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Muhammad Ayub Pathan

  
This piece of writing is my attempt to respond to the observation of a user by the name of  mamablues who commented at the end of my article titled “ความอ่อนด้อยเชิงยุทธวิธี” (tactical weakness, the English translation of which can be found at "Tactical Weakness", also by bkkboy06).  It is my hope that these exchanges will be useful towards solving the problem of violence in the Deep South, where I currently live and work.
 
From reading the mentioned comment, I could see that there were 3 issues. The first issue is with regard to the relationship between strategy and tactic, the second issue is the process of making national security policy for the Deep South, and the third issue is the implementation of the strategy according to the main plan of various agencies.
 
          My opinion on the 3 issues are as follow:
 

          The first issue, i.e. the relationship between strategy and tactic, mamablues proposed that historically, the solution to the problem of unrest in the Deep South greatly emphasized on military strategy and led to a large number of arrests.  So, there was a tactical victory, yet the problem of unrest could not be resolved, and there was even a tendency that the state would be defeated strategically.  Thus the direction was then changed to the strategy of "understand, outreach, and develop", which was a political strategy or the one that was familiarly referred to as politics-before-military.  However, it turned out that the old military tactic could not be used, while the new political tactic could not be realized, so this turned out to be a tactical dead-end.  Even though it is believed that through this new approach, the state will be the winner eventually, but a lot more time would be needed and it might even fall into the line of "when the nut is cooked, the saseme is already burnt" (hesitating until it's too late), and might cause the state to lose both in terms of tactic and strategy.

           On this issue, if the commanders and the field officers deeply understand the relationship between strategy and tactic, the mentioned problem would not have happened.  This is not to say that state officials, particularly the military and the police, would not understand the issue of strategy and tactic, as these issues are the basic of military science, but I would like to make a point that the issue is on the depth of understanding the conditions of the opponents and the environment.  For example, the terrain of the battle ground, the socio-psychological conditions of the local masses, cultural characteristics, perceptions, ideas, beliefs, and social establishments, as well as other necessary minor details, all of which are key components for the establishment of relationship between strategy and tactic, in order for the tactic to have a role that is dependent on the strategy and effectively serve the strategy.
 
 For example, if state officials are to use the strategy of understand, outreach, and develop, the tactic should then be divided into 3 sections: the section on creation of understanding, the section on reaching out to the people, and the section of development of the area.  The tactic in each section would have different activities.  For example, the section on creation of understanding would include educating the people through various media, e.g. the radio, television, direct meeting to create understanding, organizing meetings, develop and increase the level of people in the target group, etc.  The section on reaching out would have activities such as sharing grievances, bonding e.g. home visits, helping out the people with their problems, creation of opportunities and hope, acknowledging the living conditions and lifting the living conditions of the under-privileged.  The section on development would have activities such as infrastructure development e.g. roads, electricity, plumbing, telephone, clearing up waterways, household and community-level occupational development.  The activities in each section would all be responding to the context of "understand, outreach, develop".  In other words, activities based on these tactics would all be dependant on the strategy and serve the strategy of "understand, outreach, develop".
 
             Thus it could be seen that if the strategy and tactic have a relationship in that direction, the circumstance where there is a strategic victory but a tactical defeat, or a tactical victory but a strategic defeat, would never happen.

             The second issue is the process of new national security policy-making for the Deep South.  Making national security policy to be in accordance with the positive sentiments of the people in the Deep South is not a difficult thing, if those involved in the process does so with real intention and sincerity in solving the problem.  Policy-making in the past has not been very successful because those responsible used the method of "setting the flag", i.e. pre-determined the main issues of the policy, and the public forums of various sectors are only involved in making suggestions or additions on minor parts, but were not involved in determining the basic principles in any way.

Importantly, the process of security policy-making must pay great attention to the strategic offers of the underground movement that is countering state power at present, as these things will lead towards a direction that are most harmonized with the real conditions.  Negligence of this matter will lead to a key condition for resisting the existence [of the state - translator], whether in the form of violence or otherwise.
 

              Thus the push for implementation by the masses or civil societies was not as intense as the state sector had hoped for.  In this case, if national security policy was to receive acceptance from the local people and allow them to be a key component in the push for implementation, the policy-making process must adhere to the principle of people-centered practice in determining the issues and the methods in implementation by themselves.  To do so, state officials and relevant state agencies must keep and open mind and put 100% of their trust in the people.  The state will only serve as the mentor that provides the necessary academic knowledge and information.

 
          If this can be done, then the new security policy-making process should be successful and there definitely would be more involvement of the people.
 
            The third issue is the implementation of the strategy according to the main plan of various agencies.
 
             Implementation of the strategy by various agencies is similar to the strategic work of secuerity agencies.  The implementation process through participation from all sectors, i.e. the state sector, the private sector, and the general public, is the most important thing.  If the program according to the main plan does not receive cooperation from all sectors as it should, any activity cannot be driven towards success.
 
          
Therefore, the process of participation must be implemented seriously from the very beginning in order for all sides to think, plan, set targets, and determine the mission together and in a clear manner.  Collaboration from the beginning to the end will allow for program implementation to proceed towards the determined target.
 
 
Comment by mamablues
 
Khun Muhammad Ayub, your question is interesting because historically, the state emphasized on the military strategy, and it can be said at a certain level that the result was a tactical victory with a significantly higher arrest statistics, but it could not solve the problem, which reflected a strategic-level defeat.
 
Up until recently, under the Peacebuilding policy, the state has tried to adjust its strategy towards 'understanding, outreach, development' in order to achieve strategic victory.  It turned out that the directional framework of this policy that emphasized "politics before the military" and facilitation of justice could not be driven with the existing tactics (which emphasized on the military and could be referred to as the "hawkish" measure).  The strategy of this policy is also something that needs time and is a rather abstract concept: its success must be measured in the long term.  In other words, it is a long-term solution measure, e.g. solving the problem of injustice in the area, opening up educational opportunities, respect for differences in identity, etc.  Thus, while the result of the strategy has not yet existed, it would appear as though the state had been tactically defeated in term. 
 
Nowadays, now that the state is about to make new national security policy for the Deep South, with an emphasis on the issue that you have raised, i.e. driving and managing the policy towards implementation, including the addition of the principle of involvement of the people rather than using the state power as the core, it could be reflected that under this new policy, in the future, the people in each area will become the main core in driving policy in collaboration with local governmental agencies.  As for today, it has to be said that this new policy is only in its infancy, i.e. listening to opinions from the area.  In this aspect, I must bid you and everyone here to share their opinions and exchange information to push this policy together from the very beginning.  I have to say this because I understand the limitation of the Thai state that policies tend to be made from the capital (through hearing of opinions from seminars in hotels in the area), while the locality will only be involved when the policy principles have been made.  Thus there is no true participation.  Meanwhile, adjustment of the state structure by providing opportunities for the locality to have more policy power (or the issue of the Special Administrative Zone) is still an issue that is more progressive than what the officials and the society-at-large today is willing to listen.  This issue is the irresolute limitation of today.  However, as for this Deep South policy, I understand that the state wants it to have participation form the very beginning. If this is successful, it could be said that this is the first policy where the state and the people start together from the very beginning. 
 
So, shall I start from the issue that you have left at the end of the article?  What is your opinion? Who should be involved in the process of driving/implementation of the strategy according to the main plan of various agencies?

 

Read previous writings by Ayub

(English translation available here)