful of reports, there is scant existing literature on how subnational conflicts affect men and male youth. A summary of recommendations taken from a number of publications that could be applicable to Thailand's Deep South are as follows.

Research

- Conduct additional research on the impact of conflict and violence on men and male youth as well as on women and on how hyper-masculine identities and gender norms contribute to factors driving violent conflict.
- Identify at-risk youth, especially in areas where there is evidence of religious or ethnic extremism.
- Foster greater understanding of sexual violence against men and boys; combat sexual violence against women, girls, men, and boys.
- Promote the exchange of lessons learned regarding the need to engage men in the peace and security agenda and raise awareness about the emerging research in this area.

Planning

- Develop, implement, and evaluate interventions that address drivers of conflict through the lens of male identities and that proactively engage men in peacebuilding and conflict prevention.
- Integrate at-risk youth into society through programs that bring together youth from both inside and outside the target group.
- Promote the idea among the youth of ownership of the programs so they can develop critical leadership skills and be able to productively collaborate with adults. Such training could include practical citizenship skills, such as public speaking, negotiation, advocacy, and budgeting.
- Develop an emergency response system to quickly address sexual and gender-based violence in post-conflict settings and ensure that it engages men as active participants in both the response and prevention components.
- Advance the understanding that paying attention to the lived experiences of men in conflict situations and seeing men as gendered beings whose lives are shaped by social norms—as are women— and does not in any way take away from the women, peace, and security agenda.
- Identify concrete ways that men can be allies in the women, peace, and security agenda by supporting women's leadership in peace negotiations and sensitizing men to gender equality agendas during the negotiations.

Implementation

- Reestablish youth-focused community-driven development programs to help create employment opportunities, connect young people with their communities, and empower them to participate in the nation-building process.
- Support education as a key intervention that provides an excellent way to introduce a daily routine and sense of purpose and order in the lives of youth; expand cash/in-kind school programs.

- The livelihood needs of male youth can best be addressed by adopting an integrated approach that combines functional literacy, life-skills training, agricultural skills development, and vocational skills training. Similarly, partnerships with the local business sector in the form of apprenticeships and mentoring will enable youth to develop the skill mix required by the labor market.
- Provide safe zones where youth can meet, network, and interact with peers, including establishing youth clubs and centers, constructing sports facilities such as basketball courts, and equipping centers with basic sports equipment.
- Support a youth-led communications program to connect youth with their communities, particularly their peers, and to strengthen informal social connections.
- Support a community justice and safety program to end impunity and reduce incentives to engage in opportunistic violent behavior. Increase the capacity of formal institutions, including police and courts, to investigate and prosecute youth violence and crime.
- Implement and evaluate programs that help men—both former combatants and civilians—construct healthy, nonviolent, and gender-equitable post-conflict identities.
- Promote men's involvement as mentors or equitable, nonviolent, and involved fathers and caregivers. This will contribute to intergenerational transfer of positive norms.
- Build capacity among local government officials, police, and service providers in peacebuilding and psychosocial skills to enable them to be sensitive to the situation faced by the youth.

Qualitative Study

The study focused on the impact of the conflict in southern Thailand on men and male youth. The findings are briefly summarized below.

Men and Youth Directly Impacted by the Conflict

Men Detained in Security Cases

Men detained in security cases have faced impacts at the individual, family, and community levels. At the individual level, the men feel that their lives are not safe, that they have lost both their dignity and their freedom to live a normal life even after they have been cleared of all charges, that they have lost their social status and roles, and that they have not received justice. Because of this, they have lost confidence in the judicial system, and the government has yet to restore their confidence. At the family level, the impacts are mainly economic, but even though conflict-affected men pay less attention to other impacts, they should not be ignored. Easing the negative impacts are critical for helping restore the normal lives of the conflict-affected men.

The role that communities and society should play in delivering care to men involved in security cases is unclear. Many play it safe and only give limited help to the detainees/former detainees and their families who try to cope with the impacts on their own by: (1) adjusting travel behaviors and activities of daily life; (2) finding temporary or permanent safe places; and (3) turning to reliable organizations for help and counseling. The detainees/former detainees usually turn to nongovernmental and civic organizations for help because they do not trust the government. For the past three years, conflict-affected men have been developing their own groups and organizations to help one other. For support dealing with psychological impacts, conflict-affected men usually turn to religion and family.

Men facing security charges receive assistance from relevant organizations in two phases. The first covers the time period when they are facing legal proceedings; the second phase begins once they are cleared of charges. During the first phase, help comes in one of two forms: (1) assistance for legal battles faced by a detainee under normal procedures; and (2) assistance for a detainee who chooses to negotiate. Each option

has its pros and its cons. Under the normal procedures, a man can receive an acquittal from a court verdict, but the process usually takes a long time, is expensive, and while underway, will cost the detainee opportunities to return to a normal life. If he is willing to negotiate, a detainee can return to his life sooner, but he will probably have to confess to a crime, and because men who negotiate are seen as pro-government, he will put himself at risk.

The second phase involves financial compensation. A payment is awarded through the Southern Border Provincial Administration Center's (SBPAC) special policy based on the time spent in detention without having committed a crime. However, these payments could be discontinued if SBPAC executives change the policy. Government and other service providers have not yet been able to comprehensively meet the needs of men involved in security cases, and this negatively affects their ability to return to normal lives.

Men and Youth on Watch Lists

Most of the men on the government watch list are religious leaders or educators, students attending religious schools, teachers at these schools, and people who completed their education abroad in a Muslim country.

At the individual level, men and youth on the government watch list report a *lack of freedom to live normal lives, living in fear, and concerns about their names remaining on the government watch list*. They say government officials continue to watch them closely even when their names have supposedly been removed from the watch list. There are also complaints *about loss of social status*, particularly among community and religious leaders. These men also face major negative economic and social impacts, especially first, but these impacts do decrease gradually over time if they are not prosecuted—impacts for men facing prosecution are more severe. The men find it difficult to join public activities because they are under the close watch of government officials all the time.

As a coping strategy, the men *prioritize the removal of their names from the watch list*. In order to feel safer, the men try to reduce government suspicion toward them by living out in the open as much as possible in their everyday lives and at special activities. If they feel threatened, they will leave the area or seek protection. For psychological support, they turn to religion and family.

Key players in the delivery of assistance to men on the watch list are civic organizations—especially the Muslim Attorney Center when in terms of preventing rights violations and the violent measures by government officials. The center has won the trust of men on the watch list and their families. SBPAC and the Alternative Volunteer Lawyers Network are also involved in providing assistance; both have sought to coordinate with relevant agencies to request that the conflict-affected men's names be removed from the government watch list. With regard to remedial actions, SBPAC's special policy has allowed compensation payments to be made to the former detainees. It is not clear what other remedial actions could ease the feeling among the conflict-affected that they are victims of government abuse.

Young Men Who Lose Family Members to the Unrest

Among the most profound impacts that young men (aged 15 to 25 years) who have lost family members to the unrest face are psychological, educational, and economic. Psychological impacts are enormous because the losses (usually of fathers) are quite sudden and happen when the survivors are too young to effectively cope with what has happened. Boys need male role models and when one is lost, the effects are long-lasting. Economic impacts stem from the loss of the family breadwinner. These financial losses create many other problems, sometimes forcing family members to live apart or sacrifice educational opportunities, which in turn negatively impacts on their future options.

These psychological, educational, and economic impacts affect young men who have lost family members to extrajudicial killings the most harshly because these youth receive no much-needed assistance. They believe they are being unfairly treated by the government and, as a result, feel hatred toward it. The government finds it hard to reach the youth in this climate of hatred. This then feeds into conditions that could encourage the youth to use violence against the state in the future.

After losing family members, most youth primarily rely on their mothers and close families to cope with what has happened. Their ability to cope depends on their age: the very young might not even be aware of the serious impacts they have suffered and must be monitored. Youth aged 15 years and older are better able to cope, and the older boys can sometimes even help their family members cope.

Assistance from the government agencies is welcomed but has been plagued with delays caused by the time required for acquiring the necessary certifications from three key agencies as well as the lack of an integrated and updated central database. Further, the government's follow-up support has been inconsistent due to the limited number of government officials and the fact that some families and communities do not trust them. Some nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have reached out to the conflict-affected families, especially those not receiving government assistance, but they have limited resources and are unable to mitigate the dissatisfaction and anti-government attitudes among the families.

Male Youth Indirectly Impacted by the Conflict

Unemployed Youth

The high rate of unemployment among young men indirectly impacted by the conflict in the Deep South include low levels of education that limit employment opportunities and the lack of jobs in their communities because the unrest has resulted in a stagnant economy. Male Muslim youth often have low education levels for reasons including a lack of fluency in the Thai language and the poor educational quality at schools in the Deep South, especially at the privately-run religious schools. Buddhist youth tend to stay in the educational system longer than their Muslim peers because most Buddhists recognize the importance of an education and parents in Buddhist families try support their children with their studies. But many Muslim families do not yet understand the importance in education and the ongoing violence is another complicating factor. In the face of unrest, unemployment persists and young men find it even harder to live normal lives. Male Muslim youth are most affected in this way because they are under constant surveillance by the security agency.

The geographic location of the homes of the youth also affects their living conditions and employment status. Most young men who live in the more isolated coastal zones have limited educational and economic opportunities compared with the young men who live in farming and urban zones.

To date, government agencies have not identified young men as a main target group for continued support. The government has no clear strategy for the development of young men and so the men do not receive adequate opportunities to continue their education and develop life skills, and this impacts their lives going forward. NGOs and civic organizations have great potential to empower youth, but much of their efforts lack clear-cut direction due to their limited resources that will not allow them to sustain their work over the long term. Many organizations have participated in delivering occupational promotion, but their efforts have been somewhat unsuccessful because they need to be more comprehensive, including the transfer of knowledge and skills, the provision of start-up capital, assistance with marketing, and setting up monitoring and evaluation systems needed for provide adequate support.

Assistance delivery efforts must be carefully conducted in a way that avoids causing any further rift between Buddhists and Muslims in the Deep South. Buddhist youth think that government agencies and other organizations focus primarily on Muslim youth, and they find this unfair because they are given fewer opportunities than their Muslim peers.

Impacts on Gender Issues

From the gender perspective, the unrest has affected both men and women. However, the public usually sees men as parties to the conflict, so when a man becomes a victim of violence due to arrest, detention, or extrajudicial killing, there is a certain amount of public acceptance. At the family and community levels, men have reduced roles as breadwinners and public participants and they have fewer social interactions in their communities in order to avoid the intense attention of the authorities. Men being prosecuted in security cases or who are on the government watch list, in particular, have had to significantly reduce their roles. As a result, they feel they have lost their social status as leaders—something very important for males in Muslim society.

Just as men have kept a low profile, women have had to take on a more public role. They shoulder additional burdens in terms of supporting families, joining community activities, and engaging in social activities in lieu of their male family members. The women face pressure from Muslim society that still does not accept women taking on leadership roles. Further, women find it impossible to fully take on a male role. They cannot, for example serve as male role models to their sons. The adjustments women have made due to the situation of unrest in the southern border provinces have widespread social impacts. Many women from conflict-affected families are now engaged in rehabilitation efforts for other victims and campaigns for greater public awareness of human rights.

Factors Related to the Delivery of Assistance to Affected Men and Youth

Both direct and indirect factors arise from the unrest that impact on the delivery of assistance to men and youth. The factors are key conditions that if improved would allow for the efficient delivery of help, potentially easing the problems and impacts faced by the conflict-affected people to the point that conditions for unrest in the region will diminish over the long term.

Direct Factors

The judicial system in the southern border provinces has failed to win the confidence of the local people, and it has not set a clear goal for pursuing justice for reconciliation. The majority of the problems of the people affected by the unrest in the southern border provinces is a reflection of a judicial system that is flawed in its structure, process, and implementation method. These shortcomings include a lack of clarity, delays in processing, and the use of normal judicial procedures for a conflict situation that is abnormal, complicated, and sensitive. The distrust of the judicial system among conflict-affected and other local people intensifies their feeling of dissatisfaction toward the government.

Remedial help has failed to efficiently rehabilitate the victims and foster trust for the government. Despite its efforts to deliver remedial help, the government has faced various constraints and failed to win the trust of the conflict-affected men and their families. Existing government mechanisms are inadequate for delivering help to the target groups in a comprehensive and efficient manner over the long term. Without this, conflict-affected men and their families will continue to feel that complete justice has not been served and that their human dignity has not been fully restored. Further, the government's remedial help does not cover all key groups of conflict-affected people. Families of men lost to extra-judicial killings, for example, are excluded, and those not receiving assistance feel discriminated against and rejected by the state.

Indirect Factors

Government agencies in the three southernmost provinces are too focused on security. As long as policies in the Deep South stay focused on security, government agencies and other organizations cannot fully address the region's problems. For example, development units concentrate their efforts in red-zone areas, in response to the government policy of using development works to drive out security threats in these areas. As a result, other communities miss out on development opportunities that they otherwise would have had. The unrest has also made it challenging for civil servants to fully function in the region due to safety concerns.

There is a growing distrust between Muslims and Buddhists. The unrest in the southern border provinces has sowed distrust between local Muslims and Buddhists. Each eyes the other with suspicion, and they have increasingly distanced themselves from one another. Out of safety concerns, most try to limit their interactions with the other group and associate only with people of the same faith. The delivery of government assistance in the region has become a sensitive issue. Buddhists, who are a minority population in the southernmost provinces, feel that they receive less help from the government than Muslims. In some areas, violence has broken out between them.

Efforts to improve the quality of life among men in the Deep South have been insufficient even though they comprise the key groups involved in the unrest. Since the start of the unrest, men in the Deep South are viewed as potential members of antigovernment groups. Therefore, government officials keep a closer watch over them than they do any other group. Inadequate attention is given to the impacts experienced by men affected by the unrest by authorities because the men are seen as being against the government. The delivery of assistance to the men is further limited by the difficulty in reaching them amidst the unrest. In addition, there has been no clear strategy for how to support the men, young men, and orphans in the Deep South in terms of quality of life, education, worldview, and life skills needed to adjust to a fast-changing society.

Media coverage and other forms of communication about the conflict have not adequately increased knowledge and understanding of the situation. Messages received by the public about the Deep South have fostered negative images of certain groups and have concentrated on violent incidents. Sometimes, the careless release of information to the public has served to deepen rifts and increase distrust. Media coverage has failed to inform a larger audience about the situation in a way that could promote a process toward peace, and it has not nudged society into an understanding that the unrest in the Deep South is an important agenda item and that it needs to play a role in calming the unrest.

Policy Recommendations

Judicial and Legal Systems

1. Strengthen the judicial and legal system with the goal of attaining reconciliation.

- *Set clear guidelines for the search, arrest and questioning of suspects.* Any action taken must be done with great caution and awareness of its sensitive nature. Evidence must be adequate before officials take any actions. Officials must inform suspects of their rights, handle their cases with transparency, and be accountable.
- *Streamline legal proceedings* to reduce impacts on suspects involved in security cases and their families.
- *Enforce laws in an equal, fair, and neutral way.* Culprits must be brought to justice regardless of whether they are members of antigovernment groups or government officials themselves. Additionally, there must be clear communication with the public in order to foster trust in the judicial system.
- *Offer reconciliatory and/or alternative justice,* referencing existing laws and institutions, particularly the Internal Security Act (Article 21) and the Public Prosecutors Organization Act (Article 21), which allow a person being prosecuted who wants to demonstrate repentance to request training or a reeducation program from the public prosecutor or judge. A public prosecutor can choose to drop the charges against the suspect. All measures in the alternative justice system should protect the rights of suspects or persons directly affected by the unrest.
- *Install mechanisms to ensure justice for conflict-affected people.* The mechanisms should be operated by the civil sector or by educational institutes with participation from representatives of

domestic and international human rights organizations whose neutrality is widely recognized and whose reputation has been widely accepted. They should help foster understanding and if suspects do not receive proper treatment during the interrogation and prosecution process, they should negotiate and mediate with government agencies.

Attitudes of Government Officials

2. Improve the attitudes of government officials.

- *Encourage positive attitudes between officials and the people of the Deep South.* Officials and people must change their attitudes and work to eliminate any biases they have. Government officials operate without bias and with sincerity to generate public confidence and trust. They should foster an understanding that all sides have to work together to solve problems. People, meanwhile, should cultivate better attitudes toward government officials and cooperate with them.
- *Create positive attitudes toward a peace-building process.* The government should boost the knowledge and understanding of and positive attitudes toward the peace-building process among officials based in the Deep South. For example, government officials should be encouraged to see the accused as “people with different opinions,” rather than as “bandits.”
- *Learn from past efforts.* The government should learn from both successful and unsuccessful past efforts in order to make improvements and prevent mistakes from recurring. Public forums should be held to encourage the exchange of opinions because the information garnered could be useful to the government going forward.

Improve Assistance and Rehabilitation

3. Increase the efficiency of remedial work by using a participatory method focused on psychological rehabilitation, the restoration of dignity for the conflict-affected people, and the revival of positive relationships among locals.

- *Develop and provide psychosocial programs for men and youth directly impacted by the conflict.*
- *Support existing social mechanisms for helping conflict-affected people,* including communities, religious institutions, the civil sector, and groups comprised of conflict-affected people. These social mechanisms should be encouraged because they can reach out to the conflict-affected people in an efficient manner and because their participation will foster a caring environment in society, which will, in turn, serve to rehabilitate the conflict-affected and revive positive relationships in their communities.
- *Pay significant attention to efforts at restoring the human dignity of the conflict-affected.* If a suspect is cleared of charges, the government should share that information with the public, especially within his community. Only when he wins back public confidence can a conflict-affected man and his family return to their normal lives and feel that their dignity has been restored.
- *Clearly communicate with conflict-affected men and their families about remedy-delivery guidelines and with the public to create mutual understanding.* The government should strictly adhere to standard guidelines for the delivery of remedial help to keep from being perceived as giving preferential treatment to certain groups.
- *Provide remedies to all conflict-affected groups,* including families of men lost to extrajudicial-killings in order to ease their sense of dissatisfaction toward the government and so they will be less likely to be lured into using violence against the state in the future.
- *Develop a central database for remedial work.* This is needed for all relevant parties to access information, deliver timely assistance to the conflict-affected, and efficiently monitor the results of the remedial work.

4. Identify men as important target group for quality-of-life support. The support should cover economic, social, and educational aspects.

Economic and Social Aspects

- *Promote comprehensive occupational support.* If a man cleared of security charges cannot return to his old job, he should get an alternative livelihood compatible with his way of life.
- *Encourage conflict-affected men to become operators of small- and medium-sized enterprises in the Deep South* by equipping them with vocational skills, entrepreneurial skills, and access to capital.
- *Help generate job opportunities for men in the Deep South* by promoting investments in large businesses well matched with the region's resource and manufacturing capacity. Work conditions should be arranged in a manner respectful of local culture and traditions. Locals should be encouraged to become entrepreneurs as well, potentially creating jobs for men who would otherwise leave in search of employment elsewhere.
- *Create forums for participation in public activities.* Men and youth should be encouraged to take part in constructive activities (e.g., religious or cultural) in response to the needs of and for the benefit of their communities. Their participation will boost their feelings of self-worth and will strengthen their community ties.

Educational Aspect

- *Promote educational opportunities for young men to maximize their access to formal general and vocational education* by generating interest among young men and their parents, providing scholarships throughout the higher levels and for graduates of both general and vocational education programs, and improving the quality and standards of religious schools as well as constantly evaluating their quality. Efforts should also be made to further develop vocational educational institutes so they can gain the confidence of and acceptance by locals. Educational institutes, including schools, should be encouraged to conduct learning activities in various dimensions. All schools should also have an alternative process in dealing with problematic students. These children should not be expelled because that will only push them further down the wrong path in life.
- *Improve Thai language ability of young Muslim men.* As men become more fluent reading, writing, and speaking Thai, they will gain confidence in their communication skills and can use it effectively in their studies.
- *Promote short vocational courses* that match the needs and interests of men who cannot participate in the formal education system.

5. Promote networking of men affected by the unrest. Conflict-affected men should be encouraged to participate in a group of other men in a similar situation and to network with other groups of men to exchange experiences, opinions, and feelings and to learn about coping strategies from others. Through such groups, the conflict-affected men are able to help one another and constantly create new opportunities for self-development. They may even be able to help others in the future.

6. Promote the learning process and life-skills development among young men.

- *Boost life skills and expand the horizons of youth* to ensure they are open-minded, inspired, committed, and energetic. The ultimate goal is to equip them with the skills they will need to live in a multicultural society and amidst the changing societal circumstances. The youth should be encouraged to learn from many sources, including learning centers, youth role models, the arts, and culture.
- *Develop leadership skills in young men* to increase their self-confidence. Learning activities could

include training or participation in constructive social and cultural activities. Mentoring coaches should be on hand to constantly monitor and evaluate the young men on a continued and serious basis.

- *Set up counseling units for children and youth.* These units should seek to develop the potential of young men who have faced numerous challenges in life so that they can enjoy better quality lives and acquire positive attitudes, becoming youth role models themselves. They can then volunteer as mentors, working with professional psychologists to help solve the problems of other youth by engaging families, schools, and communities.

7. Create an atmosphere of mutual coexistence in a multicultural society by encouraging various groups to learn about and understand the cultures of others.

- *Change attitudes of the new generation of youth toward living together in a multicultural society.* Classroom settings are the ideal focus for these efforts. Buddhist and Muslim children should sit in the same classrooms during their primary school years, giving them opportunities to learn about each other's customs and to develop ties before they hit their teen years.
- *Organize joint activities* within and between communities so participants can mutually learn from one another about their different faiths and cultures. Buddhists and Muslims, for example, should be encouraged to meet and participate in joint activities on a continued basis.
- *Allow people with different opinions to become part of the community* by encouraging them to take part in community development projects. The government must demonstrate that it is sincere toward them and that it trusts them. It must also encourage them to learn about peace, embrace education, and try to improve their quality of life. At the same time, communities should respect the rights and dignity of people who think differently. Communities should also help them to remain proud and confident by engaging them in community work.

8. Rehabilitate and strengthen communities so that they become areas of trust and take the role of caring and helping the conflict-affected people.

- *Rehabilitate and strengthen communities.* This includes empowering family institutions because when a family is strong, it can efficiently care for its members. Community unity should be also promoted. Community leaders should be united and supported by government officials who should listen to the recommendations from locals at public forums. The government and public should have channels of communication that will support the goals of understanding, reaching out to, and developing local areas. Efforts must be based on the principles of fairness, morality, and ethics.
- *Create learning space in communities.* Learning should be comprehensive but with an emphasis on providing information to communities about the legal and judicial system and human rights so they can protect their rights when facing the judicial system.
- *The government and communities must work together to develop guidelines for the care of orphans.* The care should be comprehensive and should seek to instill positive attitudes among the orphans. The government should give serious support to communities and religious institutions to deliver care to the orphans by, for example, establishing orphanages and creating networks for the care of orphans. Actions like this will pave the way for an efficient system of care for orphaned children.
- *The delivery of assistance in the southernmost provinces must be implemented carefully* since the perception among the Buddhist minority living there is that they receive less help from the government than their Muslim peers. It is important that any assistance delivered or support provided neither widen the current rift nor deepen distrust among Buddhists and Muslims in the Deep South. Mutual

coexistence must be promoted. Elements supportive of a multicultural society that existed in the region before the unrest should be revived.

Communication

9. Communication must generate knowledge and understanding of peace-building.

- *Communications must neither deepen rifts nor aggravate negative sentiments.* News coverage of incidents in the Deep South should be very carefully handled and should include well-rounded and balanced information; especially with regard to sensitive issues such as religion. The media should take care with regard to their key content and choice of words. It is not, for example, appropriate to call people whose opinions are different from the governments and who perpetuate violence as “bandits.”
- *Communication must move toward presenting balanced coverage or positive news.* The media should report on the positive aspects of the Deep South, such as its local culture and identity and its social and cultural diversity. News reports should seek to provide accurate information about the judicial process and people’s rights within the legal and judicial system so that people can protect themselves from any potential abuse by the authorities. This type of communication, in addition to encouraging nonviolent approaches to problem solving would create an atmosphere conducive to building peace.

Anchana Heemmina, 2014. "The alleged offenders against security and insurgency offenses (4): Statistics and impacts of illegal and extrajudicial murders." Deep South Watch, January 2014, [http:// www.deepsouthwatch.org](http://www.deepsouthwatch.org).

Bureau of the Budget, Ministry of Finance of Thailand, 2014. "National Budget for Problem Solution and Development of the Southern Provinces for 2004 – 2014".

Burke, A., P. Tweedie, and O. Poocharoen. 2013. "The Contested Corners of Asia: Subnational Conflict and International Development Assistance, The Case of Southern Thailand." The Asia Foundation.

Carpenter, C. 2006. "Recognizing Gender-Based Violence Against Civilian Men and Boys in Conflict Situations." *Security Dialogue* 37 (1): 83–103.

Center for Conflict Studies and Cultural Diversity (CSCD), Prince of Songkla University. 2013a. "Deep South Poll: Public Opinion Survey on Peace Process during March 21–25, 2013." Deep South Watch. <http://www.deepsouthwatch.org>.

———. 2013b. "Deep South Poll: The Attitudes of People in the Deep South Provinces to the Peace Process: Second Round, June 9–11, 2013." Deep South Watch. <http://www.deepsouthwatch.org/node/4397>.

Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers. 2008. "Child Soldiers Global Report 2008." CSUCS, London.

Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers and Justice for Peace Foundation (JPF). 2011. "Priority to Protect: Preventing Children's Association with Village Defence Militias in Southern Thailand." Joint report, Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers and JPF. <http://resourcecentre.savethechildren.se/sites/default/files/documents/3995.pdf>.

Cornwall, A. 1997. "Men, Masculinity and Gender in Development." *Gender & Development* 5(2): 8–13.

Crisis Group. 2012. "Thailand: The Evolving Conflict in the South." Crisis Group Asia Report. 241, Bangkok/Brussels.

Dwyer, L., and R. Cagoco-Guiam. 2009. "Gender and Conflict in Mindanao." The Asia Foundation, Institute for Peace and Development, and Mindanao State University.

Gienger, V. 2013. "Dying to be Men: Symposium Digs for Roots of Gender Violence." Paper presented at Men, Peace, and Security: Agents of Change Symposium, October 31, United States Institute of Peace, Washington DC. <http://www.usip.org/publications/dying-be-men-symposium-digs-roots-of-gender-violence>.

Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva. 2006. "Small Arms Survey: Unfinished Business." Oxford: Oxford University Press. <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2006/en/Small-Arms-Survey-2006-Prelims-Intro-EN.pdf>.

Human Rights Watch. 2007a. "It Was Like Suddenly My Son No Longer Existed: Enforced Disappearances in Thailand's Southern Border Provinces," Human Rights Watch 19(5). <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/thailand0307webwcover.pdf>.

———. 2007b. "No One is Safe," Human Rights Watch 19(13). <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/thailand0807.pdf>.

———. 2013a. "Thailand: New Killings in the South." Human Rights Watch, August 28. <http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/08/28/thailand-new-killings-south>.

———. 2013b. "Thailand: Still No Justice for 'Disappearance' Victims." Human Rights Watch (August 30). <http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/08/30/thailand-still-no-justice-disappearance-victims>.

Insider Peacebuilders Platform (IPP), "How Can the Peace Process Be Taken Forward?" Deep South Watch, February 28. <http://www.deepsouthwatch.org/en/node/5446>.

International Crisis Group (ICG). 2008. "Recruiting Militants in Southern Thailand." Asia Report 170, ICG, Bangkok/Brussels. http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/thailand/170_recruiting_militants_in_southern_thailand.pdf.

———. 2012. "Thailand: The Evolving Conflict in the South," Asia Report 241, ICG.

Jitpiomsri, S. 2010. "Sixth Year of the Southern Fire: Dynamics of Insurgency and Formation of the New Imagined Violence." Deep South Watch, March 10. <http://www.deepsouthwatch.org/node/730>.

———. 2011. "The Protracted Violence amidst the Unstable Political Situation after 2011 Elections." Deep South Watch, October 5. <http://www.deepsouthwatch.org/node/2343>.

———. 2013. "The New Challenge of Thailand's Security Forces in the Southern Frontiers." In *Knights of the Realm: Thailand's Military and Police, Then and Now*, edited by P. Chambers. Banglamung, Thailand: White Lotus Press.

Jitpiomsri, S. 2014. "An Inconvenient Truth about Deep South Violent Conflict: A Decade of Chaotic, Constrained Realities and Uncertain Resolution". <http://www.deepsouthwatch.org/node/5904>

Jitpiomsri, S., and A. Engvall. 2013. "A Meaningful Peace: Ramadan Ceasefire Assessment." Deep South Watch, September 9. <http://www.deepsouthwatch.org/node/4720>.

Jitpiomsri, S., and D. McCargo. 2010. "The Southern Thai Conflict Six Years on: Insurgency, Not Just Crime." *Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs* 32(2): 156–183.

Jitpiomsri, S., and R. Panjor. 2013. "Fatai kab karn ririrmsantiparb haeng duan ramadon 2557" (Southern Fire and Ramadan Peace Initiative in 2013: The Protracted Violence Must Only Be Counterbalanced by the Force of Peace). Deep South Watch. <http://www.deepsouthwatch.org>.

Jipiomsri, S., et al. 2013. "Mummong khong prachachon chaidaen tai: kwamwang nai satanakan kwamroonnraeng un youtyua tai rom-ngaosantipab" (People's Perspectives in the Deep South: 'Hope' in Violent and Protracted Situation under the Shade of 'Peace'). Deep South Watch—The Center for Conflict Studies and Cultural Diversity (CSCD), Prince of Songkla University, Pattani Campus. <http://www.deepsouthwatch.org/node/4147>.

McCargo, D. 2010. "Autonomy for Southern Thailand: Thanking the Unthinkable?" *Pacific Affairs* 83(2): 261–81.

———. 2014. "Southern Thailand: From Conflict to Negotiation?" Lowy Institute for International Policy. http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/mccargo_southern-thailand_0.pdf.

Ministry of Commerce and Trade. 2014. "Survey of Trade and Investment Confidence in Three Southern Border Provinces, Round 12." Ministry of Commerce and Trade, Thailand.

Muslim Attorney Center. 2011. "Legitimacy Watch Project on the Southernmost Provinces: Insurgency Offence Law. Muslim Attorney Center Foundation.

———. 2012. "Complaints by Families Lodged with the Muslim Attorney Center between 2004 and 30 November 2011." Muslim Attorney Center Foundation.

———. 2013. Statistics of Security Offense Cases, 2007–2013. Muslim Attorney Center Foundation.

National Statistics Office. 2011. National Rate of Enrollment in Primary and Secondary Education, National Statistics. National Statistics Office, Thailand.

Nilsson, M. 2012. *Suspect, Detainee, or Victim? A Discourse Analytical Study of Men's Vulnerability in Thailand's Deep South*. Sweden: Lund University.

Office of Private Education. n.d.. Private Education Office of Pattani, Yala, Narathivas. <http://www.opecnara.go.th>; <http://www.yalaopec.go.th>.

Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). 2011. Summary of Stakeholders Reports to the 12th Session of the Universal Periodic Review. OHCHR, United Nations, Geneva: A/HR/WG.6/12/THA/3.

Panjor, R. 2013. "Making Choice of the Future: Analyzing the Deliberation about Politics and Governance in Public Policy Forums Concerning "The Southern Border Provinces' Self-Government" (in Thai). Deep South Watch. <http://www.deepsouthwatch.org>.

Pathan, D. 2014a. "Hostage to National Politics: Thailand's Southern Peace Initiatives." Asia Peacebuilding Initiatives, January 27. <http://peacebuilding.asia/hostage-to-national-politics-thailands-southern-peace-initiatives>.

———. 2014b. "Negotiating the Future of Patani." *Patani Forum*, 72–85.

Philippines Department of Health, UNICEF, and World Food Program. 2009. "Joint Emergency Nutrition and Food Security Assessment of Conflict-Affected Internally Displaced Persons in Mindanao." UNICEF, Manila.

Piccard, S. 2011. "Masculinities and Gender-Based Violence in Conflict and Post-Conflict Settings." Essay, Peace Academy Foundation, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. <http://mirovna-akademija.org/rma/en/essays/english/47-gender/257-masculinities>.

Prince of Songkla University. 2011. "Survey of the Residents of the Three Southernmost Provinces on the Quality of Life and Economic Situation (3)." Research project funded by Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) and National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), Prince of Songkla University, Pattani Campus.

Rajendran, S., et al. 2006. "The Impact of Armed Conflict on Male Youth in Mindanao, Philippines." Community and Family Services International, World Bank, Washington, DC.

Ropers, N. 2013a. "Govt must strive to build 'positive peace' in South." *Bangkok Post*, April 29. <http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/347484/govt-must-strive-to-build-positive-peace-in-south>.

———. 2013b. *Insider Peacebuilder Platforms under the Context of Pa(t)tani Peace Process in ASEAN Context*. Deepbook, 23–41.

Sandole, D. J. 1999. *Capturing the Complexity of Conflict: Dealing with Violent Ethnic Conflicts of the Post–Cold War Era*. London: Frances Pinter.

Sivakumaran, S. 2007. *Sexual Violence Against Men in Armed Conflict*. *The European Journal of International Law* 18(2).

———. 2010. "Lost in Translation: UN Responses to Sexual Violence against Men and Boys in Situations of Armed Conflict." *International Review of the Red Cross* 92 (877).

Social Research Institute. 2006. "Political Economy and the Three Southern Provinces. Part Two." Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok.

Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC). 2013. *Annual Report*. Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre.

Streicher, R. 2011. "The Construction of Masculinities and Violence: Youth Gangs in Dili, East Timor." Center for Middle Eastern and North African Politics Working Paper 2, Freie Universität Berlin.

Theidon, K., K. Phenicie, and E. Murray. 2011. *Gender, Conflict, and Peacebuilding: State of the Field and Lessons Learned from USIP Grantmaking*. Washington DC: US Institute of Peace.

UNICEF. 2008. "Everyday Fears: A Study of Children's Perceptions of Living in the Southern Border Area of Thailand," UNICEF Thailand.

United Nations Security Council. 2014. "Children and Armed Conflict." Secretary General Report, General Assembly 68th Session, May, U.N. General Assembly Security Council.

United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 2005. "Youth and Conflict: A Toolkit for Intervention." Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, Washington DC.

Vess, J., et al. 2013. "The Other Side of Gender: Men as Critical Agents of Change." Special Report 340, United States Institute of Peace, Washington DC. <http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR340.pdf>.

World Bank. 2007. "Timor-Leste's Youth in Crisis: Situational Analysis and Policy Options." World Bank, Washington DC. http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSPContentServer/WDSP/IB/2008/05/07/000334955_20080507044213/Rendered/PDF/434800WP0ENGL1h0in0crisis01PUBLIC1.pdf.




Photo by: Mr. Charoon Thongnual
Senior photographer with The Nation newspaper.
Stationed in the three southern provinces.



Center for Conflict Studies and Cultural Diversity (CSCD)
Prince of Songkla University, Pattani Campus

181 Charoenpradit Rd., Rusamilae
Mueang, Pattani Thailand 94000

www.cscd.psu.ac.th

ISBN 978-616-271-259-3



9 786162 712593