An Inconvenient Truth about the Deep South Violent Conflict: A Decade of Chaotic, Constrained Realities and Uncertain Resolution

DeepSouthWatch's picture
Srisompob Jitpiromsri
Center for Conflict Studies and Cultural Diversity (CSCD)
Deep South Watch (DSW)
 
Violence and conflict in Thailand’s Deep South have unfolded from different factors. Central to these factors is identity politics, which is the claim to power of a particular identity, be it national, clan, religious or linguistic. For years, Thai state had drastically rearranged and transformed Patani’s elite and political structures, particularly governance, Islamic education and legal systems, into more secularized, Thai-oriented system. The violence is essentially a renewed version of the older separatist struggle of the 1960s and 1970s. How far the current groups are linked to the previous generations of insurgents remains an open question, but the root-caused problematic embodies the same dimension of conflicts between the centralized state and the resistant movements representing interests and grievances of ethnic minority, the multifaceted state-minority conflict.
 
Major characteristics of the Deep South conflict are pertinent to the defined subnational conflict, armed conflict over control of a subnational territory. In this violent conflict situation, one or many armed resistant movements had turned to apply violence in the attempt to win the contesting political authority and replace the lack of state legitimacy with self-rule governance[1]. In other words, central to the chaotic situations is ‘legitimacy deficit’ of the Thai government in the region. There will also be no resolution in the Deep South until there is trust between the people and the authorities. As an expert puts it, it is impossible to get people to accept legitimacy of state through violence or military force. The only way Thailand can address these complex political problems is to win people over, making them feel that they are participating effectively in what is going on through building the political space.[2]
 
New development, after 10 years of violence, that signifies the apparent effort for political solution ensues when, on February 28th, 2013, the Royal Thai Government represented by the National Security Council (NSC) and the most powerful resistance movement group, the National Revolutionary Front (BRN), signed a General Consensus on Peace Dialogue Process. The event came into existence with the active support of the Malaysian government, which took the function as a facilitator. Some critics said that the peace process was “starting off on the wrong foot”[3] and, because of the shaky, unsettled peace process, nevertheless identified the Deep South conflict in Thailand as the “absence of a political transition.”[4]
 
However, the voice of civil society movement on the ground still represents some optimistic connotation. The dynamic of the peace process has widened space for the discussion of contested political issues relating to the southern conflict organized by both government agencies as well as civil society groups inside and outside the southernmost region. This development has produced a constructive atmosphere for peaceful conflict resolution.[5] All things considered, it is more sensible to claim that, given the number of lives that have been lost in this terrible insurgency, any peace process is better than no peace process.[6]
 
Still Be the Protracted Conflict
 
Pattern of Southern violence over 10 years is characterized by the uncountable uncertainty and variations. It is noticeable that violence forces behind the troubled region tend to move at a constant velocity, unless acted upon by other force (s).
If the trend of violence still holds onto the same shape, it means that the local conflict and violence have long been constituted the perpetuation of conflict. From comparative experiences, many conflicts become less a matter of the original and underlying troubles, but more a matter of becoming trapped in an extended action-reaction sequence in which today’s conflict behavior by one side is a response to yesterday’s by the adversary[7].
 
On the other hand, there is “inertia” or "innate forces" inherent in conflict processes, which resisted any acceleration. After the waves of violence started in 2004 and continued trend onward, evidently, there has been no such thing as the acceleration of violence since 2008. The conflict dynamics on the ground embody the contesting forces from society and the polity that gradually contain the escalation ups and downs to a certain level. Endogenous mechanisms, thus, emerged in different formations including the peace process, the changes of government policy and the evolving movements of civil society[8].
 
Latest statistics of the Deep South unrest during 10 years from January 2004 to April 2014 showed that the total number of incidents of violence was increasing up to 14,128 with about 17,005 deaths and injuries altogether. The statistics also showed that of the 6,097 deaths, most of the preys of fatalities were Muslims with 3,583 people, approximately 58.55 percent of the deaths, while there were 2,359 Buddhist deaths, approximately 38.69 percent.  On the contrary, there were about 10,908 injuries, most of which were identified as Buddhists, about 6,462 individuals, 59.24 percent, while there were 3,475 injured Muslims, or approximately 31.86 percent. When compared with the monthly incidents of violence, the fatalities and injuries temded to be higher apparently since July 2007, as a result of large-scale military campaign to crackdown on the unrest awhile after the military coup in September 2006.
 
This had led to the severe ‘surround-and-search operations’ enforced under the provision of the martial law and the emergency decree initiated in 2005, as well as the detentions of more than 4,000 people, most of which were quickly released later. The insurgents, consequently, transformed their operational tactics to focusing on specific target, civilians and military ones, which had affected the higher casualties than frequencies of incidents, a so-called ‘qualitative violence.’[9]
 
The statistics reveals that, after 2007, the number of incidents decreased, but the remaining attacks caused a higher numbers of deaths and injuries. Consequently, the casualties of people on the ground had been constant. In terms of the pattern of violence, it is obvious that while the number of incidents differed significantly by month, the number of deaths and injuries became higher from late 2007 onwards[10]. Implication is that the outright use of security-military-approach to solve the complex political conflict could plausibly lead to both positive effect and negative boomerang effects. However, the adverse effects of military-oriented approach in the Deep South run deep if one considered about the consequences to families of the losses encompassing 30,435 people, members of the families of the demises, and 54,540 people of the families of the injuries, 85,025 people altogether[11]
 
 
 
On the other hand, the trend-line of the Deep South violence seems to vary and fluctuate in a certain way formulating distinct characteristics.  The situation was “volatile, confusing and complex, and thus there was a high chance of escalation.”
Nevertheless, like the law of physics, violent forces tend to move at a constant velocity, unless acted upon by other force (s). In recent years, the INTRINSIC COUNTER-BALANCED FORCES have also been developed; encompassing politics lead military approach of the government agencies, the human rights movements, the growing and strengthening capacity of civil society organizations, and the initiatives of peace processes[12].
 
For the security agencies on the ground, the message from their experiences over 10 years is clear that strong but delicate security reforms and a political approach should be the central strategy. Political solutions coupled with security reforms are the critical factors to gradually improve the violent situation. Political dialogue and decentralization are the keywords for a political approach that can solve the problem of legitimacy. For security reform, a crucial issue is effective coordination between civilian and military agencies in the security administration. Another plausible approach is the managed process of moving toward more professional and accountable security arrangements[13].   
 
Furthermore, the most critical factor for stabilization, if not de-escalation, of the violence after 2011 is the peace dialogue initiated in 2013. The dynamic of this peace process has widened space for the discussion of contested political issues relating to the southern conflict organized by both government agencies as well as civil society groups inside and outside the southernmost region[14]. A favorable atmosphere for peaceful conflict resolution has been constructed and implemented, which resulted in a substantial decrease in lethal violence on the ground during 40 days of Ramadan 2013. The number of dead from insurgency related violence has not been declined since the outbreak of violence in 2004 except for during this ceasefire agreement. However, the Thai Government and BRN still failed in maintaining the ceasefire throughout the 40-day period initially agreed to[15].
 
The widening space for public deliberation has also led to the formation and expansion of civil society network organizations in the Deep South provinces emerging around 2010. With the robust movement to understand genuine feelings of the local people, the CSOs has acquired the appropriated model of governance based on the local demands, the public deliberation through campaigns of about 200 forums of local communities during 2012-2013. Finding from the public discussions reveals that local people has expressed their strong orientation towards the self-governance model of administration to help support conflict resolution, 51.8 percent of the respondents preferred to variations of the election of governor[16]. The data is pertinent to the attitude survey research conducted in 2013 by Prince of Songkla University at Pattani, which found that 55 percent of the 1,870 samples were in favor of the special form of decentralization in Patani region, while only 14 percent disagreed with it[17]. Moreover, in the same survey, conducted instantaneously after a ‘General Consensus on Peace Dialogue Process,’ finding has shown that the majority of people, 67 percent, have confidence in the peace process that was going on. The progressing forces for peaceful conflict solution from below have grown vividly despite some sensible, but pessimist critics.     
 
 
 
Balancing Acts, Balancing Forces in Violent Conflict
 
Combined influence of these composite factors has been associated with the protracted, but stabilized violent trend in the Deep South region. It seems that in the treacherous currents, there exists some stabilizing forces that, in dynamic but balancing acts, could probably constrain the conflict escalation. There are three phases of conflict situation within 10 years from 2004 to 2014. The early years of violence, 4 years from January 2004 to December 2007, have seen the dramatic escalation of unrest. Patterns of violent incidents were characterized by multiple and coordinated attacks.  For example, in June 2006, there were simultaneous carpet attacks of militants in 54 spots in all 3 provinces of the Deep South, most of which involved improvised explosive devices (IEDs) with an aim to create disturbances in a variety of target areas. In August 2006, disturbances occurred in more than 122 locations in the four Deep South provinces at approximately the same time, ranging from bombings, arsons, puncture nail scatterings, and tire-burnings, and in September 2006, there were bombings of residential and tourist areas at 7 spots in the center of Songkla province’s Hat Yai city with 5 deaths and more than 60 individuals injured. In general, the average incidents of violence per month are about 160.47.
 
After the modification by the Thai government’s Southern policies in the second half of 2007, the de-escalation effects have gradually shown thereafter. The incidents of violence decreased down to a significant level and have become level off. On the other hand, de-escalatory measures using military might during that time had an effect on the frequency or number of incidents of unrest, but had no significance on the changes in the rate of deaths and injuries in each month[18]. The average incidents of violence per month since January 2008 to April 2014 are kept to about 84.53, signifying the formation of dynamic and constant patterns of violence. During this period of time, however, there exist some situation variations. From January 2008 to December 2011, the average incidents of violence were 77.29, which means that the “politics leads the military” (kanmuang nam kantahan), structural political changes or reforms to solve the problems in the long term, had some, if not complete, fruitful outcomes.
 
The government, particularly the military, had achieved some tactical successes in suppressing the insurgency and maintaining peace. In terms of operations, the number of incidents of unrest had tended to decline after late 2007. However, the use of economic development policy and civil affairs activities, as major components of the structural adjustment policy to enhance military operations, failed to achieve intended goals, specifically in terms of socio-economic development[19]. Many of chronic structural problems are here to stay for a long time. This is borne out by the latest opinion survey of the local people by Prince of Songkla University shown that the most serious problems of the communities are still the difficulties about illicit drug and substance use, unemployment, insurgency, and poverty[20].  
 
 
After 2011, there are some policy changes. The Yingluck government approved a new policy on the ‘Administration and Development of the Southern Border Provinces, 2012–2014, drafted and arranged by the National Security Council (NSC) during the Democrat-led government[21]. Out of nine objectives articulated by the new policy, the keywords are clearly stated that the government will attempt to create appropriate circumstance conducive to dialogue in order to end the conflict and ensure the participation of all concerned parties in the peace-building process. The peace dialogues were implemented through the Kuala Lumpur’s Peace Initiatives beginning from February 28, 2013.
 
Despite the challenges and internal difficulties, it is considered that the Malaysian initiative marks considerable progress on previous, closed-door talks processes[22]. Moreover, opening space policy has been paralleled to growing movements of the local civil society, which have voiced the support of all three rounds of peace dialogues in Malaysia[23]. In March and June of 2013, the opinion surveys organized by Prince of Songkla University have substantiated the rising favor of local people towards the peace process, increasing from 67 to 77 percent[24].
 
 
Meanwhile, the violence level from 2012 to 2014 appears to be increasing to certain level. The intrinsic mechanisms of violence are so dynamic, while there is “inertia” or "innate forces" inherent in conflict processes, which resisted any acceleration. As a result, since January 2012 to April 2014, the average incidents of violence per month are about 96.96. The alarming signs of the growing sophistication of the insurgency erupted on March 31, 2012, when insurgents staged the most deadly coordinated attacks in years, killing 14 people and injuring more than 100 with car bombs that targeted shoppers in Yala Province and a high-rise hotel frequented by foreign tourists in Songkhla Province.
 
There were many high-profile operations in 2012 leading up to the launch of peace process in 2013, such as the Mayo attack on July 2012, the murder of Imam Abdullateh Todir and consequent spikes of violence on November 2012, and the Bacho operation on February 2013.[25] The 40-day ceasefire agreed between the Thai National Security Council (NSC) and the BRN separatist movement had led to lower number of insurgency related deaths since the outbreak of violence in 2004, particularly in July of 2013, but later broke down as both parties seem to withdraw from the agreement leading to an escalation in violence during August[26]. The violent patterns during 2013, while the two sides were engaged in peace dialogues, have changed to the accentuation of the hard target attacks, the military, police and paramilitaries. One of the requests from the Thai authorities in the peace dialogue was that the BRN refrain from attacking the civilians and the economic communities in town areas; the request was practically responded by the BRN operatives[27]. However, in the early 2014, after the stall of peace dialogue, the trend of attack has shifted to soft targets, civilians or ordinary people, again.  
 
 
It is evident in comparative studies of the protracted violent conflict that the internal dynamic is important. ‘The protracted nature of conflicts can be a consequence of the ways these wars were fought.’ A common factor for all wars and conflicts studied is that the government side, and often the rebel side as well, engaged in widespread abuses of the civilian population, which accentuated the number of refugees, hardened the attitudes of survivors, and created difficulties for former victims to reconcile with their opponents in cases where a settlement has been reached[28]. The increasing attacks to civilians, males, females as well as child, are an alarming sign for intractable difficulties in the protracted violent conflicts.
 
To sum up, dynamics of violent conflict in the Deep South are characterized by ‘volatile, confusing and complex,’ and thus likely to be escalated. Interestingly, while the incidents of violence are indeterminate, they are loosely constrained in nature, making them peculiar. The early years of escalated violence from 2004 to 2007 were teemed with suppression, resistance, and strong enforcement of state order, to no avail, which resulted in a dramatically high level of violence. The intervention of stronger mobilization policy, pouring in the 60,000 forces, along with the de-escalatory measures, including ‘politics lead military approach,’ the special economic development programs, with some successful, had led to decreasing number of violence to a significant level. But the years from 2008 to 2011 had also seen the formation of the ‘qualitative violence,’ somewhat lower level of incidents of violence with a clearly constant level of fatalities and wounds. The violent conflict in years between 2012 and 2014 has become further dynamic. There were many conspicuous violent events, but the immanent forces for peaceful solution were also apparent. Overall, the long period of time between 2008 and 2014 is still stabilized with the average incidents of violence per month about 84.53, unexpectedly moving at the steadied level.       
 
 
Closely considering the violent timeline reveals again that violence forces tend to move at a constant velocity, unless acted upon by other force (s). The INTRINSIC COUNTER-BALANCED FORCES have been unfolded in a wobbly trend-line. Using polynomial least-squares regression[29] over the fluctuation of incidents to find the best-fitting line could represents a downward trend from 2004 to 2014, while implying a stabilized and slightly upward direction in recent months. Level of violent conflict has been alleviated through different social forces from below, military as well as political processes interpolated by the polity over 10 years to become level off and then eventually being pulled up slightly from the internal violent forces. It remains unclear if this latest ambiguous trend would formulate a U-shape, parabola projection or maintains its status in the same shape. The indeterminate projection is likely to be volatile and obscure depending on the influence of politics of the Junta-led policy for the rest of the year.
 
 
Meanwhile, another polynomial least-squares regression presents the formation of fatalities and injuries that has become stabilized, steady trend from 2004 to 2014, similarly implying a moving equilibrium of state of violence that affected the whole level of casualties. The straight, parallel line of fatalities and injuries over 10 years indicates that there exists an equilibrium line over years of violence and the intrinsic forces, both war and peace processes, have shaped composite factors pushing for stability in a moving, shaking and very dynamic manner, while exposed to varied external factors. To be sure, the equilibrium forces need to be maintained through the continuing process of building common spaces and supporting political, peace solutions.   
 
 
The Adverse Consequences
 
To alleviate the damaging impact of violence, the core concepts of the "politics lead military" approach were reconstructed by government agencies. They were the emphasis on economic development and the special plans for development of Deep South provinces, with large spending on many projects to raise the level of income and standards of living, economic revival, investment, and connecting the economy to the neighboring country, with the SBPAC as the main organ for mobilization and coordination. Over 10 years, many of government budgets were spent in the Deep South region to cope with the immediate raging emergencies. National budget for ‘problem solution and development of the southernmost provinces’ from 2004 to 2014 has reached B 206,094.440 millions, which is quite considerable amount of resources[30].
 
The peak year of budget mobilization is 2009, 27,144.91 million baths, two years after the large-scale crackdowns on Southern insurgencies and the decreasing level of violence. This means that the counter-insurgency war is costly.
 
The second largest amount of budget is supposed to be spent in 2014, 24,152.39 million baths, after the long process of peace and dialogue policy led by SBPAC ending up with the Junta-led regime. Peace is supposed to be costly as well. The question now is how the New Regime will spend the proposed budget that has been run by the SBPAC, after the abrupt reshuffle of the organization’s top leader.    
 
 
However, the use of economic development policy and civil affairs activities to cope with the adverse effects of insurgencies and enhance military operations failed to achieve intended goals. Studies in 2010, while the large amount of money had been spent for special development projects, show that although there was a high level of need for state assistance and there were positive responses towards short-term programmes such as the 4,500 baht employment project and the Graduate Volunteer programmes, as well as development in infrastructure and transportation, they clearly had little impact in terms of distribution of income or poverty reduction. State projects still lacked capacity building, and the economic development potential of the area remained unrealized. One serious indicator of social problems is illicit drug use. Abuse of illicit drugs has been widespread for years, reflecting the failures of socio-economic development in the area seen in such problems as youth unemployment[31]. In spite of the more economic development programs after 2004, economic inequalities still has been serious problem.
 
Even before the escalation of violence in 2004, provincial GDP per capita in the three provinces of the Deep South declined by around 20% relative to the overall national average and the economic inequality has continued[32]. However, when looked closely in details, the economic growth of the Deep South region is relatively adequate and fine when compared with the Southern region in recent years as a consequence of overwhelming special economic projects.
 
 
 
Inevitably, violent conflict, which is a composite political factor, has forcefully affected the economic structures of the region in terms of production and employment, particularly to the agricultural sector, which has slower growth, and industrial sector, whose growth engines are blocked by violent events. However, the growth of non-agricultural sector, in particular the public administration expenditures, has dramatically grown in recent years and, partially if not fully, become a safety-net for the overall economy not to recess or totally collapse. The Deep South economy has thus expanded gradually through the functioning of public sector's engine of economy against the backdrop of violent conflict and insurgency. Moreover, it could help the Deep South economy enduring the other adverse effect from outside, such as the impact of rising oil prices and decreasing prices of rubber products. On the other hand, the public projects still could not alleviate poverty, inequality and increasing social problems, not to mention coping the ongoing social injustice, which is widespread and worsened. In the violent situations, people are living dangerously, while socio-economic status of the Deep South provinces in general has been recurrently insecured and fragile[33]
 
Conclusion: Different Realities and Realistic Strategies
 
Almost all people of the Deep South provinces have been under varied effects of violent situation for decades. When all things considered, many are having suffering live. People from all walks of life still endure difficulties and risk their lives in the ‘volatile, confusing and complex’ situations. The helping hands from the state’s policies and projects were proved inadequate and, in many cases, scary for them. Most of ones who suffered, males, females, and kids, with all ethnic and religious backgrounds, need to survive and continue their lives for good with some forms of personal strategies. On the other hand, the Thai state is confronting serious challenges from unstable policies and organizational arrangements resulted from recurring political instability.
 
While the unfavorable political change in Bangkok has led to the growing risk for the unsecured situation in general, there is something more to seriously reconsider about the Deep South situation, its related policies and strategies. The inconvenient truth involves the unpredictable and confounded violent situation leading to protracted daily deaths and injuries with some intrinsic forces of moving and sensitive equilibrium. This has led to other challenge about the public policy management, which seems to be jumbled, unsystematic because of the varied, competing organizations and structures. Though over years, to be fair to the concerned bureaucrats, all things have been functional, if not fully effective.
 
Another difficulty concerns about the future of ongoing peace dialogues with the resistant movements, BRN, PULO, BIPP and others; How to go about bringing back peace and order to the troubled region without disrupting the balancing act going on among local social forces including active civil society networks and local leaders? The catchwords here are not only the ‘genuine democracy’, but also a ‘genuine peace.’
 
Concerning the peace talks, it is imperative that the new regime has clear idea about different understanding of the essence of the conflict and its transformation. While, in the past, the government side understood the peace dialogue first and foremost as an effort to reduce and terminate violent incidents (also called “negative peace”), the Patani-Malay movement emphasized primarily the need to acknowledge the deeper historical and political roots of the conflict and to develop an agenda for a political transformation (also called “positive peace”).
 
Reaching common understanding is immediately necessary process, which is supposed to be open to any validity claims to peaceful political solutions from all concerned parties and it should be inclusive, to be successful and satisfactory for all. Any exclusive claims teemed with one-sided opinion and attitude risk destabilizing the ongoing social and communicative processes for peace. The state of bounded violence will certainly break down.   
       
Likewise, regarding the efforts to bring about integration of public administration to facilitate implementing policy on the Deep South’s violent conflict, the policy-makers should not confound the issue about integration and effectiveness of public management with the concept about ‘unity of command and control.’ Management of Deep South policies over a decade has time-consuming evolved and developed to embrace organizational dynamics and variables like local needs, internal conflict factors, emotions, and societal influences on the policy implementation and special administrative processes. Public management in general embraces cooperative social systems and thus the unity of command is not mere solution to the subtle conflict management. The Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC) and Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) could effectively and forcefully cooperate their missions, while featuring independent entities to support the civilian-military coordination and maintain a unique structure of management for the ‘politics leads military’ approach.
 
Lastly, it is crucial and fair to keep broadening spaces for all in the Deep South provinces to take part in the conflict resolution. Structures of policy management have already been put in place, so the peace dialogues including the engagement of the Thai state, the Patani-Malay movement and the Malaysian facilitator could resume sooner or later. The Multi-Track expansion of the peace process should also be supported through open and sincere activities of civil society organizations and an infrastructure for peace support should be established.
 
 
 
Remark: This article is adjusted from a part of the commissioned research project conducted by CSCD research team submitting to World Bank Thailand.
 
 

[2] Duncan McCargo, Tearing Apart the Land: Islam and Legitimacy in Southern Thailand, Cornell University Press, 2008.
 
[3] Don Pathan, Negotiating the Future of Patani, PATANI FORUM, 2014, p. 93.
 
[4] Adam Burke, op. cit. p. 2.
 
[5] Insider Peacebuilders Platform (IPP), “How can the Peace Process Be Taken Forward?,” Deep South Watch (DSW), Retrieved on June 6, 2014, from http://www.deepsouthwatch.org/en/node/5446   
 
[6] Duncan McCargo, “Southern Thailand: From Conflict to Negotiation?,” Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2014, p. 14
 
[7] Dennis J. D. Sandole, Capturing the Complexity of Conflict: Dealing with Violent Ethnic Conflicts of the Post–Cold War Era (London: Frances Pinter, 1999), p. 201
 
[8] Srisompob Jitpiromsri and Romadan Panjor, “Faitai kab karn rirermsantiparb haeng duan ramadon 2557” (Southern Fire and Ramadan Peace Initiative in 2013: The Protracted Violence Must Only Be Counter Balanced by the Force of Peace) Deep South Watch (DSW), Retrieved on June 6, 2014, from http://www.deepsouthwatch.org/sites/default/files/dsw_analysis_-_southern_violence_and_rpi2013_th_0.pdf
[10] Srisompob Jitpiromsri and Duncan McCargo, “The Southern Thai Conflict Six Years on: Insurgency, Not Just Crime,” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, Volume 32, Number 2, August 2010, pp. 156-183.
 
[11] Estimation is based on the assumption that individual family of all casualties or the ‘affected’ involves about 5 people.
 
[12] See details of the security and political measures developed by the different governments in International Crisis Group (ICG), Thailand: The Evolving Conflict in the South, Asia Report N°241 – 11 December 2012. 
 
[13] Srisompob Jitpiromsri, “The New Challenge of Thailand’s Security Forces in the Southern Frontiers,” In Paul Chambers ed., Knights of the Realm: Thailand’s Military and Police, Then and Now, White Lotus Press, 2013, pp. 572-3.
 
[14] Insider Peacebuilders Platform (IPP), “How can the Peace Process Be Taken Forward?,” Deep South Watch (DSW), Retrieved on June 6, 2014, from http://www.deepsouthwatch.org/en/node/5446   
 
[15] Srisompob Jitpiromsri and Anders Engvall, “A Meaningful Peace: Ramadan Ceasefire Assessment,” Deep South Watch (DSW) Retrieved on June 6, 2014, from http://www.deepsouthwatch.org/node/4720
 
[16] Romadon Panjor, “Making Choice of the Future: Analyzing the Deliberation about Politics and Governance in Public Policy Forums Concerning ‘The Southern Border Provinces’ Self-Government’,” (in Thai), Deep South Watch (DSW), 2013, Retrieved on June 6, 2014, from http://www.deepsouthwatch.org/sites/default/files/200_self_governance_report.pdf; Romadon Panjor, “Disclosure of the 200-Public Forum Report on “Self-Governance”: Facing Peace Challenge from People’s Voice,” Deep South Watch (DSW), 2013, Retrieved on June 6, 2014, from http://www.deepsouthwatch.org/node/5139 ; The variations of proposed models for autonomy of the Deep South provinces can be seen in Duncan McCargo, “Autonomy for Southern Thailand: Thanking the Unthinkable?,” Pacific Affairs: Volume 83, No. 2 June 2010. Pp. 261-281.; Srisompob Jitpiromsri et al., “Tang Lueak Klang Fai Tai:  Rao Cha Yu Ruam Kan Yang Rai?” (Choices in the midst of Southern Fire: How do we live together?), Office of Reform Thailand, 2013. Retrieved on June 6, 2014, from http://www.deepsouthwatch.org/sites/default/files/issuebook_solutions_am_southern_violence_th.pdf
 
[17] Srisompob Jitpiromsri et al., “Mummong khong prachachon chaidaen tai: kwamwang nai satanakan kwamroonnraeng un youtyua tai rom-ngao santipab” (“People’s Perspectives in the Deep South: ‘Hope’ in Violent and Protracted Situation under the Shade of ‘Peace’”), The Center for Conflict Studies and Cultural Diversity (CSCD), Prince of Songkla University, Pattani Campus, 2013. Retrieved on June 8, 2014 http://www.deepsouthwatch.org/node/4147     
 
[18] Srisompob Jitpiromsri, “The Protracted Violence amidst the Unstable Political Situation after 2011 Elections,” Deep South Watch (DSW), Retrieved on June 13, 2014, http://www.deepsouthwatch.org/node/2343; See the patterns of violence in International Crisis Group (ICG), Thailand: The Evolving Conflict in the South, Asia Report N°241 – 11 December 2012.  
 
[19] Srisompob Jitpiromsri and Duncan McCargo, “The Southern Thai Conflict Six Years on: Insurgency, Not Just Crime,” op. cit., p. 165-6.
 
[20] Center for the Conflict Studies and Cultural Diversity (CSCD), Prince of Songkla University, Deep South Poll: the Attitudes of People in the Deep South Provinces to the Peace Process: Second Round, June 9-11, 2013. Sampling of 2006 people from the Deep South provinces. Retrieved on June 12, 2014 from ‘Perd pon poll chaidaentai robsong noon kanpootkui santipab perm khuen’ (New Release of the Second Round of Deep South Poll: Increasing Support for the Peace Dialogue). http://www.deepsouthwatch.org/node/4397
 
[21] Srisompob Jitpiromsri, “The New Challenge of Thailand’s Security Forces in the Southern Frontiers,” op. cit., p. 569.
 
[22] Duncan McCargo, “Southern Thailand: From Conflict to Negotiation?.”, op. cit, p.1.
 
[23] Norbert Ropers, “IPP in the Context of PPP, Insider Peacebuilder Plaforms under the Context of Pa(t)tani Peace Process,” in PPP: Pa(t)tani Peace Process in ASEAN Context, Deepbooks, 2013, pp.23-41; Norbert Ropers, “Govt must strive to build ‘positive peace’ in South,” Bangkok Post, Published: 29 Apr 2013 retrieved from http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/347484/govt-must-strive-to-build-positive-peace-in-south.
 
[24] Center for the Conflict Studies and Cultural Diversity (CSCD), Prince of Songkla University, Pattani Campus, Deep South Poll: Public Opinion Survey on Peace Process during March 21-25, 2013, op. cit; Center for the Conflict Studies and Cultural Diversity (CSCD), Prince of Songkla University, Pattani Campus, Deep South Poll: Public Opinion Survey on Peace Process during June 9-11, 2013, op. cit.
 
[25] Don Pathan, Negotiating the Future of Patani, op. cit., pp.72-85.
 
[26] Srisompob Jitpiromsri and Anders Engvall, “A Meaningful Peace: Ramadan Ceasefire Assessment,” op. cit., pp.1-4.
 
[27] Srisompob Jitpiromsri and Romadan Panjor, “Faitai kab karn rirermsantiparb haeng duan ramadon 2557,” op. cit., p.6.
 
[28] Marcus Nilsson and Joakim Kreutz, “Protracted conflicts: Issues or dynamics at stake?,” New Routes, A Journal of Peace Research and Action, 4/2010, Volume 15, pp.3-6
 
[29] Regression model is a statistical tool to find how to fit data to a straight line. But sometimes data, like the violent trends, fits better with a polynomial curve. The analysis and image of this model are produced by Excel program.  
 
[30] The statistics of budget expenditures does not include the personnel budget, the salaries and public employment. Data is collected from the Bureauof the Budget, 2014.  
 
[31] Srisompob Jitpiromsri and Duncan McCargo, “The Southern Thai Conflict Six Years on: Insurgency, Not Just Crime,” op. cit., p. 165.
 
[32] Adam Burke et al., The Contested Corners of Asia: Subnational Conflict and International Development Assistance, op. cit., p.19.
 
[33] See the general analyses of the impact from violent situation on Deep South economy in recent years in Center for Conflict Studies and Cultural Diversity, Prince of Songkla University, “The Socio-Economic Structures of the Communities in the Southern Borders Provinces of Thailand,” the research paper submitted to Southern Thailand Empowerment and Participation (STEP) Project the STEP, United Nation Development Programme (UNDP), 2012. 
 

 

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